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“I interrogated a colonel during Desert Storm, an Iraqi colonel, and based on my 
understanding of his background he knew a lot about order of battle of his infantry division. 
And so I won his cooperation, we spent a lot of time talking about life in Iraq. There was a 
great deal of rapport that we developed. And at the end of asking all of the questions that I 
had, like a good interrogator you're disciplined to ask at the very end, "Is there anything else 
that you know about that I haven't asked you?"  
 
And at that point we were very interested in the location of the Scud missiles, which, you 
know, were a concern especially as they were launched on Israel at the time, which could 
have broken up the coalition. And so -- but I didn't ask that because based on his background 
we had no -- we couldn't even speculate that he would know anything about it. But because 
of the relationship, because I'd actually won his cooperation as I stood up putting my papers 
together, has asked, "Don't you want to know about the Scud missiles?"  
-Colonel Steven Kleinman 
 
 
 
 
General Abstract 
Two interviewers are often used by police and intelligence agencies, yet very little is 
known about the benefits of this approach or the best way to employ it. This thesis 
tested a two interviewer protocol to determine how the second interviewer should 
behave in order to elicit cues to deceit. Over four experiments, a second interviewer 
was employed (in various ways) in mock forensic interviews before examining the 
amount of detail and/or repetition in interviewees’ responses.  The results offered 
four key findings: First, that a supportive second interviewer can elicit cues to 
deceit, notably by encouraging truth tellers to say more. Second, the impact of a 
second interviewer can be influenced by other factors, such as unexpected questions 
and the behaviour of both interviewers. Third, the results supported previous 
research by highlighting that consistency between two accounts is an unreliable cue 
to deceit. Finally, this thesis also suggests that deliberately mimicking interviewees 
may encourage truth tellers to provide more detailed and accurate responses. One 
explanation for the observed findings is that a supportive second interviewer 
provides a source of positive feedback, reinforcing and encouraging interviewees’ 
default response strategy. The results enabled a recommendation that forensic 
interviewers adopt a supportive demeanour. More research is needed before a 
supportive second interviewer should be introduced in real life interviews. Future 
research should seek to replicate the findings presented here and test a speaking 
second interviewer. While it was not clear that a supportive second interviewer 
generated rapport, overall, this thesis provides support for a rapport based approach 
to investigative interviewing. 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction to Thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
One current focus of deception literature is eliciting cues to deceit through 
specific interventions (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). Imposing cognitive load on 
interviewees (Evans, Meissner, Michael, & Brandon, 2013), asking unexpected 
questions (Vrij et al., 2009) and introducing evidence in interviews in a strategic 
manner (Granhag, Strömwall, Willén, & Hartwig, 2012; Hartwig, Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006) are all examples of strategies that have proved 
effective in eliciting cues to deceit. The present thesis is concerned with using a 
second interviewer to elicit two cues to deceit; detail and repetition. This particular 
intervention is part of a new strategy for eliciting cues to deceit by ‘encouraging 
truth tellers to say more’. The current chapter explores the role of a second 
interviewer, as well as the impact of demeanour and rapport in investigative 
interviews. In addition, this chapter also discusses cognitive load and deception, and 
reverse order recall as a tool for eliciting cues to deceit. Finally, detail and 
consistency as cues to deceit are introduced with reference to the relevant literature.  
The second interviewer in investigative interviews. In the United 
Kingdom, the use of two interviewers in forensic interviews is common. Interviews 
with high profile suspects and juveniles are frequently conducted with more than one 
investigator (Sim & Lamb, 2012). Based on correspondence with the UK Police, a 
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second interviewer is instructed to take notes while the first interviewer focuses on 
asking the questions. It should be noted that the use of a second interviewer varies 
considerably from country to country. For example, in Belgium the second 
interviewer types what is being said.  
While a second interviewer is currently used in real life forensic interviews, 
to the author’s knowledge, no previous research has looked at how to use this extra 
interviewer effectively. Further, the use of a second interviewer is likely to vary 
considerably. This is important, as the second interviewer may impact on 
interviewees in ways that are currently not understood. There is a genuine need to 
establish a tried and tested two interviewer protocol that impacts on interviewees 
positively. 
The use of a second interviewer has been examined in employment 
interviews (Huber & Power, 1985; Kinkaid & Bright, 1957). Research testing a two 
interviewer protocol has noted three potential benefits. First, it enables one 
interviewer to focus on posing questions. Second, an extra interviewer can keep the 
interview on track and highlight areas that have been missed if the first interviewer 
strays from the line of questioning. Third, a second interviewer can act as a buffer to 
the first interviewer’s memory, filling in the gaps where appropriate. 
With regards to the second interviewer’s role in forensic interviews, this 
thesis is interested in testing variations of a two interviewer protocol, and to 
establish methods that are effective at magnifying the differences between truth 
tellers and liars. With a greater understanding of how the second interviewer can 
benefit forensic interviews, there may be some scope to offer practitioners 
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recommendations about how to use an extra interviewer. Current interview 
techniques could be informed by the research conducted in this thesis.  
Demeanour and rapport in investigative interviews. Manipulating the 
demeanour of the second interviewer may cause truth tellers and liars to behave 
differently. There are a few studies that have looked at the impact of interviewer 
demeanour on interviewees’ responses. Collins, Lincoln, and Frank (2002) examined 
the effect of three interviewer-attitude conditions, ‘rapport’, ‘abrupt’ and ‘neutral’ on 
eyewitness recall. Participants watched a 66-second videotape of a real life stimulus 
event. After viewing the tape, participants were interviewed about what they saw. 
The interview required writing a free-written narrative of the incident in question, 
and completing a structured questionnaire.  During the interviews, each of the 
different interviewer-attitude conditions was implemented according to a pre-
determined script. The conditions varied according to voice modulation, dialogue, 
body language, personalisation and name usage, as well the arrangement of furniture 
and props. In the ‘rapport’ condition, the interviewer spoke with a gentle tone, 
referred to the participant by name, adopted a more relaxed body posture, and was 
generally friendly. In the ‘abrupt’ condition, the interviewer spoke with a harsher 
tone, did not refer to the participant by name, maintained a stiff body posture, and 
appeared highly focussed on conducting the interview. In the ‘neutral’ condition, the 
interviewer adopted a neutral tone, posture, and approach. After the interview, 
participants were asked to comment on the interviewer’s behaviour. The results 
showed that participants reported having greater rapport with the interviewer in the 
‘rapport’ condition. In addition, participants recalled more correct information in the 
‘rapport’ condition than participants in the ‘abrupt’ and ‘neutral’ conditions.  
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Liden, Martin, and Parsons (1993) examined the effect of an interviewer’s 
nonverbal behaviour on applicants in mock employment interviews. Participants 
adopted the role of job applicants, each being interviewed by a confederate 
interviewer who displayed either ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ nonverbal behaviour. In the 
‘warm’ condition, the interviewer made eye contact (approximately 90% of the 
time), smiled occasionally, and faced the participant. In the ‘cold’ condition, the 
interviewer tried to avoid making eye contact, leaned back, did not smile, and did 
not face the participant. After the interviews, independent judges rated the 
participants’ verbal and nonverbal behaviour. The results revealed that participants 
who were interviewed by the ‘warm’ interviewers were rated as being more positive 
in their verbal and nonverbal behaviour. These findings support the contention that 
an interviewer can directly influence an interviewee’s behaviour (Buller & Burgoon, 
1996).  
Bain and Baxter (2000) looked at the effect of interviewer demeanour on 
interrogative suggestibility. Participants answered a series of questions as part of the 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 1 (Gudjonsson, 1997), which measures an 
individual’s susceptibility to leading questions and interrogative pressure, both of 
which can compromise the accuracy and reliability of testimony. The questions were 
posed by a confederate interviewer, who either appeared ‘friendly’ or ‘abrupt’. In the 
‘friendly’ condition, the interviewer smiled when participants entered the room, and 
reciprocated smiles from the participants during the interview. Any attempt at 
conversation made by the participants was met with a friendly response. 
Nonverbally, the interviewer leaned away from the participants, and maintained eye 
contact.  
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In the ‘abrupt’ condition, no attempt was made to be friendly from the 
moment the participant entered the room. Attempts at conversation by the participant 
were met with a limited response, and the interviewer’s main interaction revolved 
around issuing instructions in an abrupt manner. The interviewer did not smile or 
reciprocate the participants’ smiles. The interviewer’s expressions were intended to 
convey mild annoyance. Nonverbally, the interviewer leant forward towards the 
participant, but maintained eye contact as in the ‘friendly’ condition. The results 
showed that participants interviewed by the ‘abrupt’ interviewer scored significantly 
higher on measures of shift and suggestibility.  
All of the above experiments used participants that played a role comparable 
to truth telling witnesses. In all cases, a friendly interviewer had a positive impact on 
interviewees’ responses, or at least did not have a negative impact. The present 
thesis explores the impact of second interviewer demeanour (being positive, neutral, 
or negative) on interviewees’ responses, specifically in terms of detail and repetition. 
With this in mind, one aim of this thesis is to determine how a second interviewer 
should behave in forensic interviews in order to differentiate truth tellers and liars.   
Cognitive load and reverse order recall. Lying is thought to demand a lot 
of our finite mental resources, as it involves completing several complex tasks 
simultaneously (DePaulo et al., 2003; Mann & Vrij, 2006; Vrij, 2008; Zuckerman et 
al., 1981). Indeed, research suggests that lying can be more cognitively demanding 
than telling the truth (Vrij et al., 2012). One instruction that is believed to increase 
cognitive load is reverse order recall (ROR), which involves repeating a previous 
account in reverse chronological order. This instruction originates from the cognitive 
interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992), where it is used as a memory enhancing 
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technique in interviews with witnesses. If lying does impact heavily on working 
memory and speed of processing (Bond, 2012), then ROR may be very difficult for 
liars, as it involves retrieving real and imagined data from long term memory into 
working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). In addition, ROR conflicts with our 
real world knowledge of temporal sequence (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Munte, Schiltz, 
& Kutas, 1998; Kahana, 1996), and makes it more difficult to reconstruct the event 
from a schema (Geiselman & Callot, 1990). ROR has been tested successfully in 
deception research (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012) and in the 
field (Evans, Houston, & Meissner, 2012; Zimmerman, Veinott, Meissner, Fallon, & 
Mueller, 2010). In addition to increasing cognitive load, ROR may also be effective 
because it is likely not anticipated. The benefits of asking unanticipated questions 
have been noted (DePaulo et al., 2003; Mann et al., 2013; Vrij et al., 2008), 
particularly with regard to detail as a cue to deceit.  
The presence of a second interviewer, combined with ROR, may result in 
more deceptive leakage by further increasing cognitive load. Liars are known to 
monitor their target for any sign that they are being believed (Buller & Burgoon, 
1996), and therefore having to monitor two targets may make the task more difficult. 
Going one step further, the second interviewer’s demeanour could accentuate any 
verbal differences (or give rise to differences that otherwise would not have 
emerged) in truth tellers and liars.  
To summarise, this thesis uses ROR in the hope that it will further magnify 
the differences between truth tellers and liars in terms of the detail of their accounts. 
A more typical approach could be to simply compare two normal order responses. 
However, ROR is a tried and tested method for eliciting detail as a cue to deceit, and 
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this thesis will aim to build on previous research by providing more evidence that 
this instruction can be used effectively in suspect interviews.  
 Detail as a cue to deceit. With regards to verbal cues to deceit, research 
suggests that truth tellers are more detailed than liars in mock forensic interviews 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2005). One way in which a second interviewer may be 
useful in forensic interviews is by encouraging truth tellers to say more. Indeed, the 
core goal of investigative interviewing is to elicit detailed information from 
interviewees (Fisher, 2010). It is beneficial for truth tellers to say more because the 
more interviewees say, the more likely it is that they will be believed (Bell & Loftus, 
1989; Johnson, 2006; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Encouraging liars to 
say more is likely to be a much harder task. Liars can sometimes lack the 
imagination to conjure up new information (Köhnken, 1996, 2004). In addition, liars 
know that investigators verify their responses, and so may be discouraged from 
providing new information (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Masip & Ces, 
2011; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012a, 2012b). Therefore, methods that encourage 
interviewees to say more may result in truth tellers (but not liars) providing 
additional detail. With this in mind, the second aim of this thesis is to define ways in 
which a second interviewer encourages truth tellers to say more.  
Consistency as a cue to deceit. As part of an investigation, a suspect may be 
required to provide two accounts of the same incident on two separate occasions. 
Repetition is one of four measures of consistency across accounts, and a high level 
of repetition between two accounts indicates few contradictions, commissions, and 
omissions (note that this thesis focuses solely repetition as a measure of consistency, 
though strictly speaking, the term ‘consistency’ refers to repetitions, contradictions, 
15 
 
commissions, and omissions combined. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, 
repetition as a cue to deceit is considered a reflection of consistency as a cue to 
deceit. Where appropriate, a distinction between ‘repetition’ and ‘consistency’ has 
been made). It is reasonable then to expect truthful accounts to be highly repetitive, 
however, this is not always the case (Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2013). Granhag and 
Strömwall (1999) suggested that truth tellers and liars use different retrieval 
strategies when recalling an event a second time. Strömwall (1999) argues that truth 
tellers reconstruct the incident in question from their memory, while liars tend to 
repeat what they said in their first statement. Note that reconstructing an event for a 
second time can result in new details emerging, and details being remembered 
differently. The end result of these two different strategies is that truth tellers may 
repeat themselves less than liars, and ultimately appear less credible.  
 It is clear that factors other than veracity can influence how an interviewee 
responds when repeating a story. The third aim of this thesis is to use a second 
interviewer to learn more about repetition as a cue to deceit, and potentially identify 
situations where truth tellers repeat themselves less than. Knowing when repetition 
between two accounts indicates deceit or not would be invaluable information, and 
may help investigators to make correct veracity judgements.   
1.2 Thesis Outline 
This thesis consists of the following four chapters: 
Chapter 2:  Experiment 1: Repetition in reverse order recollections: Using two 
interviewers to evoke cues to deceit 
16 
 
Chapter 2 starts by explaining how a second interviewer is used in forensic 
interviews, and the proposed benefits of a second interviewer, based on research in 
employment interviews. Next, the complex relationship between consistency and 
deception is dissected. The chapter then focusses on the experiment, which involved 
participants being interviewed by two interviewers about their journey to work. Of 
the two interviewers, the first interview did all the talking and remained neutral, 
while the second interviewer remained silent, and adopted a different demeanour in 
each interview (either supportive, neutral, or suspicious). The main findings were 
that when the second interviewer was supportive, truth tellers repeated themselves 
less than liars. The findings also indicated that the reverse order instruction was not 
anticipated by participants. From these findings, the author recommends forensic 
interviewers to display a supportive demeanour. The chapter concludes by stating 
that a second supportive interviewer can differentiate truth tellers and liars by 
eliciting repetition as a cue to deceit.  
Chapter 3:  Experiment 2: Expect the unexpected? Variations in question 
type elicit cues to deception in joint interviewer contexts. 
Chapter 3 starts by introducing how a second interviewer is used in police 
and intelligence settings, as well as previous research examining the impact of a 
second interviewer. Next, the chapter discusses how a supportive second interviewer 
may affect truth tellers’ and liars’ responses to unexpected questions, and how 
reverse order recall may impact on the use of temporal connectives. The experiment 
is then introduced, detailing the different tasks that truth tellers and liars completed, 
and the subsequent interview, which required participants to describe how they 
prepared a room for a seminar. In the interview, the first interviewer asked all the 
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questions, and the second interviewer remained silent. However, both interviewers 
behaved either neutral or supportive in each interview. The main findings were that 
when the second interviewer was supportive, the difference in detail resulting from 
the expected and unexpected questions was significantly larger for liars than for 
truth tellers. In addition, truth tellers used the temporal connective ‘before that’ more 
than liars. The chapter concludes by stating that a second supportive interviewer 
magnifies the differences between truth tellers and liars in terms of their responses to 
expected and unexpected questions. The recommendation for forensic interviewers 
to adopt a supportive demeanour is repeated.  
Chapter 4: Experiment 3a: ‘We’ll take it from here’: The effect of changing 
interviewers in information gathering interviews. 
Chapter 4 commences by introducing the reverse order instruction in 
interviews, and how the changing of interviewers may impact on truth tellers’ and 
liars’ responses. Next, the author describes the experiment in which truth tellers and 
liars attended a meeting before being interviewed by two interviewers. The two 
interviewers that commenced the interview either remained throughout or were 
substituted half-way through by two new interviewers. In Experiment 3a (and 
Experiment 3b, which is derived from the same data set), interviewer demeanour 
was fixed; the first interviewer appeared neutral in all interviews and the second 
(and silent) interviewer behaved supportively in all interviews. The main findings 
were that when the interviewers changed, truth tellers were more detailed and 
repeated themselves more than liars. These findings indicated that a change in 
interviewers weakens liars’ tendency to repeat themselves, shedding new light on the 
deception/consistency debate. In addition, the chapter describes how the 
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experimental manipulation compliments a new approach in deception research: 
encouraging truth tellers to say more.  
Chapter 5: Experiment 3b: Mimicry and investigative interviewing: Using 
deliberate mimicry to elicit information and cues to deceit. 
Chapter 5 starts by introducing the various strategies for eliciting cues to 
deceit, and the relevant literature related to mimicry and social interaction. Next the 
chapter details how participants attended a meeting before being interviewed by two 
interviewers. During half the interviews, the second interviewer deliberately 
mimicked interviewees’ postural behaviour. While the effect of the mimicry 
manipulation was small, there were two main findings. First, when the interviewees 
were mimicked, truth tellers gave more detailed responses in the interview, and liars 
volunteered significantly less accurate information in their responses. The finding 
that truth tellers were more detailed was explained by the cooperation and 
compliance that can result from mimicry. No explanation was offered for the finding 
that liars gave less accurate information given the lack of a clear rationale. The 
chapter concludes by stating that deliberate mimicry may be a useful strategy in 
investigative interviews. 
 Chapter 6: Experiment 4: Examining repetition as a cue to deceit in 
reverse order accounts: A deception detection study. 
 Chapter 6 starts by examining the relevant literature related to deception 
detection efficiency, and the reasons why judges struggle to detect deceit. The 
introduction also discusses the impact of reverse order recall on cognitive load, and 
eliciting consistency as a cue to deceit. The experiment is then described, explaining 
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how half of the sample were instructed to look for repetition in the extracts they 
read, before making a veracity judgement. The instruction appeared to have no effect 
on judges’ accuracy. The results did show that the control group cited consistency as 
a cue to deceit, despite not being instructed to look for it. The focus then shifts to the 
insight gained into laypersons’ understanding of deception, before examining the 
study’s limitations. The chapter concludes by offering some recommendations for 
future studies of deception detection. 
 Chapter 7: General Discussion 
 First, the final chapter summarises the main findings with reference to relevant 
theory. Next, the chapter examines the practical implications of the findings, with 
respect to the following topics: the second interviewer in investigative interviews; 
supportive interviewing; and encouraging interviewers to say more. Finally, the 
chapter offers recommendations for future research and explores the limitations of 
the methodologies used.  
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Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
Repetition in reverse order recollections: Using two 
interviewers to evoke cues to deceit 
Foreword 
The author of this thesis was the third author in Mann et al. (2013), which examined 
the effect of second interviewer demeanour on detail as cue to deceit. Experiment 1 
shares some extracts from the Mann et al. paper, and the findings are derived from 
the same data set. However, much of the following chapter is novel, as are the 
findings. 
Abstract 
 
This study examined the effect of manipulating a second interviewer’s demeanour 
on repetition as a cue to deceit. It was predicted that a supportive interviewer would 
differentiate truth tellers and liars by encouraging liars’ strategy of repeating 
themselves. Participants (N = 126) appeared before two interviewers: The first 
interviewer asked all the questions and the second remained silent. The second 
interviewer exhibited either a supportive, neutral or suspicious demeanour. 
Participants recalled their journey to work first in normal chronological order. Later 
in the interview, participants recalled the same journey but in reverse chronological 
order. In the reverse order responses, truth tellers repeated themselves less than liars, 
but only when the second interviewer was supportive. A supportive second 
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interviewer has a positive effect on interviewing. This finding is discussed with 
reference to the literature on consistency and investigative interviewing.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In many countries, police frequently conduct suspect interviews with two 
interviewers, particularly for more serious crimes. For example, research suggests 
that 68% of interviews with juvenile suspects in the UK are conducted with more 
than one investigator (Sim & Lamb, 2012). A UK Police Interview Trainer revealed 
that when two interviewers are used, one interviewer tends to do the talking while 
the second interviewer generally remains silent, sometimes taking notes. Suspect 
interviews in human intelligence settings are also frequently carried out with two 
interviewers (Soufan, 2011). Research on using pairs of interviewers, carried out in a 
non-police context, cite three advantages of a two interviewer protocol (Huber & 
Power, 1985; Kincaid & Bright, 1957). First, it is efficient as one interviewer can 
engage in conversation while the other can concentrate on recording answers 
accurately and completely. Second, when the interview becomes unstructured or 
when the first interviewer vigorously pursues one train of thought, a second 
interviewer can pick up on points missed by the first interviewer. Third, when 
analysing the interviews, the second interviewer can help the first interviewer recall 
what was said or what happened. The question addressed in the present experiment 
is which demeanour (being supportive, neutral or suspicious) should the second 
interviewer adopt to maximise verbal differences between truthful and deceptive 
suspects? The second interviewer’s demeanour was manipulated, as the second 
interviewer’s demeanour is probably easier to manipulate in real life than the first 
interviewer’s demeanour. Displaying a demeanour requires concentration and 
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cognitive effort, and the first interviewer may lack mental resources for this as he or 
she has to focus on the interview (Patterson, 1995).  
The present study adopts the same methodology as Mann et al. (2013). 
Participants were asked to describe their journey to work on two occasions during an 
interview. In the first instance, participants described their journey to work in normal 
chronological order. In the second instance, participants described the same journey, 
but this time in reverse chronological order (therefore, participants were asked to 
provide the same information they had provided in the first instance, except in 
reverse order). Previous research shows that the reverse order recall (ROR) can elicit 
detail as a cue to deceit, perhaps by increasing cognitive load (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, 
Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012). ROR exists in the current study as an artefact of the 
Mann et al. (2013) publication, and therefore no examination of its impact on 
cognitive load or the amount of details provided is conducted.  
After the interview, participants’ normal and reverse order accounts were 
compared to see how consistent they were. Consistency is measured by comparing 
two accounts of the same incident, and looking for evidence of repetition, 
contradictions, commissions, and omissions. Consistency is frequently cited by 
judges as a reason for discrediting another human being (Brewer, Potter, Fisher, 
Bond, & Lusczc, 1999; Granhag & Strömwall, 2000; Strömwall, Granhag, & 
Jonsson, 2003). However, consistency is not a reliable indicator of deceit (see Vrij, 
Leins & Fisher, 2013). The relationship between consistency and deception is 
complex, and truth tellers can appear less consistent than liars. Truth tellers and liars 
adopt different approaches to recalling an event. When the same event is recalled for 
a second time, truth tellers ‘reconstruct’ what actually happened, which can result in 
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new details emerging and/or some details being remembered differently. When liars 
describe an event a second time, they tend to repeat their prepared story, which can 
result in them appearing more consistent than truth tellers (Granhag & Strömwall, 
1999).  
Having a supportive interviewer present may differentiate truth tellers and 
liars by the amount of repetition in their reverse order responses. A supportive 
interviewer may result in truth tellers repeating themselves less than liars for a few 
reasons. First, liars’ tendency to repeat themselves in a second recollection may be 
enhanced by a supportive interviewer. The positive nonverbal responses displayed 
by the supportive interviewer may cause liars to think that they are being believed. If 
liars adopt the ‘repeat’ strategy and believe they are convincing the interviewer, then 
this may encourage and strengthen the use of this strategy. Second, liars are less 
likely to add new information at a second recollection, as adding new details 
increases the risk of those details being falsified (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 
2007; Masip & Ces, 2011; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012a, 2012b), and liars 
sometimes find it difficult to come up with new information that sounds plausible 
(Köhnken, 1996, 2004; Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 2015). Finally, 
truth tellers are more likely to add new information in a second account, as their 
recall strategy can give rise to new details. In light of these factors, it was predicted 
that when the second interviewer was supportive, truth tellers would repeat 
themselves less than liars in the reverse order responses (Hypothesis 1).  
The current study also examines whether the reverse order instruction is 
unexpected (see Vrij, Leal, Mann & Fisher, 2012). One of the obvious benefits of 
asking unexpected questions is that liars cannot prepare for them, and spontaneous 
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lies are more likely to contain cues to deceit (DePaulo et al. 2003). While ROR 
originates from a widely used interview protocol aimed at eliciting new details from 
witnesses (the Cognitive Interview, Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) and has been applied 
in interviews with suspects in deception research (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Leal, Mann, 
& Fisher, 2012) and in the field (Evans, Houston, & Meissner, 2012; Zimmerman, 
Veinott, Meissner, Fallon, & Mueller, 2010), it is unlikely that participants 
(undergraduates and members of staff, many of whom will not have been exposed to 
ROR in studies of deception) in this experiment will expect such an instruction. 
Participants in the present study were asked prior to the interview what questions 
they anticipated being asked. It was predicted that no participants would expect any 
questions demanding a response in reverse chronological order (Hypothesis 2). The 
most frequently expected questions relating to issues about work were also explored.  
2.2 Method 
Participants  
The 126 participants (43 males and 83 females) were undergraduate students and 
university staff. Their average age was M = 26.73 years (SD = 10.81 years). The 
truth tellers (N = 64) had 34 different professions, with sales assistant (N = 6) and 
administrator (N = 4) the most frequently cited. Other occupations belonging to 
more than one truth telling participant included bar tender, cashier, teaching 
assistant, waiter, football referee, delivery driver and support worker. The jobs that 
liars pretended to have during the interview matched those of truth tellers. 
Design 
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The experiment adopted a 2 (Veracity: truth (N = 64) vs lie (N = 62)) X 3 
(Demeanour: neutral (N = 42) vs suspicious (N = 42) vs supportive (N = 42)) 
between-subjects design, with repetition in the reverse order responses as the 
dependent variable.  
  
Procedure  
Participants were recruited via advertising posters and an announcement on the 
university intranet. The advertisements asked for volunteers to take part in a study 
called ‘Lie for a living’. They were told that the study would take about 30-45 
minutes, that they would be interviewed about their real or a pretend job, and that 
they could receive a £5 cash reward for taking part. The first 126 people that 
responded via email (consisting of university administrative staff, academic staff and 
students) acted as participants in the experiment. First they were asked (via email) 
which job they had. Then they were sent (again via email) a list of 21 different jobs 
and were asked to indicate how much they knew about each of them (on rating 
scales ranging from [1] ‘Very little’ to [7] ‘A lot’). The participants were allocated 
randomly via email to the truth telling (N = 64) and lying (N = 62) condition. It is a 
common procedure in deception research to allocate participants to a lie condition 
rather than give participants the choice to lie. In many ways this also reflects real 
life. In many situations people do not lie out of free choice, but out of necessity 
when asked about their actions (e.g., criminal acts, cheating on partners) they want 
to keep secret. The truth tellers were informed that they would be interviewed about 
their job. The liars were told that their task would be to pretend to have a job during 
the interview they did not actually have. Participants were emailed about the job 
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they should pretend to have, and this decision was based on the selection list they 
had returned. Participants were always allocated a job that they claimed to have little 
knowledge of (a score of 2 or 3 on the selection form). An appointment was then 
made with the participant to attend the interview in the Psychology Department.  
Each participant was given sufficient time to prepare themselves for the interview (at 
least three days). In order to motivate them to be convincing, participants were 
informed that they would receive a £5 cash reward if the interviewer actually 
believed them.  
On arrival in the Psychology Department the participants were greeted by the 
experimenter, and asked to sign an informed consent form. The truth tellers were 
reminded that they were to answer the questions truthfully and the liars were 
reminded which occupation they should pretend to have during the interview. All 
participants said that they understood the instructions, and all liars said that they 
remembered which job they had been given to lie about a few days earlier (a check 
of the transcripts revealed that all truth tellers discussed their actual job and that all 
liars discussed their assigned pretend job). Before being interviewed, the participants 
completed a pre-interview questionnaire which asked what questions they 
anticipated being asked in the interview. Participants could write as many questions 
as they liked.  
The participants were then brought to the interview room where two 
interviewers were present. After introducing themselves the interview commenced. 
The first (female) interviewer asked all the questions and the second (male) 
interviewer remained silent throughout the interview. The interviewees were not told 
beforehand about this task division between the two interviewers, neither were they 
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given an explanation about it during or after the interview. The interview consisted 
of 16 questions relating to the participant’s occupation. For the purposes of this 
thesis, only questions 5 and 15 are included (the complete interview schedule has 
been included in Appendix 1). Question 5 required participants to describe their 
journey from home to work in normal chronological order: ‘Can you describe in 
detail how you get from home to work?’ Question 15 required participants to 
describe their journey from home to work in reverse chronological order: ‘Can you 
describe in detail how you get from your work to home? To clarify, I’d now like you 
to recall your journey from home to work in reverse chronological order. Therefore, 
starting from your work, I’d like you to work backwards and explain the journey in 
reverse order.’   
In the supportive condition (N = 42) the second interviewer nodded his head 
throughout the interview, smiled and sat with an open posture. In the suspicious 
condition (N = 42) he frowned, shook his head slightly, raised his eyebrows and 
showed a more closed posture. In the neutral condition (N = 42) he kept an open 
posture but tried to not react in any way to the participant’s responses. 
The first interviewer was instructed to remain neutral in all interviews. To 
check whether she was successful in doing this, an independent coder judged the 
first interviewer’s demeanour in all interviews by watching the videotapes. The 
coder could only see the first interviewer and was blind to the experimental 
conditions and research hypothesis. The coder rated how suspicious the first 
interviewer was (on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from [1] ‘Very suspicious’ to 
[7] ‘Very trusting’) and how supportive (on a seven-point scale ranging from [1] 
‘Very unsupportive’ and [7] ‘Very supportive’). The two variables correlated with 
28 
 
each other (r = .45) and were clustered into one ‘appearance’ index. A 2 (Veracity) 
X 3 (Demeanour) ANOVA with appearance as the dependent variable revealed no 
significant effects for Veracity, F(1, 120) <.01, p = 956, for Demeanour, F(1, 120) = 
2.12, p = .125 or for Veracity X Demeanour, F(1, 120) = .48, p = 617. This indicates 
that the first interviewer’s appearance was constant throughout the experimental 
conditions. The grand mean score was M = 4.54 (SD = .51) on a seven-point Likert 
scale indicating that the first interviewer indeed succeeded in displaying a neutral 
appearance. A manipulation check of the second interviewer is included in the 
Results section. 
The truthful (M = 678.67 seconds, SD = 215.94) and deceptive (M = 653.69, 
SD = 214.63) interviews were of similar length, F(1, 119) = .44, p = .510. Second 
interviewer demeanour had no effect on the length of the interviews (Demeanour, 
F(2, 119) = .42, p = .655, Veracity X Demeanour, F(2, 119) = .01, p = .986). The 
interviews were video and audiotaped and the audiotapes were subsequently 
transcribed. 
After the interview, the participants completed a post-interview questionnaire 
measuring motivation, impression of the second interviewer (manipulation check) 
and cognitive load. To measure motivation, the participants were asked to what 
extent they were motivated to perform well (on a five-point scale ranging from [1] 
‘Not at all’ to [5] ‘Very much’). The participants’ impression of the interviewer was 
measured with three questions. The participants were asked to indicate whether the 
second interviewer was [1] ‘Suspicious’ – [7] ‘Trusting’; [1] ‘Unsupportive’ – [7] 
‘Supportive’; and [1] ‘Negative’ – [7] ‘Positive’. The questions were clustered into 
one ‘supportive’ index (Cronbach’s alpha = .84, inter-item correlations r > .675). 
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Cognitive load was measured with three questions: (1) ‘I felt that the interview 
required a lot of thinking’, (2) ‘I felt that the interview was mentally difficult’ and 
(3) ‘I had to concentrate a lot during the interview’. Again, answers were given on 
seven-point Likert scales ranging from [1] ‘Disagree’ to [7] ‘Agree’, and the 
questions were clustered into one ‘cognitive load’ index (Cronbach’s alpha = .82, 
inter-item correlations r > .595). 
After the participants completed the questionnaire they were thanked and 
debriefed. For ethical reasons, all participants were told that the interviewers had 
believed them and received a £5 cash reward. 
Coding  
A coder blind to the hypothesis and experimental conditions read the transcripts and 
subjectively rated the amount of repetition between the normal and reverse order 
responses. Repetition was rated on a seven-point Likert scale rating from [1] ‘No 
repetition’ to [7] ‘Complete repetition’. A second coder, also blind to the hypothesis 
and experimental condition also rated the amount of repetition between the normal 
and reverse order responses. The inter-rater reliability between the two coders for 
overlap (r = .61) was satisfactory.  
 
2.3 Results 
Manipulation Checks.  
 Motivation and Impression of Second Interviewer. The participants were 
motivated to do well in the interview (M = 4.18, SD = .70). In fact, 48% of the 
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participants reported to be motivated (score of 4) and 34% to be very motivated 
(score of 5) to do well in the interview, whereas the remaining 18% were ‘neutral’ 
(score of 3). A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Demeanour) ANOVA revealed that truth tellers 
were more motivated (M = 4.35, SD = .65) than liars (M = 4.00, SD = .70), F(1, 119) 
= 8.11, p = .005, eta2 = .06, but even among the liars, 76% indicated that they were 
(very) motivated to do well. Neither the Demeanour main effect, F(2, 119) = 1.24, p 
= .292, nor the Veracity X Demeanour interaction effect, F(2, 120) = .44, p = .644 
was significant for motivation. 
 A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Demeanour) ANOVA with the impression the second 
interviewer made on the participants as dependent variable revealed a significant 
Demeanour effect, F(2, 120) = 59.00, p < .001, eta2 = .50. Post-hoc tests revealed 
that the second interviewer was perceived as most supportive in the supportive 
condition (M = 5.32, SD = 1.0), followed by the neutral (M = 3.56, SD = 1.0) and 
suspicious (M = 3.06, SD = .94) conditions. Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that the 
supportive condition differed significantly from the neutral and supportive 
conditions (p < .001) and that the neutral and suspicious conditions also differed 
significantly from each other, p = .032 (one-tailed), all d’s > .52. The Veracity main 
effect, F(1, 120) = <.01, p = .999, and the Veracity X Demeanour interaction effect, 
F(2, 120) = .17, p = .842, were not significant.  
Hypothesis Testing.  
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 Repetition. A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Demeanour) ANCOVA1 was conducted with 
ratings of repetition in the reverse order responses as the dependent variable. The 
Veracity main effect, Demeanour mean effect, and Veracity X Demeanour 
interaction effect were all non-significant (all Fs <3.31, all ps >.071, with .071 being 
the p value for the Veracity main effect). However, the pattern of results appeared to 
support Hypothesis 1, as truth tellers (M = 3.92, SD = 1.34) repeated themselves less 
than liars (M = 4.75, SD = .91) when the second interviewer was supportive, and the 
greatest differences emerged in this condition compared to the neutral and 
suspicious conditions (truth tellers (M = 4.48, SD = 1.36) repeated themselves more 
than liars (M = 4.27, SD = 1.30) with a neutral second interviewer, while truth tellers 
(M = 3.88, SD = 1.16) repeated themselves less than liars (M = 4.42, SD = 1.16) with 
a suspicious second interviewer). Despite the lack of a significant interaction effect, 
Hypothesis 1 predicted a specific type of interaction based on theory and previous 
research and the pattern of results matched the pattern of results predicted in 
Hypothesis 1. In line with Nahari and Ben-Shakhar (2011), this justifies further 
examination of the data, specifically examining the difference between truth tellers 
and liars in the three Demeanour conditions separately, as this addresses Hypothesis 
1. Three one-way (Veracity) ANCOVAs with ratings of repetition in the reverse 
order responses as the dependent variable revealed that truth tellers (M = 3.92, SD = 
1.34) repeated themselves less than liars (M = 4.75, SD = .91) when the second 
interviewer was supportive, F(1, 39) = 5.78, p = .021, eta2 = .13, supporting 
                                                          
1 As the amount of repetition in the reverse order responses is linked with the amount of detail in the normal 
order responses, subjective ratings of the amount of detail in the normal order responses was introduced as a 
covariate for the hypothesis testing.  
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Hypothesis 1. The neutral, F(1, 39) = .26, p = .612, and suspicious, F(1, 39) = 2.12, 
p = .152, conditions did not have an effect on repetition.   
 Anticipated questions.  Examination of the pre-interview questionnaire data 
revealed that no participants anticipated any questions requiring ROR, supporting 
Hypothesis 2. Looking at the questions participants did anticipate (related to where 
they work), 33 participants (26%) expected to be asked about where they worked 
and 6 participants (5%) anticipated a question asking them to describe where they 
work. Two participants (2%) anticipated being asked how they travel to work 
(question 5 of the interview schedule and that which was used in the analysis of this 
study).  
2.4 Discussion 
 In the present experiment, participants discussed their journey to work in normal 
and reverse order. Lying about occupation is not a common type of lie in deception 
research, but it can have important consequences. For example, in security and 
intelligence settings it relates to spies and informants: Is the person really who s/he 
claims to be? Another example is fraud investigations. Fake payslips and other 
documents can be purchased on the web and they can be used to commit mortgage 
fraud (The Observer, 15 November 2009). 
 As predicted, a supportive demeanour displayed by the second interviewer 
was found to be effective in terms of eliciting cues to deceit, as truth tellers repeated 
themselves less than liars, a finding that did not emerge when the second interviewer 
was suspicious or neutral. In addition, examination of the pre-interview 
questionnaires revealed that no participants expected any questions requiring ROR.  
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 The fact that liars repeated themselves more that truth tellers provides support 
for Granhag and Strömwall’s (1999) suggestion that liars use a ‘repeat’ strategy 
when recalling their story a second time. In addition, the findings offer new insight 
into the relationship between consistency and deception. While consistency is often 
used as a cue to deceit, the notion that a lack of consistency indicates deception is 
too simplistic (see Fisher, Vrij, and Leins, 2013). Indeed, this study found that in the 
presence of a second supportive interviewer, truth tellers appeared less consistent 
than liars. Before using consistency as a cue to deceit, judges must consider the 
context through which the cue has emerged. For example, having a supportive 
second interviewer present may strengthen liars’ tendency to repeat themselves. 
However, knowing that liars respond in this way under certain circumstances is 
useful, and researchers should continue to be critical of consistency as a cue to 
deceit.  
 The impact of the interview setting is a factor that should be considered in 
future examinations of consistency and deception. The findings presented here lend 
more support for the recommendation that forensic interviewers should display a 
supportive demeanour. Such a recommendation is already widely made in the 
literature about good practice in interviewing children and cooperative witnesses 
and, increasingly, in interviewing suspects (see Bull, 2010, Fisher, 2010, Kassin, 
Appleby, & Torkildson-Perillo, 2010; Meissner, Redlich, Batt, & Brandon, 2012; 
Vrij, 2011, for recent reviews). In addition to eliciting cues to deceit, using a 
supportive second interviewer has three additional advantages. First, it is very easy 
to apply as no interview skill is required. The only activity required from the second 
interviewer is to be supportive. Second, using a supportive second interviewer is not 
related to any specific interview protocol, and it could therefore be applied to every 
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interview setting. Third, using a supportive second interviewer leads to extra 
information from truth tellers (see Mann et al. 2013), which gets to the core of 
interviewing: To obtain as much information from an interviewee as possible 
(Fisher, 2010).  
 To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to manipulate a second 
interviewer in order to elicit repetition as a cue to deceit. Future studies should use 
the findings presented here to explore the role of a second interviewer in more depth. 
Our results suggest that a second supportive interviewer can be used to elicit cues to 
deceit. However, more research is needed to determine the most effective use of a 
two interviewer protocol. The first step for researchers would be to replicate our 
findings.  There is very little research on a two interviewer protocol, and yet two 
interviewers are currently used in forensic interviewers. Any recommendations 
relating to a two interviewer protocol must be thoroughly tested, given the stakes of 
real life forensic interviews.  
 In line with the prediction, the results suggested that the reverse order 
instruction was not expected by participants. While ROR has been used in various 
studies of deception and in real life forensic interviews, this study supports prior 
research suggesting that participants do not anticipate a question of this nature (Vrij, 
Leal, Mann & Fisher, 2012). The benefit of asking unanticipated questions is that 
liars cannot prepare for them, and there is a growing body of literature that has 
adopted the unexpected-questions technique to elicit verbal differences between 
truth tellers and liars (see Vrij & Fisher, 2013). 
 The limitations of this experiment warrant some discussion. First, it was not 
possible to establish the ground truth. It is possible that participants lied about their 
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actual occupation and experience, and no measures were taken to check these 
details. Second, the experiment could have benefited from a more rigorous approach 
to coding the responses. A more comprehensive approach would have been to 
objectively identify each and every detail in the first (normal order) description of 
the journey to work, and look for evidence of all noted details in the second (reverse 
order) account. Such an approach would have been superior to a simple subjective 
comparison. Third, the Veracity X Mimicry interaction effect was not significant, 
which suggests that the second interviewer’s demeanour had no effect. While the 
author accepts that there is good cause to conduct no further analyses in these 
circumstances, the pattern of results in the present experiment indicated support for 
the hypothesis and as such warranted further examination (see Nahari & Ben-
Shakhar, 2011). Replication of the findings accompanied with a significant 
interaction effect would provide greater confidence about the impact of a second 
supportive interviewer. Finally, the measure of whether questions were expected 
could have been improved. A better approach would be to present the questions 
asked at interview in a post interviewer questionnaire, and ask participants to state 
whether they were expected or not. Comparing those ratings would provide a greater 
insight into whether the reverse order instruction were unanticipated.  
 These results suggest that a second supportive interviewer can elicit repetition 
as a cue to deceit.  Future research should try to identify factors that affect repetition 
in suspect testimony. Second interviewer demeanour is one factor that shows 
promise of highlighting deceptive response patterns in interviewees, but there may 
be many factors that affect whether an interviewee appears consistent or not. In 
addition, it is unknown whether manipulating the behaviour of the first interviewer 
can also magnify the differences between truth tellers and liars.  
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 To conclude, a supportive second interviewer can elicit cues to deceit in the 
form of repetition. In light of these findings, future research should continue to 
explore the potential benefits of a supportive second interviewer.  
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Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
Expect the unexpected? Variations in question type 
elicit cues to deception in joint interviewer contexts 
Foreword 
The following chapter is based on the 2013 article with the same name 
published in Applied Cognitive Psychology. In all subsequent chapters that similarly 
originate from a publication, minor amendments have been made to (i) reduce 
repetition, (ii) improve the clarity of the language, and (iii) to ensure the literature is 
up to date.  
Abstract 
This experiment examined the effect of (i) first and second interviewer demeanour 
and (ii) asking expected and unexpected questions on cues to deception. It was 
predicted that liars compared to truth tellers would provide more detail to expected 
questions and less detail to unexpected questions, particularly when the second 
interviewer is supportive. Liars prepare answers for expected questions and a 
supportive interviewer will encourage them to provide more detail. Liars cannot 
prepare for unexpected questions and therefore their answers to such questions will 
be less detailed. Participants (N = 168) appeared before two interviewers: The first 
interviewer asked all the questions, and the second interviewer remained silent. Both 
interviewers exhibited either a supportive or a neutral demeanour. As predicted, liars 
provided more detail to expected questions and less detail to unexpected questions, 
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particularly when the second interviewer was supportive. A supportive second 
interviewer elicits cues to deceit, and therefore investigative interviewers may 
benefit from adopting a supportive demeanour.  
3.1 Introduction 
Suspects are frequently interviewed with two interviewers present in the 
room, (see Sim & Lamb, 2012; Soufan, 2011), and research on using pairs of 
interviewers outside of the intelligence (or police) context, has noted clear 
advantages of this technique (Huber & Power, 1985; Kincaid & Bright, 1957). 
Despite the frequent use of two interviewers there is not much forensic research 
examining the how a second interviewer impacts on suspects’ testimony. The 
present experiment examined what demeanour (being supportive or neutral) first and 
second interviewers should adopt to maximise verbal differences between truthful 
and deceptive interviewees. The effect of interviewer demeanour on answers to (i) 
questions which were in all likelihood anticipated and (ii) questions which were in 
all likelihood not anticipated was explored.  
The Effect of the Second Interviewer. Mann et al. (2013) examined the 
effect of a second interviewer on the verbal recall of truth tellers and liars. They 
found that truth tellers were more detailed than liars, particularly when the second 
interviewer displayed a supportive demeanour (head nodding, smiling and an open 
posture). A supportive interviewer facilitates talking and encourages cooperative 
witnesses (e.g., truth tellers) to talk (Bull, 2010; Fisher, 2010; Memon, Meissner, & 
Fraser, 2010; Milne & Bull, 1999). For example, Collins, Lincoln, and Frank (2002) 
showed that a rapport building approach impacts positively on the amount of correct 
information recalled by interviewees. A supportive interviewer may encourage truth 
39 
 
tellers to provide more detailed responses, but liars will not always be able or willing 
to do this. Liars may be unable to because they lack the fantasy to fabricate 
additional detail (Köhnken, 1996; 2004), or they may be unwilling because they fear 
that the additional detail sounds implausible or that it increases the opportunity for 
interviewers to attempt to verify these details and discover they are lying (Hartwig, 
Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Masip & Ces, 2011; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012a, 
2012b). In sum, a supportive second interviewer makes truth tellers, but not liars, 
more willing to talk, resulting in enhanced differences in the amount of detail truth 
tellers and liars provide. 
In response to unanticipated questions, liars must provide unprepared, 
spontaneous answers. Spontaneous lies contain fewer details than spontaneous 
truthful stories (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 
2003; Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Sporer, 2004; Vrij, 2005, 2008), 
and, as Mann et al. (2013) found, a supportive second interviewer enhances this 
difference between truth tellers and liars. The opposite effect, that liars provide more 
detail than truth tellers which is further enhanced by a supportive second 
interviewer, may occur when liars expect the questions and prepare answers to them. 
Observers pay attention to detail and the richer an account is perceived to be, the 
more likely it will be believed (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Johnson, 2006; Johnson, Foley, 
Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Liars are aware that interviewers pay attention to detail 
when making veracity judgements and are therefore keen to provide details in order 
to make an honest impression (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012a). As a result, liars may 
prepare a detailed alibi and will report it when the opportunity arises. This 
opportunity does arise when an expected question is asked, and a supportive second 
interviewer may encourage liars to recall all the information they have prepared. The 
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result of this differential pattern of responses to expected and unexpected questions 
is that liars will give more detail than truth tellers when answering expected 
questions, but less detail than truth tellers when answering unexpected questions. 
This pattern will be exaggerated by the presence of a supportive second interviewer. 
In other words, the difference in detail between expected and unexpected questions 
will be larger in liars than in truth tellers, particularly in the supportive second 
interviewer condition (Hypothesis 1).  
Questions can be unexpected for two different reasons. First, the content of 
the question can be unexpected. For example, Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi, and 
Granhag, (2012) instructed participants to tell the truth or lie about their forthcoming 
flight, and asked questions about the purpose of the trip, the planning of the trip, 
transportation from the airport after arrival, and about the core event of the trip. 
Participants reported that they had expected the questions about the purpose of the 
trip, whereas all the other questions were unanticipated. Second, the format of the 
question can be unexpected. For example, a request to sketch the layout of a 
restaurant or office is more unexpected than the request to verbally recall the layout 
of a restaurant or office (Vrij et al., 2009; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2012); and 
being asked to recall an event in reverse chronological order is more unexpected 
than being asked to recall an event in normal order (Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 
2012). Experiment 1 of this thesis also indicates that participants do not anticipate 
the reverse order instruction when asked what questions they expect at interview. 
The present experiment, the latter definition of unexpected questions was used and 
participants were asked to describe the event in normal order (expected question) 
and in reverse order (unexpected question). Recalling an event in reverse order is not 
only unexpected, it is also particularly difficult for liars. Deceptive behaviour is 
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likely to impact on two basic mechanisms in cognition: working memory and speed 
of processing (Bond, 2012). Answering in reverse order may be particularly taxing 
on these resources, as liars must retrieve real and imagined data from long term 
memory into working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). This task also conflicts 
with our real world knowledge of temporal sequence (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; 
Munte, Schiltz, & Kutas, 1998; Kahana, 1996), and makes it more difficult to 
reconstruct the event from a schema (Geiselman & Callot, 1990). The reverse order 
instruction was originally used as a memory enhancing technique as part of the 
Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). It has since been effectively 
applied in deception research both in the laboratory (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Leal, 
Mann, & Fisher, 2012) and in the field (Evans, Houston, & Meissner, 2012; 
Zimmerman, Veinott, Meissner, Fallon, & Mueller, 2010).  
In the present experiment, the second interviewer remained silent throughout 
the interview. This measure was taken as an experienced UK police interviewer 
informed us that this is how two interviewers are normally used. Mann et al. (2013), 
who also introduced a silent second interviewer, found that participants looked at the 
second interviewer for only 8% of the time. It seems reasonable to suggest that the 
impact of a second interviewer will become stronger if participants pay more 
attention to the second interviewer. With this in mind, the second interviewer was 
introduced as a ‘senior investigator and expert in lie detection’, a procedure also 
used in human intelligence interviews (Soufan, 2011). This introduction could well 
overshadow the effect that the speaking interviewer’s demeanour has on the 
interviewee’s responses. Therefore no prediction was made regarding the effect of 
the speaking interviewer’s demeanour on the interviewee’s verbal recall. However, 
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the speaking interviewer’s demeanour was manipulated nevertheless, as it offers a 
more complete picture of the effect of interviewers’ demeanour on verbal responses. 
Temporal Connectives. Temporal connectives, words such as before, and 
after, are used to form a temporal sequence of events. Kintsch and Mannes (1987) 
found that they play an important role in script generation. In their study, 
participants were asked to generate a script by describing what typically happens in 
three common situations: Going to a restaurant; buying groceries; and going to the 
doctors. Temporal connectives frequently occurred in the participants’ accounts, and 
Kintsch and Mannes (1987) suggested that they act as retrieval cues, establishing the 
links between each new episode or event. 
Kintsch and Mannes’ (1987) experiment related to scripted events. In our 
experiment, participants organised a room for a forthcoming seminar; a task that 
they are not likely to have carried out many times before. Therefore, the script that 
they use in the interview will not be of the same quality as a script created from a 
commonly performed event, such as buying groceries. However, this does not 
preclude any possible differences between truth tellers’ and liars’ recollections. 
Script generation from imagined events is likely to be different, because mental 
representations of false events are likely to be less coherent than those of truthful 
events (Duran, Hall, McCarthy & McNamara, 2010).  
Genuine cues to deceit do exist, though such cues are often faint and 
unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003), and deception researchers are tasked with eliciting 
new cues that magnify the difference between truth tellers and liars (see Hartwig & 
Bond, 2012).  With this in mind, this paper examined the frequency of temporal 
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connectives present in responses to a reverse order question, as such an approach 
may yield a new and diagnostic indicator of deceptive leakage.  
A distinction was made between normal (‘and then’) and reverse order 
(‘before that’) connectives. From having a perceptually impoverished experience 
compared to truth tellers, liars may have a weaker, less detailed script. And given 
that temporal connectives act as retrieval cues, liars may well use them less, owing 
to this weaker, less detailed script. Furthermore, given the disorganised nature of 
their script, re-structuring this information in reverse order may be particularly 
difficult for liars. This should be reflected in their responses with the use of 
connectives that do not cohere with a reverse order sequence. Therefore, it was 
expected that liars would use fewer reverse order (‘before that’) connectives than 
truth tellers (Hypothesis 2) 
3.2 Method 
Participants  
A total of 168 participants (57 males and 111 females) took part in the study. The 
sample comprised undergraduate students and university staff, with an average age 
of M = 23.40 years (SD = 7.4 years).  
Design 
To test the hypotheses, a 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Silent Interviewer 
Demeanour: supportive vs neutral) X 2 (Speaking Interviewer Demeanour: 
supportive vs neutral) between-subjects design was used, with the following four 
dependent variables: (i) the frequency of visual and spatial details in the normal 
order recollections; (ii) the frequency of visual and spatial details in the reverse 
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order recollections; (iii) the frequency of normal order temporal connectives in 
normal order recollections; and (iv) the frequency of reverse order temporal 
connectives in reverse order recollections.  
Procedure  
Participants were recruited via posters and leaflets, and online via advertisements on 
the University’s staff and student portals. Participants were invited to try to ‘Fool an 
expert’ in lie detection and were promised a £5 reward for convincing the expert. 
While participants were informed that the reward was conditional on a good 
performance, all participants received £5 for taking part. 
 Upon arrival in the Psychology Department the participants were greeted by 
the experimenter and taken to a quiet room close by. Participants signed an informed 
consent form and completed a pre-interview questionnaire which measured how 
motivated they were to perform well in the interview on a five point scale ranging 
from [1] ‘Not at all motivated’ to [5] ‘Very motivated’. At this stage, participants 
were randomly allocated to either the truth (N = 82) or lying (N = 86) condition, and 
given instructions about their task.  
Truth tellers’ task was to prepare a room (Room A) for a (mock) seminar, 
which involved completing a few basic organisational tasks. The task was modified 
from Leins, Fisher, and Vrij (2012) and Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal and Mann (2011, 
Experiment 2). The experimenter explained that, owing to the absence of the 
individual who was supposed to prepare the room, the participant must now prepare 
the room instead. 
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Room A contained various objects relevant to a seminar, including: three 
tables; four chairs (all varying in style and colour); a flip chart; a clipboard and 
attendance sheet; and seminar materials for four people (articles, pens and pads of 
paper). Before participants began the task, all items were organised according to a 
pre-determined and standardised plan of the room. The room was deliberately made 
to look as if it had been left disorganised from a previous seminar to create a sense 
of realism. The seminar materials were located in an untidy pile at the far end of the 
tables, and the chairs remained in seemingly random locations around the room. All 
participants experienced the same disorganised layout of Room A before they 
completed their task.  
 On entering Room A, truth tellers were presented with a sheet of instructions 
detailing the order of the three organisational tasks to be completed. They were 
instructed that they had as much time as they needed to complete the tasks, and that 
they should notify the experimenter when they had finished by knocking on the door 
they entered through. The first of the three tasks was to complete the attendance 
sheet and place it on the low table in the corner of the room. Second, participants 
were instructed to place all of the chairs behind the two tables in the centre of the 
room, and ensure that they were facing the flipchart. The final task involved sorting 
through the seminar materials; a pen, a pad of paper, and one of each of the colour 
coded journals was to be placed in front of each of the chairs.  
 After completing the tasks, truth tellers were briefed before being taken to 
the interview room: 
‘I have just been informed that someone has accessed and stolen some sensitive 
information from the University’s servers, and I need you to have an interview to 
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determine whether you know anything about this incident. It is the interviewer’s task 
to determine whether you have done this. You will therefore be interviewed about 
your activities during the last 30 minutes’.   
Before being taken to the interview suite, participants were reminded that 
they would receive £5 as a reward if they managed to successfully convince the 
expert they were telling the truth. They were also told that they would have to write 
a statement about their activities in Room A if the interviewer did not believe them.  
Liars’ role in the study was broken down into two stages. Their main task 
was to ‘illegally’ copy some encrypted information from another room, Room B. 
The participant was first informed about this task: ‘In Room B is a computer, and on 
the desktop of that computer is a file called ‘Delta’. We would like you to make a 
copy of this file. Before you can do that you need to decrypt the file, and this 
involves entering a code. To do that, double click on the file and a small window 
will pop-up, prompting you for a password. That information is on this card [the 
experimenter shows the participant the card in the sleeve with all the materials in]. 
There is also some basic information here about how to save a copy of the file, using 
the USB stick provided. Room B will be locked, so you will need this key to enter 
the room.’ The experimenter then explained that their alibi (in case anyone should 
question them) is that they were preparing Room A for a seminar, and that someone 
else complicit in the crime would prepare the room on their behalf. After receiving 
this information liars viewed Room A, which enabled them to formulate an alibi. 
They were provided with the same sheet of instructions provided to truth tellers, and 
were asked to imagine completing the organisational tasks, and to memorise this 
information.  
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Liars were then led to Room B (located a short distance from Room A) to 
complete their primary task. On completion of their task, the experimenter set the 
scene for the interview to take place: 
‘I have just been informed that someone has accessed and stolen some sensitive 
information from the University’s servers, and I need you to have an interview to 
determine whether you know anything about this incident. Just to re-iterate, in this 
interview you are going to lie. You must deny that you (i) have been in Room B and 
(ii) that you have completed the task in Room B. Instead you are going to say that 
you prepared Room A. If you are asked anything about Room B, you have got to do 
your best to convince the interviewer that you know nothing about it.’ Again, before 
being escorted to the interview suite, participants were reminded that they would 
receive £5 for convincing the expert, and were further told that they would have to 
write a statement about their activities in Room A if the interviewer did not believe 
them.  
The Interview. The interview schedule was broken down into two parts. One part 
focused on the alleged activities in Room A and the other part on the alleged 
activities in Room B. The current experiment focusses on questions that relate to 
Room A (see Appendix 2 for details of all interview questions relating to Room A).  
The questions were aimed at eliciting detailed visual, spatial, and temporal 
information. The interview commenced with a question that participants were likely 
to expect: (1) ‘Giving as much detail as possible, please describe all the things you 
did whilst inside Room A in the exact order in which you did them’. After some 
filler questions the participants were then asked: (2) ‘Please now describe, in reverse 
chronological order, exactly what you did in Room A?’ 
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After the interview, participants completed a post-interview questionnaire 
which included three manipulation checks. First, participants rated the expertise of 
the interviewers from [1] ‘Novice’ to [7] ‘Expert’. Second, the participants were 
asked to indicate on a seven point scale whether each interviewer was [1] 
‘Suspicious’ to [7] ‘Trusting’, [1] ‘Unsupportive’ to [7] ‘Supportive’, and [1] 
‘Negative’ to [7] ‘Positive’. The questions were clustered into one ‘supportive’ 
index (for the silent interviewer, Cronbach’s alpha = .88, inter-item correlations r > 
.70; for the speaking interviewer Cronbach’s alpha = .89, inter-item correlations r > 
.67). Third, participants were asked to mark which of the interview questions were 
unexpected by ticking a corresponding box. Therefore, using a dichotomous rating 
scale, each question was rated as expected (box not ticked) or unexpected (box 
ticked).  
The questionnaire also included questions about the likelihood of receiving 
£5, and the likelihood of having to write a statement ([1] ‘Not at all likely’ to [7] 
‘Very likely’).  
Interviewer Demeanour.  Each interview was conducted by two female interviewers 
of whom one was speaking and one was silent. Each interviewer was either supportive 
or neutral. In the supportive condition the interviewers tried to show the participants 
that they believed what they were saying. They achieved this by leaning forward, 
nodding, and smiling when the participants answered. The interviewers also 
maintained an open posture throughout the interview. These behaviours were selected 
as they are often associated with friendliness and empathy in communication research 
(Burgoon, 1991; Burgoon, Birk, & Pfau, 1990; Seay & Altekruse, 1979; Smith-Hanen, 
1977). These same operationalisations were used by Mann et al. (2013) and 
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Experiment 1 of this thesis. In the neutral condition, the interviewers kept an open 
posture, but largely did not respond to the participant’s answers. They were also 
conscious, however, of not appearing negative or disbelieving. The speaking 
interviewer introduced herself as a trainee interviewer, before mentioning that she was 
being accompanied by a senior investigator who is an expert in lie detection (to see 
the exact introduction, see Appendix 2). To make the manipulation more believable, 
the ‘expert’ interviewer was several years older than the ‘trainee’, and also dressed 
more formally.  
Coding and Data Analysis  
The interviews were videotaped, audiotaped and transcribed and the verbal coding 
was based on the transcripts. A coder, blind to the hypotheses and experimental 
conditions, read each answer carefully and marked every detail the interviewee gave. 
These details were then classified as visual, spatial or neither. For example, the 
sentence ‘I put the clipboard on the low table in the left hand corner’ contains three 
visual details (clipboard, low, table), two spatial details (on, left hand corner), and 
one other detail (put). A second coder, also blind to the hypotheses and experimental 
conditions, also coded spatial and visual details using a sub-sample of 37 transcripts 
(23%). The inter-rater reliability between the two coders for both the normal order 
question (r = .85) and reverse order question (r = .82) was high. Comparisons of 
visual (t (36) = -.55, p = .588) and spatial (t (36) = 1.07, p = .291) details coded in 
the normal order question, and visual (t (36) = 1.28, p = .209) and spatial (t (36) = 
.60, p = .554) details coded in the reverse order question revealed no differences 
between the two coders’ data.  
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To create the difference score, first, the total number of spatial and visual 
details observed in the normal and reverse order responses were recorded, and two 
new variables were created with the sum number of these details in each response. 
Next, a new variable was created by taking away the sum number of visual/spatial 
details in the reverse order response from that of the normal order response. This 
new variable represents the difference in detail between the responses, and is 
referred to as the ‘difference score’. Inspection of the difference scores revealed that 
the data set contained nine outliers, that is, nine participants with an average 
difference score that fell plus or minus two standard deviations from the mean of the 
total sample. Those nine participants were removed from the dataset; a common 
procedure when dealing with outliers in statistical data (Field, 2005).  
The first coder also rated the reverse order responses for the temporal 
connectives ‘and then’ and ‘before that’. ‘And then’ is considered to be a normal 
order phrase and ‘before that’ is considered to be a reverse order phrase. For clarity 
reasons the phrases ‘and then’ and ‘before that’ are used in the Results section. The 
decision to focus on these phrases originates from the coding of transcripts in 
Experiment 1, where a coder observed that: (i) ‘and then’ and ‘before that’ were 
used frequently in the reverse order responses (ii) truth tellers appeared to use 
‘before that’ more frequently than liars.  
The second coder also rated the temporal connectives in a sub-sample of 37 
transcripts (23%). The inter-rater reliability between the two coders ratings of the 
‘and then’ (.97) and ‘before that’ phrases was also high (.98). Comparisons of 
normal order connectives (t (36) = 2.02, p = .051) revealed no difference between 
the coders, however, there was a difference in the coding of reverse order 
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connectives (t (36) = 2.462, p = .019). Regarding the significant difference in reverse 
order connectives, the mean scores were small and even a small difference amounts 
to a significant difference. The exceptionally high correlation (r = .98) indicates that 
the coding was reliable.   
In order to check that participants took notice of the silent interviewer, all 
videos were coded subjectively for gaze duration towards the interviewers. A third 
coder, blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions, rated the percentage of 
time the interviewee looked at either of the two interviewers or away from the 
interviewers, with the total of all three ratings adding up to 100%. For example, the 
rating could be ‘60% to the speaking interviewer, 20% to the silent interviewer and 
20% elsewhere’. A fourth coder, also blind to the hypotheses and experimental 
conditions, also coded gaze duration using a sub-sample of 59 videos (37%). The 
inter-rater reliability between the two coders for gaze at the silent (.74) and speaking 
(.93) interviewers was high.  
3.3 Results 
Motivation, Incentive and Penalty. Participants (N = 168) were motivated to do 
well in the experiment ([M = 4.08, SD = .75] on a five point Likert scale), with 55% 
reporting that they were ‘Quite motivated’ (score of 4), and 27% ‘Very motivated’ 
(score of 5). A 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Silent Interviewer Demeanour: 
supportive vs neutral) X 2 (Speaking Interviewer Demeanour: supportive vs neutral) 
ANOVA with motivation as the dependent variable revealed no significant main or 
interaction effects (all F’s < 1.38, all p’s > .24) indicating that the participants’ 
motivation levels were similar amongst the experimental conditions. 
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The 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Silent Interviewer Demeanour: supportive 
vs neutral) X 2 (Speaking Interviewer Demeanour: supportive vs neutral) ANOVA 
regarding the likelihood of receiving an incentive of £5 resulted in a main effect for 
Veracity, F(1, 151) = 10.78, p < .001, η2 = .067, whereas all other main and 
interaction effects were not significant, all F’s < 2.21, all p’s > .14. Truth tellers (M 
= 4.64, SD = 1.3) more than liars (M = 3.91, SD = 1.5) were inclined to think that 
they would receive a £5 incentive.  
 Another 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Silent Interviewer Demeanour: 
supportive vs neutral) X 2 (Speaking Interviewer Demeanour: supportive vs neutral) 
ANOVA regarding the likelihood of having to write an essay also resulted in a main 
effect for Veracity, F(1, 151) = 10.98, p < .001, η2 = .068, whereas all other main and 
interaction effects were not significant, all F’s < 2.49, all p’s > .12. Liars (M = 3.91, 
SD = 1.2) more than truth tellers (M = 3.29, SD = 1.2) were inclined to think that 
they would be requested to write an essay. In sum, the participants were motivated to 
be convincing and the incentive and penalty appeared realistic. 
Manipulation Checks: Demeanour of Interviewers, Expertise of the 
Interviewer, and Expectedness of the Questions. A 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 
(Silent Interviewer Demeanour: supportive vs neutral) X 2 (Speaking Interviewer 
Demeanour: supportive vs neutral) ANOVA with ratings of the speaking 
interviewer’s demeanour as dependent variable revealed significant main effects for 
Veracity, F(1, 151) = 6.78, p = .013, η2 = .04, Silent Interviewer, F(1, 151) = 27.67, 
p < .001, η2 = .16, and Speaking Interviewer, F(1, 151) = 19.97, p <.001, η2 = .12. 
None of the interaction effects were significant, all F’s < .68, all p’s > .41. In 
alignment with the experimental manipulation, the speaking interviewer was 
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perceived as more supportive in the supportive speaking interviewer condition (M = 
5.07, SD = 1.1) than in the neutral speaking interviewer condition (M = 4.32, SD = 
1.2). In addition, truth tellers found the speaking interviewer more supportive (M = 
4.93, SD = 1.2) than liars (M = 4.48, SD = 1.1). Finally, the speaking interviewer 
was perceived as more supportive when the silent interviewer was neutral (M = 5.13, 
SD = 1.0) than when the silent interviewer was supportive (M = 4.23, SD = 1.3).   
 A 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Silent Interviewer Demeanour: supportive vs 
neutral) X 2 (Speaking Interviewer Demeanour: supportive vs neutral) ANOVA with 
ratings of the silent interviewer’s demeanour as dependent variable revealed a 
significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 151) = 61.33, p < .001, η2 = .29, whereas 
all other main effects and interaction effects were not significant, all F’s < 2.76, all 
p’s > .103. Again, in line with the experimental manipulation, the silent interviewer 
was perceived as more supportive in the supportive silent interviewer condition (M = 
5.22, SD = 1.3) than in the neutral silent interviewer condition (M = 3.67, SD = 
1.32).  
 A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Silent Interviewer Demeanour) X 2 (Speaking Interviewer 
Demeanour) X 2 (Expertise of Interviewer) mixed ANOVA with Expertise of the 
Interviewer (speaking interviewer or silent interviewer) as the only within-subjects 
factor and ratings of the interviewers’ expertise as the dependent variable revealed a 
main effect for Expertise, F(1,140) = 16.13, p < .001, η2 = .10, whereas all other 
main and interaction effects were not significant, all F’s < 2.17, all p’s > .137. The 
silent interviewer was perceived as being more of an expert in lie detection (M = 
5.22, SD = 1.3) than the speaking interviewer (M = 4.66, SD = 1.1). 
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 A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Silent Interviewer Demeanour) X 2 (Speaking Interviewer 
Demeanour) X 2 (Type of Question) mixed ANOVA with the Type of Question 
(normal order versus reverse order) as the only within-subjects factor and 
unexpectedness as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect for Type 
of Question, F(1, 151) = 189.29, p < .001, η2 = .56, whereas all other main effects 
and interaction effects were not significant, all F’s < 3.60, all p’s > .06. Only 9% 
(SD = 28) of participants found the normal order question unexpected, whereas the 
majority of participants (68%, SD = 47) found the reverse order question 
unexpected.  
In sum, both the speaking and silent interviewers were perceived as more 
supportive in the supportive interviewer conditions; the silent interviewer was 
considered more of an expert in lie detection than the speaking interviewer; and the 
reverse order question was more unexpected than the normal order question. This 
means that the manipulations were successful.  
Gaze. A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Silent Interviewer Demeanour) X 2 (Speaking 
Interviewer Demeanour) X 2 (Gaze at Interviewer) mixed ANOVA with Gaze at 
Interviewer (towards speaking interviewer or silent interviewer) as the only within-
subjects factor and eye contact as the dependent variable revealed a significant main 
effect for Gaze at Interviewer, F(1, 145) = 377.27, p < .001, η2 = .722. Participants 
looked considerably more at the speaking interviewer (M = 40.62% of the time, SD 
= 20.7) than at the silent interviewer (M = 7.33% of the time, SD = 5.2). In fact, 
7.33% indicates that participants hardly looked at the second interviewer. The 
                                                          
2 The gaze patterns of 8 participants could not be clearly seen on the videotapes, due to wearing glasses for 
example, and these participants were dropped from this analysis. 
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Veracity main effect was also significant, F(1, 145) = 5.40, p = .022, η2 = .04, as was 
the Veracity X Gaze at Interviewer interaction effect, F(1, 145) = 4.95, p = .028, η2 = 
.03. The latter effect is the more informative of the two. Liars (M = 44.30, SD = 
21.7) maintained more eye contact with the speaking interviewer than truth tellers 
(M = 36.67, SD = 18.9), F(1, 151) = 5.31, p = .023, η2 = .03, whereas no difference 
emerged in maintaining eye contact with the silent interviewer between liars (M = 
7.46, SD = 6.0) and truth tellers (M = 7.21, SD = 4.2), F(1, 151) = .09, p = .768, η2 = 
<.01. All other main effects and interaction effects were not significant, all F’s < 
1.81, all p’s > .178).  
Hypotheses-Testing  
A 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Silent Interviewer Demeanour: supportive vs 
neutral) X 2 (Speaking Interviewer Demeanour: supportive vs neutral) ANOVA  
with the mean difference score as the dependent variable revealed a significant 
Veracity X Silent Interviewer Demeanour interaction effect, F(1, 151) = 9.82, p = 
.002. η2 = .06. All other main effects and interaction effects were not significant, all 
F’s < 1.14, all p’s > .283. Simple effect tests showed that liars obtained a 
significantly larger difference score (M = 7.78, SD = 6.0) than truth tellers (M = 
3.33, SD = 7.0) when the silent interviewer was supportive, F(1, 75) = 9.39, p = 
.003, η2 = .11. In contrast, when the silent interviewer was neutral the difference 
scores of liars (M = 4.54, SD = 7.0) and truth tellers (M = 6.73, SD = 6.6) did not 
differ, F(1, 80) = 2.24, p = .148, η2 = .03. This supports Hypothesis 1.  
A larger difference score for liars than for truth tellers in the supportive 
interviewer condition can be caused by liars being more detailed than truth tellers in 
answering the (expected) normal order question (option 1), liars being less detailed 
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than truth tellers in answering the (unexpected) reverse order question (option 2), or 
due to a combination of the two (option 3). In order to examine these three options, a 
2 (Veracity) X 2 (Type of Question) mixed ANOVA was carried out with Veracity 
as a between-subjects factor, Type of Question (normal order or reverse order) as a 
within-subjects factor and the total number of details as dependent variable. The 
analysis only included the participants allocated to the supportive silent interviewer 
condition. The Veracity main effect was not significant, F(1, 75) = .21, p = .649, η2 
< .01, but the Question main effect was, F(1, 75) = 58.66, p < .001, η2 = .44. Of most 
interest is the Veracity X Question interaction effect, which was also significant, 
F(1, 75) = 9.39, p = .003, η2 = .11. Liars (M = 23.88, SD = 8.8) were more detailed 
than truth tellers (M = 20.86, SD = 8.7) when answering the (expected) normal order 
question and less detailed (M = 16.10, SD = 8.1) than truth tellers (M = 17.53, SD = 
7.2) when answering the (unexpected) reverse order question. However, the 
difference between liars and truth tellers in the normal order question, F(1, 75) = 
2.27, p = .136. η2 = .03, and the reverse order question, F(1, 75) = .66, p = .418. η2 = 
.01 were not significant. In other words, the significant difference score obtained 
between truth tellers and liars and described above was due to the combination of 
liars being more detailed in answering the expected normal order question and less 
detailed in answering the unexpected reverse order question (option 3).    
A 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Silent Interviewer Demeanour: supportive vs 
neutral) X 2 (Speaking Interviewer Demeanour: supportive vs neutral) MANCOVA3 
                                                          
3 As the frequency of connectives is linked with the length of participants’ responses, total words uttered in 
participants’ responses to the reverse order questions was introduced as a covariate (which was significant, F(2, 
149) = 48.44, p <.001. η2 = .39, truth tellers’ (M = 88.10, SD = 45.7) responses contained more words than liars’ 
(M = 85.99, SD = 39.8)). 
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with the use of the phrases ‘and then’ and ‘before that’ as dependent variables 
revealed a significant Veracity main effect, F(2, 150) = 4.13, p = .018. η2 = .05. All 
other main effects and interaction effects were not significant, all F’s < .41, all p’s > 
.667. Univariate tests showed that truth tellers (M = 1.47, SD = 2.1) said ‘before that’ 
more than liars (M = .74, SD = 1.3), F(1, 157) = 7.94, p = .005. η2 = .05, supporting 
Hypothesis 2. Truth tellers (M = 2.27, SD = 2.0) and liars (M = 2.18, SD = 2.0) did 
not differ from each other in saying ‘and then’, F(1, 157) = .01, p = .906. η2 = <.01.  
The mean scores indicate that both truth tellers and liars used the phrase ‘and 
then’ more often than the phrase ‘before that’. The ratio of ‘before that’ to ‘and then’ 
phrases (the frequency of using the phrase ‘before that’ divided by the frequency of 
using the phrase ‘and then’)4 was calculated before conducting an ANCOVA5 with 
this ratio as the dependent variable and Veracity as a factor. The analysis revealed a 
significant effect, F(1, 159) = 3.93, p = .049. η2 = .02. Truth tellers’ ratio was close 
to 1 (M = .90, SD = 1.6) indicating that they used the words ‘and then’ and ‘before 
that’ with similar frequency. Liars’ ratio was close to .5 (M = .49, SD = .9), 
indicating that they used the words ‘and then’ on average twice as much as the word 
‘before that’.   
 
 
                                                          
4 In case ‘and then’ was 0, the ‘before that’ score was used as a ratio score. For example, if the ‘before that’ 
score was ‘4’, the ratio score was ‘4’ etc. 
5 Once again, the total words uttered in participants’ responses to the reverse order questions was introduced as a 
covariate (which was significant, F(1, 157) = 7.83, p = .006. η2 = .05). 
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3.4 Discussion 
In accordance with previous findings (Mann et al., 2013; Experiment 1 of this 
thesis), a supportive second interviewer effectively elicited cues to deceit. When the 
second interviewer was supportive, it was found that the difference in detail between 
expected and unexpected questions was significantly larger for liars than truth 
tellers. This was in part due to liars providing more detail in response to the expected 
question, and fewer details in response to the unexpected question. The finding that 
liars provided more details is somewhat novel, but not new. It was also found in two 
other studies in which the expected/unexpected questions approach was used 
(Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, & Waller, 2012; Warmelink, et al., 2013). For example, in 
Warmelink et al. truth tellers and liars were interviewed about their alleged 
forthcoming trip. Expected questions about the purpose of the trip (e.g., “What is the 
main purpose of your trip?”), were followed by unexpected questions about transport 
(e.g., “How are you going to travel to your destination?”), planning (“What part of 
the trip was easiest to plan?”), and the core event (“Keep in mind an image of the 
most important thing you are going to do on this trip. Please describe this mental 
image in detail?”). Liars, compared to truth tellers, gave significantly more detail to the 
expected questions and significantly less detail to the unexpected questions. The same 
argument in the present study can be given to explain Warmelink et al.’s findings. 
When liars are presented with a question that they expect and have prepared an 
answer for, they are motivated to give as much information as possible. In the 
current study, it appears that a supportive interviewer enhanced this finding.  
A second reason for the larger difference in liars is that they were less 
detailed than truth tellers when answering the unexpected reverse order question. 
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Reverse order questions are likely to impact on two basic cognitive mechanisms; 
working memory and speed of processing. For liars, answering in reverse order 
requires retrieving real and imagined data from long term memory into working 
memory, which may result in shorter, less detailed answers. Furthermore, liars 
cannot prepare for unexpected questions, which is likely to reduce the quality of 
their responses.   
The analysis of gaze behaviour replicated the findings of Mann et al. (2013) 
in three ways. First, participants looked more at the speaking interviewer than the 
silent interviewer, and liars looked more at the speaking interviewer than truth 
tellers. Second, both liars and truth tellers looked at the silent interviewer less than 
10% of the time. Third, despite the fact that participants hardly looked at the second 
interviewer, they nonetheless correctly noted the second interviewer’s demeanour 
and their verbal responses were influenced by this demeanour. It sounds reasonable 
that a second silent interviewer will have more impact on participants’ responses if 
participants pay more attention to him or her. In that respect, Mann et al. (2013) 
suggested that introducing the second interviewer as a ‘senior investigator and 
expert in lie detection’ (as in the present experiment) might increase the amount of 
time participants look at the second interviewer. This did not happen. One could 
argue that there was no reason for participants to look more at the second 
interviewer since their only activity was to display a certain demeanour (neutral or 
supportive) and this was correctly noticed by the participants. Other ways to increase 
the amount of time someone looks at a silent second interviewer could be tested. For 
example, the second silent interviewer could change his or her demeanour 
periodically throughout the interview. That might keep the participants alert. 
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Another possibility is to introduce the second interviewer half-way through the 
interview, as that may put more emphasis on the second silent interviewer.  
The finding that the speaking interviewer’s demeanour had no effect on 
participants’ responses requires some explanation. Participants looked considerably 
more at the speaking interviewer and hardly looked at the silent interviewer at all.  
So why did the speaking interviewer’s demeanour not have more effect on the 
participants’ responses? There are two possible explanations: First, as reported in the 
Introduction, the second interviewer was introduced as a ‘senior investigator and 
expert in lie detection’, and such an introduction could have caused participants to 
disregard or pay little attention to the speaking interviewer’s demeanour. Second, the 
speaking interviewer also engaged in verbal communication with the interviewee. In 
other words, the speaking interviewer provided two sources of information: 
demeanour and speech. This second source of information (speech) may have 
diminished the effect of the first source (demeanour), as typically happens when 
interviewees are exposed to different sources of information (Patterson, 1995). In 
contrast, the silent interviewer’s only interaction with participants was displaying a 
positive demeanour. If the speaking interviewer’s verbal interaction with participants 
acted as a distraction, then the silent interviewer’s demeanour may have impacted 
more on participants’ responses.  
 The prediction that liars would use more reverse order temporal 
connectives was also supported. Truth tellers used the ‘before that’ connective more 
often than liars, while there was no difference for the ‘and then’ connective. Truth 
tellers’ experience of the event they recalled during the interview was inherently 
different from liars’ experience. As a result, truth tellers may have had a more 
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coherent reverse order script of their activities, reflected in the increased use of 
reverse order temporal connectives. The finding relating to temporal connectives is 
new in deception literature, and deserves further attention. Reliable cues to deceit are 
scarce, and some researchers argue that there are no reliable cues (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Vrij, 2008). It is important to examine why truth tellers use more reverse order 
connectives than liars, and the explanation offered (truth tellers have a more 
coherent script) could be examined in more detail. For example, participants should 
be quizzed post-hoc on exactly how they reconstructed an event in reverse order, and 
whether they deliberately used reverse order connectives.  
Future research may benefit from encouraging interviewees to provide more 
temporal connectives in their responses. In Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, and Granhag 
(2013, Experiment 2), participants were interviewed on a ferry about their plans for 
the day. In a minor adjustment to the procedure, the experimenters introduced a 
specific time-prompt question: “Please describe in as much detail as possible what 
your time-table is for today at your destination?” As a result, participants provided 
more time references in their responses, and this information increased detection 
efficiency. With this in mind, reverse order questions may yield more temporal 
connectives by asking for a more precise, step-by-step account of events.  
  In order to examine further the value of temporal connectives as a cue to 
deceit, the next logical step would be to conduct a deception detection study. In this 
scenario, participants would examine the transcripts from the current study, and 
make a veracity judgment based on the use of temporal connectives. This would give 
some indication as to the diagnostic value of this cue.  
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 In sum, the present experiment, Experiment 1, and Mann et al. (2013) show 
that a second silent interviewer yields favourable effects when s/he shows a 
supportive demeanour, as it creates cues to deceit. The use of supportive 
interviewers has been recommended for some time in interviews with witnesses and 
victims (Bull, 2010; Fisher, 2010). There is growing evidence that it could also be 
useful when interviewing suspects. 
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Chapter 4: Experiment 3a 
‘We'll take it from here': the effect of changing 
interviewers in information gathering interviews 
Foreword 
The following chapter is based on the 2014 article with the same name published in 
Applied Cognitive Psychology. Note that Experiment 3a focuses solely on the effect 
of changing the interviewers, while the effect of deliberate mimicry (which was 
manipulated alongside the changing of interviewers) is examined in the following 
chapter. The decision to examine the two experimental manipulations in isolation 
was made as it fits with the trend of the thesis thus far; examining the impact of 
individual manipulations of a second interviewer. Such an approach offers greater 
clarity on the effect of each manipulation, which in turn will benefit any future 
recommendations enabled by the findings. Crucially, adopting a 2 (Veracity: truth vs 
lie) X 2 (Interviewers: Same interviewers vs changed interviewers) X 2 (Mimicry: 
present vs absent) design to test the hypotheses put forward in Experiment 3a 
revealed that mimicry did not interact with the other independent variables 
(Subjective new information: all Fs <.22, all ps >.314; objective new information:  
all Fs <.65, all ps >.424; subjective detail: all Fs <.80, all ps >.372; objective detail: 
all Fs <.79, all ps >.376; subjective repetition: all Fs <.03, all ps >.314, objective 
repetition: Fs <.2.45, all ps >.996).  
 
64 
 
 
Abstract 
A common strategy in interviewing is to repeatedly focus on the same topics. For 
example, an interviewer could ask that the event in question is recalled twice, first in 
normal chronological order, and later in reverse order. The current study adopted 
this strategy, and examined the effect of changing two interviewers after the normal 
order question, and the impact this has on cues to deception. Truth tellers may be 
most encouraged to recall again what they have witnessed when confronted with 
new interviewers, as these new interviewers have not heard their story before. Liars 
may be most encouraged to recall again their story when confronted with the same 
interviewers, realising that these interviewers will check for consistency in their 
answers. The impact of changing interviewers should lead to more pronounced 
differences between truth tellers and liars in terms of detail and repetition in the 
‘changed interviewers’ condition compared to the ‘same interviewers’ condition. 
Participants attended a mock security meeting before being interviewed by two 
interviewers regarding the meeting. In half the interviews the same two interviewers 
remained throughout, and in the other half two new interviewers took over half-way 
through. As predicted, differences between truth tellers and liars in terms of detail 
and repetition were most pronounced in the ‘changed interviewers’ condition. 
Changing interviewers during an interview effectively differentiates truth tellers and 
liars with respect to detail and repetition. This finding and its place within 
investigative interviewing and deception detection literature is discussed.   
4.1 Introduction 
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A common strategy employed by investigators is to repeatedly focus on the same 
topics throughout an investigative interview (Fisher, 2010). This technique is aimed 
at giving interviewees the chance to say everything they know, and to ensure that 
nothing is missed. One way to achieve this is by asking the same question in a 
different format, for example, by asking an interviewee to recall an event in reverse 
chronological order (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). Although the invitation to recall an 
event in reverse order is mostly used in interviews with collective witnesses (Fisher, 
2010), it has also been used when interviewing suspects (Geiselman, 2012). The 
instruction to recall in reverse order was used in the present experiment in interviews 
with (mock) suspects. Of particular interest was the impact of using different 
interviewers in different stages of an interview, and whether this approach can 
heighten the verbal differences between truth tellers and liars. The present 
experiment examined the effect of (i) having the same interviewers ask both a 
normal chronological order question at Stage One and a reverse order question at 
Stage Two (the ‘same interviewers’ condition) and (ii) changing interviewers after 
Stage One so that the interviewers who ask the normal order question at Stage One 
are different from the interviewers who ask the reverse order question at Stage Two 
(the ‘changed interviewers’ condition).  
For truth tellers, the reverse order question and the introduction of new 
interviewers at Stage Two of the interview may elicit new information. Anderson 
and Pichert (1978) showed that recalling an event from a different perspective 
stimulates an interviewee to think again, subsequently evoking new information. 
Similarly, recalling an event in reverse order in the presence of two new interviewers 
may encourage an interviewee to think harder about the event in question. For liars, 
the reverse order question or the introduction of new interviewers is less likely to 
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result in new information. Liars may find it difficult to come up with new 
information that sounds plausible (Köhnken, 1996, 2004; Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, 
Vernham, & Fisher, 2015). Equally, liars may be discouraged from being detailed as 
this increases the risk of that information being falsified (Hartwig, Granhag, & 
Strömwall, 2007; Masip & Ces, 2011; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012a; Nahari & Vrij, 
2014). Therefore, methods that can evoke new information from truth tellers 
(reverse order recall or the introduction of new interviewers) may not have such an 
effect on liars. With this in mind, it was predicted that at Stage Two truth tellers 
would provide more new details than liars (Hypothesis 1a). It was further predicted 
that truth tellers would provide more new details at Stage Two than liars, particularly 
when confronted with new interviewers (Hypothesis 1b).  
Apart from providing new information at Stage Two, the current study also 
examined the amount of detail provided during the interview and the amount of 
repetition in answers between Stages One and Two. Having the same or new 
interviewers at Stage Two may have opposite effects on truth tellers and liars, 
notably in terms of detail at Stage Two and the amount of repetition between Stages 
One and Two responses. Truth tellers will realise that the new interviewers have not 
heard what they said at Stage One. Therefore, they may be encouraged to be detailed 
at Stage Two and to repeat what they have said previously when new interviewers 
are present. Of course, a good reason for truth tellers to be detailed at Stage Two and 
to repeat themselves when the same interviewers are present is to show consistency 
in their answers. Consistency is widely seen as a sign of honesty (Strömwall, 
Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004). However, because truth tellers typically take their 
credibility for granted (DePaulo et al., 2003; Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998) 
and have no reason to believe that interviewers will doubt them, they are typically 
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not concerned with conveying their honesty (Kassin, 2005; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 
2004). Given that the same interviewers have already heard their story, and given 
that reverse order recall is cognitively demanding, truth tellers may be less 
motivated to tell them the entire story again. 
In contrast, liars may be particularly keen to be detailed at Stage Two and to 
repeat what they have said before when interviewed by the same interviewers. 
Unlike truth tellers, liars do not take their credibility for granted. Also, given that 
consistency is perceived as a sign of honesty, they may be keen to show consistency 
in their answers when the same interviewers are present, resulting in them being 
detailed at Stage Two and repeating what they have said at Stage One. When two 
new interviewers take over the interview, the idea that their answers will be 
compared is less obvious (Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag, 2011). This notion, 
combined with the difficulty of reverse order recall, may result in liars providing a 
shorter statement that includes less detail when two new interviewers are present. It 
was therefore predicted that, because liars may find it difficult to fabricate 
information or may fear that their responses will be falsified, overall truth tellers will 
be more detailed than liars (Hypothesis 2a). It was also predicted that truth tellers 
will be more detailed in the ‘changed interviewers’ condition compared to the ‘same 
interviewers’ condition, whereas liars will be less detailed in the ‘changed 
interviewers’ condition compared to the ‘same interviewers’ condition.  As a result, 
differences in detail between truth tellers and liars will be more pronounced in the 
‘changed interviewers’ condition than in the ‘same interviewers’ condition 
(Hypothesis 2b). The final prediction was that truth tellers will repeat more at Stage 
Two what they have said at Stage One in the ‘changed interviewers’ condition 
compared to the ‘same interviewers’ condition, and conversely, that liars will show 
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less repetition in the ‘changed interviewers’ condition compared to the ‘same 
interviewers’ condition. As a result, differences in repetition between truth tellers 
and liars will be more pronounced in the ‘changed interviewers’ condition than in 
the ‘same interviewers’ condition (Hypothesis 3).  
The idea that liars display less repetition than truth tellers when the questions 
are asked by different interviewers has been noted twice before (Jundi, Vrij, Hope, 
Mann, & Hillman, 2015; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag, 2011). On both occasions, 
the authors speculated that the change of interviewer may have been responsible for 
the reduced overlap in liars’ (compared to truth tellers’) responses. In this article this 
suggestion is put to an empirical test.  
One additional and novel aspect of this experiment is that liars could volunteer 
as little or as much truthful information as they liked. The reason for giving liars this 
opportunity is that it replicates a real life situation where an individual volunteers 
false information in order to mislead the authorities. Of course, in order to appear 
credible someone may provide a mixture of true and false information (lies are also 
often embedded in truthful information, see Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2011), and the 
present study adopts this scenario to create a sense of realism.  
 
4.2 Method  
Design  
A 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Interviewer: same interviewers vs changed 
interviewers) between-subjects design was adopted, with the following dependent 
variables: (i) the number of  details in Stage One recollections; (ii) the number of  
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details in Stage Two recollections; (iii) the frequency of ‘meeting events’ (see 
below) recalled in Stage One recollections; (iv) the frequency of meeting events 
recalled in Stage Two recollections; and (v) the amount of repetition between Stage 
One and Stage Two recollections. 
Participants 
A total of 165 participants (58 males and 107 females) took part in the study. The 
sample was made up of undergraduate students (N = 144), university staff (N = 18), 
and members of the general public (N = 3). The average age was M = 22.56 years 
(SD = 6.64 years). 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via posters, leaflets, and online advertisements on the 
University’s staff and student portals. An advert was also placed in a local 
newspaper. Participants were invited to play the role of a secret agent, attending a 
meeting and then an interview. The advert provided contact details and offered a £5 
reward to those who were convincing in the interview.  
After arriving at the Department, participants were informed that they were 
going to play the role of an intelligence officer, attending a secret security meeting 
conducted by an organisation known as ‘HMI’. The participants were then directed 
to a small room where the meeting took place. 
The meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to vote on a suitable location to plant 
a spy device, and included a visual presentation of the following details: the three 
members (confederates) present at the meeting; the spy device and its physical and 
technical features; and the shortlisted locations suitable to host the device, including 
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floor plans and details on suitability. Before the third and final location (a hotel 
reception) was presented, the meeting was interrupted, triggering a vote on which 
location should host the device. The outcome of this vote was pre-determined, and 
the participant’s vote could not affect the result (the three confederates voted for a 
predetermined site, therefore the vote was either unanimously in favour of one 
location, or the participant was outvoted by three votes to one)  
The participant then returned to the room where s/he started the experiment. It 
was at this stage that all participants were randomly assigned to a veracity condition, 
either truth tellers (N = 82) or liars (N = 83). 
Prior to being interviewed, the truth tellers were informed that a sister organisation, 
HMR, was aware of the meeting they had just attended. Truth tellers were told that 
HMR knew who HMI are looking for, and had been pursuing this person for some 
time. Truth tellers were therefore instructed to have an interview with HMR and 
volunteer information about the content of meeting. They were told that their task 
was to fully cooperate with the interviewers and to volunteer all the information they 
asked for. In addition, the experimenter informed truth tellers that they would 
receive £5 as a reward if they managed to convince the interviewers. Alternatively, 
if they failed to convince the interviewers, they would have to write a report about 
the meeting instead. (All participants in this experiment, truth tellers and liars, 
received the £5 for taking part, and no one had to write a report). Finally, before 
being led to the interview room, truth tellers completed a ‘Pre-Interview 
Questionnaire’ which measured how motivated they were to perform well in the 
interview. This was measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from [1] ‘Not at 
all motivated’ to [5] ‘Very motivated’.   
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On returning from the meeting, the liars were first informed that a foreign 
intelligence agency, ‘EFA’, was aware of the meeting they had attended. To prevent 
an investigation into HMI (the organisation that conducted the meeting), liars were 
told that they must now meet with EFA and do their utmost to convince the EFA 
interviewers that they were telling the truth. The liars’ task required them to provide 
a mixture of truthful and false information. The truthful information, it was argued, 
would help convince EFA that they were being cooperative. Therefore, liars were 
first instructed to be completely honest about the room where the meeting took 
place, and the location that did not win the vote. Second, they were told that they 
must be completely dishonest about the location that did win the vote. In all cases, 
liars were instructed to say that the Hotel Reception was the location selected to host 
the device, and make up the following details: a floor plan, one reason why it was a 
suitable location, and one reason why it is not. Finally, liars were told that EFA 
knew something about the spy device and who attended the meeting, though it’s not 
clear what they knew. As a result, to appear cooperative, liars’ third task was to 
provide a mixture of truthful and false information about the device, and the people 
present at the meeting. How much truthful and false information provided was at the 
discretion of the participant. Liars also received the same information as truth tellers 
regarding the reward for being convincing and the penalty for being unconvincing. 
Liars also completed the same ‘Pre-Interview Questionnaire’. Liars were then left 
alone and given as much time as they needed to think about the details of the Hotel 
Reception. They were not provided with any writing materials during this time. 
Also, the time (in seconds) that liars took to consider what they would say about the 
Hotel Reception was recorded by the experimenter (M = 264.63 seconds, SD = 
149.01 seconds, ranging between 70 and 900 seconds). 
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The Interview. The interview protocol consisted of two interviewers. A two 
interviewer protocol is frequently adopted by the police (Driskell, Blickensderfer, & 
Salas, 2013; Sim & Lamb, 2012) and intelligence agencies (Soufan, 2011), and thus 
reflects real life. Four interviewers were used, all female, aged between 31-54. The 
interviewers had not been formally trained in investigative interviewing, but had 
extensive experience interviewing participants in previous experiments. All 
interviewers were blind to the experimental hypotheses.  Before the interview 
commenced, the speaking interviewer introduced herself and the silent interviewer, 
stressing that the silent interviewer had been trained to detect deception in 
interviews. The interviewee was also informed that the interviewers knew that s/he 
had attended the meeting with HMI, and that the purpose of the meeting was to 
select a location to host a spy device.  
The interview schedule consisted of two stages. Stage One required 
participants to recall what happened during the meeting in normal chronological 
order, and Stage Two required participants to recall the meeting in reverse order. 
Participants also responded to questions about the meeting room, the device, the 
locations, and the confederates present at the meeting. While participants’ responses 
to these questions were also transcribed and coded, the results are beyond the scope 
of the present article, and the data is not included in the analyses. The complete 
interview schedule is included in Appendix 3.  
The ‘Interviewer’ manipulation was implemented immediately after participants had 
answered questions in Stage One. In the ‘same interviewers’ condition, a 
confederate entered the room and passed a note to the speaking interviewer. The 
confederate then exited the room, and both interviewers read the note (without 
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revealing its contents to the interviewee) before proceeding to Stage Two of the 
interview. In the ‘changed interviewers’ condition, two new interviewers (one silent 
and one speaking) entered the room. Following the exchange of a note between the 
new and existing speaking interviewers, the existing pair of interviewers exited the 
room and were replaced by the new pair. Participants were not given an indication as 
to why the interviewers changed. The speaking interviewer from the new pair 
introduced herself and the new silent interviewer, explaining that they would be 
conducting the interview henceforth. Stage Two commenced after the interviewers 
had changed.  
All participants then completed a ‘Post-Interview Questionnaire’ in which 
they estimated the likelihood that they would receive the £5 (measured on a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from [1] ‘Not at all likely’ to [7] ‘Very likely), and the 
likelihood that they would have to write a statement (measured on a seven-point 
Likert scale ranging from [1] ‘Not at all likely’ to [7] ‘Very likely).  
The questionnaire also examined what the participants could remember about 
the device, the locations, and the confederates. Knowing participants’ actual 
memory of the meeting enabled the calculation of how much remembered 
information was volunteered by each participant during their interview. After 
completing the questionnaire, the participants were debriefed and received £5 for 
taking part.  
Counterbalancing. The following stimuli were counterbalanced: the locations 
presented in the meeting; the location that was voted for in the meeting; and the pair 
of interviewers that changed during in the interviews. 
74 
 
Coding 
Overview.  The amount of detail conveyed in Stage One and Stage Two was coded 
subjectively and objectively. The amount of repetition between Stage One and Stage 
Two responses was also recorded, as well as any new information provided at Stage 
Two that was not provided at Stage One, again coded subjectively and objectively.  
 Subjective Detail. The interviews were videotaped, audiotaped and 
transcribed, and the subjective ratings of detail were derived from the transcripts. A 
coder blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions rated participants’ 
responses using a seven-point scale, ranging from one (low on valuable detail) to 
seven (high on valuable detail). The responses were not coded, however, according 
to the accuracy of the details provided. The amount of valuable detail was 
determined by the degree to which the participant went into detail about events or 
topics they introduced. For example, the response ‘The meeting started with some 
introductions, then I saw the device, then we looked at some locations, then we had a 
vote, and then I left’ would be rated as low on valuable detail, as topics are 
introduced without further description. In contrast, the response ‘The meeting started 
with Mr. Black introducing himself, saying that he was the operations manager and 
that he had worked at the company for seven years’ offers a much more detailed 
account of individual topics, and therefore would have been rated high on valuable 
detail.  
A second coder also blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions 
coded for the same details using a sub sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-
rater reliability between the two coders for the Stage One (Intra-class Correlation 
Coefficient, ICC = .93) and Stage Two details (ICC = .86) was very high.  
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Subjective Repetition. To determine the amount of repetition between 
participants’ responses, again using the transcripts, Stage Two responses were 
compared with Stage One responses. A coder blind to the hypotheses and 
experimental conditions compared participants’ responses, rating them using a 
seven-point scale ranging from one (low in repetition) to seven (high in repetition). 
A response would be rated as high in repetition if much of the detail mentioned in 
Stage One recollections were repeated in Stage Two recollections, and no 
contradictions emerged between the Stage One and Stage Two recollections. It 
should be noted, however, that contradictions rarely occurred. Only eight 
contradictions were noted in the 165 transcripts by the objective coder. A similar 
measure of repetition was used by Vrij et al. (2009). A second coder, also blind to 
the hypotheses and experimental conditions, also coded for repetition using a sub 
sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-rater reliability between the two coders 
(ICC = .60) was satisfactory. 
Subjective New Information. To determine the amount of new valuable 
detail in participants’ Stage Two responses, Stage Two responses were compared 
with Stage One responses. A coder blind to the hypotheses and experimental 
conditions compared participants’ responses, rating them using a seven-point scale, 
ranging from one (low in new information) to seven (high in new information). A 
response would be rated high in new information if the participant introduced new 
information, and subsequently went into detail about the new event or topic. 
Therefore, the coding of new information was identical to the coding of detail, 
except that it only applied to new information. A second coder also blind to the 
hypotheses and experimental conditions coded for the same details using a sub 
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sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-rater reliability between the two coders for 
new information (Intra-class Correlation Coefficient, ICC = .92) was very high.  
Objective Detail. The verbal coding was also derived from the transcripts. A 
coder blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions read each response 
carefully and marked every detail the interviewee gave. A second coder also blind to 
the hypotheses and experimental conditions coded for details using a sub sample of 
42 transcripts (25%). The inter-rater reliability between the two coders for the Stage 
One (Intra-class Correlation Coefficient, ICC = .98) and Stage Two details (ICC = 
.97) was very high.  
Meeting Events.  In order to objectively measure the amount of repetition and 
new information present in participants’ responses, a checklist was created 
comprising the key events of the meeting. The checklist was derived from the script 
that confederates used to carry out the mock security meeting. The author of this 
thesis, who created the script and experimental scenario, used the script to identify 
the key events that took place at the meeting. Consideration was taken to ensure that 
each event was clear and distinct from other events during the meeting, and that all 
individual events were of a similar length. After dissecting the script, 18 key events 
were identified as meeting the above criteria, and these 18 events make up the 
meeting events checklist. 
 A coder blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions scored 
participants’ responses using the meeting events checklist. Participants could score a 
maximum of 18 points if they mentioned all events on the checklist, and they scored 
zero points if none of the details they mentioned were on the checklist. To 
demonstrate how the checklist works, item 16 on the checklist was: ‘All members 
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cast their votes by a show of hands for each location’. In order to score a point for 
each item, the participant must clearly make a reference to that event. If a 
participant’s response did not have a clear meaning, then s/he did not score a point 
for that particular item. The complete checklist of key events coded is included in 
the Appendices (Appendix 4). 
A second coder also blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions 
coded participants’ responses using a sub sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-
rater reliability between the two coders for the Stage One (ICC = .99) and Stage Two 
(ICC= .98) checklist scores was high. The ‘total detail’ and ‘checklist’ variables 
were significantly correlated with each other in both Stage One, r(165) = .69, p < 
.001, and Stage Two, r(165) = .60, p < .001.  
Objective Repetition. To calculate the repetition score, a coder blind to the 
hypotheses and experimental conditions compared the checklist scores from the 
Stage One and Stage Two responses. Events mentioned at Stage 1 and at Stage 2 
were summed to create the repetition score. Therefore, if a participant mentioned 
events 1-10 at Stage 1, and events 1-7 at Stage 2, their repetition score would be 7, 
and scores could range from 0 to 18. The few contradictions that occurred in the 
transcripts were then deducted from that score where applicable. 
A second coder, also blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions, 
coded participants’ responses using a sub sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-
rater reliability between the two coders for repetition (ICC = .92) was high.  
Objective New Information. To calculate the new information score, a coder 
blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions compared the checklist scores 
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from the Stage One and Stage Two responses. Events mentioned at Stage 2 but not 
at Stage 1 were summed to create the new information score.  The score could range 
from 0 to 18.  
A second coder also blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions 
coded participants’ responses using a sub sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-
rater reliability between the two coders for new information (ICC = .96) was high.  
Correlations between Subjective and Objective Coding. While it should be 
noted that subjective and objective coding schemes did not measure the exact same 
phenomena, correlations between the schemes were carried out for interest. The 
correlation between subjective and objective detail coding was satisfactory, r = .67 
for Stage One detail and r = .67 for Stage Two detail. The correlation between 
subjective new information and objective new information was also satisfactory, r = 
.55. The correlation between subjective and objective repetition coding was lower, r 
= .44, but it should be noted that the subjective and objective repetition coding 
measured slightly different things. Subjective repetition measured the repetition 
between the statements as a whole, whereas objective repetition measured the 
repeated mentioning of key events of the meeting only. 
4.3 Results 
Motivation, Incentive and Penalty. Participants were motivated to do well in the 
experiment ([M = 4.33, SD = .69] on a five-point Likert scale), with 43% reporting 
that they were ‘quite motivated’ (score of 4), and 44% ‘very motivated’ (score of 5). 
A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANOVA with motivation as the dependent 
variable revealed no significant main or interaction effects (all Fs <.77, all ps >.380) 
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indicating that participants’ motivation level was similar across the experimental 
conditions.  
 A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANOVA regarding the likelihood of 
receiving the £5 reward resulted in a main effect for Veracity, F (1, 161) = 41.85, p 
<.001, η2 = .21, d = 1.01. Truth tellers (M = 4.83, SD = 1.33) more than liars (M = 
3.40, SD = 1.51) were inclined to think that they would receive a £5 incentive. The 
Interviewers main effect and the Veracity X Interviewers interaction effect were not 
significant, both Fs <.3.71, both ps >.056.  
 A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANOVA regarding the likelihood of having 
to write a report resulted in a main effect for Veracity, F (1, 161) = 42.94, p <.001, 
η2 = .21, d = 1.04. Liars (M = 4.52, SD = 1.62) more than truth tellers (M = 3.03, SD 
= 1.23) were inclined to think that they would be requested to write an essay. The 
Interviewer main effect and the Veracity X Interviewers interaction effect were not 
significant, both Fs <2.15, both ps >.144. Taken together, the above analyses suggest 
that participants were motivated to be convincing and that the incentive and penalty 
appeared realistic.  
Meeting Recollections. Three 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANOVAs examining 
participants’ post interview recollections of the device, the locations, and the 
confederates resulted in no significant main or interaction effects (all Fs <1.51, all ps 
>.221), indicating that participants’ memory of the meeting was similar amongst the 
experimental conditions. The lack of an ‘Interviewers’ effect (or interaction) 
suggests that any differences in detail reported during the interview reflect the 
strategies employed by truth tellers and liars. Participants correctly recalled 84.75% 
of the device characteristics, 86.50% of the locations characteristics and 67.44% of 
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the confederate’s characteristics. This represents a satisfactory memory of the 
meeting.  
Hypothesis Testing 
New Information. A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANCOVA with participants’ 
additions at Stage Two (new information) as the dependent variable (subjective 
coding) and the Stage One subjective details score as covariate6 revealed a 
significant main effect for Veracity, F (1, 160) = 12.62, p  = .001, η2 = .07, d = .42. 
Truth tellers (M = 2.38, SD = 1.30) gave more new information than liars (M = 1.90, 
SD = 1.00), supporting Hypothesis 1a. The Interviewers main effect, F (1, 160) = 
1.45, p = .23, η2 = .009, and the Veracity X Interviewers interaction effect, F (1, 
160) = 2.93, p = .089, η2 = .02, were not significant. The absence of an interaction-
effect means that Hypothesis 1b was not supported.  
A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewer) ANCOVA with participants’ objective new 
information at Stage Two as the dependent variable and the Stage One objective 
details score as covariate revealed a significant main effect for Veracity, F (1, 160) = 
4.06, p  = .045, η2 = .025, d = .08. Truth tellers (M = 2.46, SD 2.28) offered more 
new information than liars (M = 2.28, SD = 2.01), supporting Hypothesis 1a. The 
Interviewer main effect, F (1, 160) = .20, p = .660, η2 = .001, and the Veracity X 
Interviewer interaction effect, F (1, 160) = 0.01, p = .926, η2 < .001, were not 
significant. The absence of an interaction-effect means that Hypothesis 1b was not 
supported.  
                                                          
6 The new information at Stage Two results could have been affected by the Stage One subjective details results. 
For example, if someone was very detailed at Stage One, new information at Stage Two is less likely to occur. 
Subjective details as Stage One was therefore introduced as a covariate. 
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Detail. A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANCOVA with the Stage Two subjective 
details as dependent variable was carried out. Since the Stage Two subjective detail 
are linked with the Stage One subjective detail (the Stage One and Stage Two detail 
within the same interviewee was compared) subjective detail at Stage One was 
introduced as a covariate (which was significant, F (1, 160) = 35.87, p <.001, η2 = 
.18).7 The analysis revealed a main effect for Veracity, F (1, 160) = 13.90, p <.001, 
η2 = .08, d = .68. Truth tellers (M = 4.45, SD = 1.28) provided significantly more 
detailed responses than liars (M = 3.63, SD = 1.13), supporting Hypothesis 2a. The 
Interviewers main effect was not significant, F (1, 160) = .51, p = .475, η2 = <.01, 
but the Veracity X Interviewers interaction effect was, F (1, 160) = 7.83, p = .006, η2 
= .05.  
                                                          
7An alternative analysis would be a 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interview) X 2 (Time: Stage One versus Stage Two) 
analysis. The disadvantage of this analysis is that at Stage One the ‘Same/Changed Interviewers’ manipulation 
was not yet introduced, whereas the analysis treats the Stage One data as if this factor was introduced at Stage 
One. 
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Figure 4.1. Subjective detail at Stage Two as a Function of Veracity and Interviewer. 
Error bars represent confident intervals (95%).  
Figure 4.1 shows that truth tellers gave more detail in the ‘changed interviewers’ 
condition than in the ‘same interviewers’ condition, whereas liars gave less detail in 
the ‘changed interviewers’ condition than in the ‘same interviewers’ condition. In 
the ‘same interviewers’ condition, truth tellers (M = 4.17, SD = 1.10) and liars were 
equally detailed (M = 3.84, SD = 1.21), F (1, 82) = .37, p = .548, η2 <.01, d = .29. In 
the ‘changed interviewers’ condition, truth tellers (M = 4.75, SD = 1.39) were more 
detailed than liars (M = 3.40, SD = 1.01), F (1, 77) = 19.27, p <.001, η2 = .20, d = 
1.11. This supports Hypothesis 2b. 
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A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewer) ANCOVA was conducted with the objective details 
variable from Stage Two as dependent variable and the Stage One objective details 
as covariate. The analysis revealed a main effect for Veracity, F (1, 160) = 21.13, p 
<.001, η2 = .12, d = .97. Truth tellers (M = 28.91, SD = 12.06) provided significantly 
more detailed responses that liars (M = 19.00, SD = 7.87). The Interviewer main 
effect was not significant, F (1, 160) = .68, p = .410, η2 = .004, but the Veracity X 
Interviewer interaction effect was, F (1, 160) = 5.49, p = .020, η2 = .03. In the ‘same 
interviewers’ condition truth tellers (M = 27.29, SD = 10.85) and liars (M = 19.63, 
SD = 8.09) gave a similar amount of detail, F (1, 82) = 2.66, p = .107, η2 = .03, d 
=.80. In the ‘changed interviewers’ condition, truth tellers (M = 30.63, SD = 13.13) 
gave significantly more details than liars (M = 18.33, SD = 7.67), F (1, 77) = 20.69, 
p <.001, η2 = .21, d = 1.14. This supports Hypothesis 2b. 
Repetition. A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANCOVA with participants’ 
subjective repetition scores as the dependent variable and the Stage One subjective 
details score as covariate (which was significant, F (1, 160) = 117.56, p <.001, η2 = 
.42)8. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for Veracity, F (1, 160) = 6.41, 
p = .012, η2 = .04, d = .55. Truth tellers (M = 3.76, SD 1.39) showed more repetition 
than liars (M = 3.06, SD = 1.13). The Interviewers main effect, F (1, 160) = .01, p = 
.926, η2 < .001 was not significant, but the Veracity X Interviewers interaction effect 
was, F (1, 160) = 6.33, p = .013, η2 = .04.  
                                                          
8The subjective detail at Stage Two results could have been affected by the Stage One subjective details results. 
For example, those who reported many details at Stage One have a greater likelihood to obtain a higher 
repetition score on Stage Two. Subjective details at Stage One was therefore introduced as a covariate.  
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Figure 4.2. Subjective repetition between Stages One and Two as a Function of 
Veracity and Interviewer. Error bars represent confidence intervals (95%).  
 
Figure 4.2 shows that truth tellers showed more repetition in the ‘changed 
interviewers’ condition than in the ‘same interviewers’ condition, whereas liars 
showed less repetition in the ‘changed interviewers’ condition than in the ‘same 
interviewers’ condition. In the ‘same interviewers’ condition, truth tellers’ (M = 
3.57, SD = 1.25) and liars’ (M = 3.30, SD = 1.28) repetition did not differ from each 
other, F (1, 82) = .01, p = .920, η2 < .01, d =.21. In the ‘changed interviewers’ 
condition, truth tellers repeated themselves more (M = 3.95, SD = 1.52) than liars (M 
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= 2.80, SD = .88), F (1, 77) = 13.62, p <.001, η2 = .15, d =.93. This supports 
Hypothesis 3. 
A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewer) ANCOVA with participants’ objective repetition 
scores as dependent variable and the Stage One objective detail as covariate revealed 
a main effect for Veracity, F (1, 160) = 10.79, p =.001, η2 = .06, d = 0.80. Truth 
tellers repeated themselves more (M = 8.26, SD = 3.52) than liars (M = 5.81, SD = 
2.62). The main effect for Interviewer was not significant, F (1, 160) = .01, p = .910, 
η2 <.001, but the Veracity X Interviewer interaction effect was, F (1, 160) = 8.61, p 
= .004, η2 = .05. In the ‘same interviewers’ condition, truth tellers (M = 7.86, SD = 
3.54) and liars (M = 6.35, SD = 2.84) did not differ in terms of repetition, F (1, 82) = 
.009, p = .924, η2 < .001.  In the ‘changed interviewers’, truth tellers repeated 
themselves more (M = 8.78, SD = 3.43) than liars (M = 5.33, SD = 2.32), F (1, 77) = 
21.88, p <.001, η2 = .22, d = 1.17. This supports Hypothesis 3. 
Discussion 
In the present experiment truth tellers and liars were first asked to recall an event in 
chronological order (Stage One) and then in reverse order (Stage Two). This study 
examined the effect of changing interviewers between the two stages or keeping the 
same interviewers throughout on cues to deceit (new information, level of detail and 
repetition in answers).  
The ‘changed interviewers’ condition was more successful in eliciting cues to 
deceit than the ‘same interviewers’ condition. When the same interviewers were 
present throughout the interview, no differences emerged between truth tellers and 
liars in terms of the amount of detail in Stage Two, and the amount of repetition 
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between Stages One and Two. In contrast, when confronted with new interviewers at 
Stage Two truth tellers were more detailed in Stage Two than liars, and their 
answers in Stages Two showed more repetition than the answers given by liars. 
Truth tellers were more detailed in recalling again what they had witnessed 
when confronted with new interviewers than when confronted with the same 
interviewers. The new interviewers had not heard their story before, which may have 
encouraged the truth tellers to say more.  In contrast, liars were less detailed in 
telling their story again when confronted with new interviewers than when 
confronted with the same interviewers. To convey honesty, liars may wish to 
produce consistent responses, but the need to do this may be less when confronted 
with new interviewers who have not heard their previous answer than when 
confronted with the same interviewers who have heard their previous answers 
before.  
The findings that truth tellers and liars showed similar repetition in the ‘same 
interviewers’ condition and that liars showed less repetition than truth tellers in the 
‘changed interviewers’ condition, sheds new light on the ongoing debate about 
whether liars are more or less consistent than truth tellers. The idea that liars are less 
consistent than truth tellers is a popular view amongst practitioners (Strömwall, 
Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004) and promoted in police manuals (Vrij & Granhag, 2007), 
but research shows that liars are not always less consistent than truth tellers (Fisher, 
Vrij, & Leins, 2013). In this respect, Granhag and colleagues introduced the 
‘reconstruct – versus repeat’ hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 2001; 
Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003), which states that when asked to report 
information for a second time, truth tellers will search their memory for the original 
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event and will reconstruct their story again based on these memoires. In contrast, 
liars will think about what they have said the first time and will try to repeat this 
information. Repetition may lead to the same level or even to more consistency than 
reconstruction. The present results suggests that when confronted with two new 
interviewers, truth tellers’ tendency to ‘reconstruct’ and liars’ tendency to ‘repeat’ is 
weakened. The end result is that truth tellers repeat themselves more, and liars repeat 
themselves less. The notion that liars are likely to be less consistent than truth tellers 
only after a change of format is introduced, was also found by Leins, Vrij, and 
Fisher (2012). In their experiment, truthful participants had visited a room whereas 
deceptive participants had not. However, in the interview all participants claimed to 
have visited the room. Participants were asked to verbally recall the layout of the 
room twice, to sketch it twice, or to verbally recall it once and to sketch it once. 
Liars contradicted themselves more than truth tellers, but only in the ‘verbal recall – 
drawing’ condition. In other words, to find differences in consistency between truth 
tellers and liars, it may be necessary to introduce a change in strategy when asking 
for the same information, either by using different interviewers (the present 
experiment) or by asking the same question in different formats (Leins et al., 2012).  
The findings suggest that ‘external factors’ (such as changing versus 
maintaining the same interviewers) can have a profound effect on consistency in 
truth tellers’ and liars’ responses. It may well be that truth tellers and liars have 
different interview strategies which are highlighted by external factors. Future 
research could attempt to shed light on the external factors that highlight such 
strategies. 
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One of the hypotheses was not supported. Although truth tellers provided, as 
predicted, more new information at Stage Two than liars did, having the same or 
new interviewers at Stage Two did not affect the amount of new information truth 
tellers gave. It was predicted that truth tellers would give more new information with 
new interviewers, because of the expectation that this change in interviewers would 
stimulate them to search their memory for more detail. It is not clear why the 
predicted effect did not occur. The request to report the event in reverse order 
already triggered truth tellers to provide new information and perhaps this task 
overshadowed the effect that new interviewers may have on eliciting new 
information. 
One noteworthy limitation of this experiment is the lack of a more 
comprehensive objective coding scheme to calculate the repetition and new 
information scores. For example, coding each individual detail at Stage 1, and then 
identifying which of those details were repeated at Stage 2 would have provided a 
more informed repetition score. While the adopted approach (breaking down the 
meeting into key events) captured most examples of repetition, some evidence of 
repetition was likely missed, and this must be taken into account when considering 
the findings.  
The ‘same interviewers’ condition is the standard procedure in the Cognitive 
Interview (CI, Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). This procedure should not be changed 
based on the findings presented in this experiment. The reverse order question in the 
CI is designed to elicit new information. The Reverse Order question did elicit new 
information and this was not influenced by the interviewer condition. In the present 
experiment the author was also interested in the repetition of information previously 
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reported, something the CI is less concerned about. It is in this elicitation of old 
information where the interviewer condition differentiated truth tellers and liars. In 
other words, if the interviewer has no reason to believe that the interviewee is lying, 
which is often the case in the Cognitive Interview as it is mainly used when 
interviewing cooperative witnesses (Fisher, 2010), only the elicitation of new 
information is relevant and therefore there is no need to change interviewers during 
the interview. 
 
The present experiment compliments the new wave of ‘interviewing to detect 
deception’ research aimed at eliciting cues to deceit through specific interventions 
(Vrij & Granhag, 2012).  Since truth tellers said more than liars, particularly in the 
‘changed interviewers’ condition, this manipulation fits particularly well in the 
‘encouraging truth tellers to say more’ research domain (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, 
Vernham, & Fisher, 2015). Encouraging truth tellers to say more has several 
benefits. It addresses the core of investigative interviewing, which is to obtain as 
much information as possible from interviewees (Fisher, 2010). In addition, if truth 
tellers provide lots of information they are more likely to be believed, because the 
richer an account is perceived to be, the more likely it is to be believed (Bell & 
Loftus, 1989; Johnson, 2006; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Finally, the 
additional information truth tellers provide could provide leads for investigators to 
pursue.  
Methods that encourage truth tellers to say more are unlikely to have the same 
effect on liars. First, liars may find it too cognitively demanding to add as many 
details as truth tellers do. Moreover, if liars do add a sufficient amount of detail, the 
additional information may be of lesser quality or may sound less plausible (Leal et 
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al., 2015). Finally, liars may be reluctant to add more information out of fear that it 
will provide leads to investigators and, consequently, give their lies away (Nahari, 
Vrij, & Fisher, 2012a). 
In conclusion, the present experiment demonstrated the beneficial effect of 
changing interviewers half-way through an interview, notably when interviewers 
discuss the same topics twice over the course of an interview. In their second 
response, truth tellers provided more new information, more detail overall and 
repeated themselves more compared to liars, but only if the interviewers had 
changed half-way through the interview.  The findings challenge previous findings 
(Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 2001; Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003) where 
liars appeared more consistent than truth tellers. The present findings highlight the 
complex relationship between consistency and deception, suggesting that 
consistency may depend on both internal (such as retrieval strategies) and external 
factors (such as interview setting).  
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Chapter 5: Experiment 3b 
Mimicry and investigative interviewing: Using 
deliberate mimicry to elicit information and cues to 
deceit 
Foreword 
The following chapter is based on the 2015 article with the same name published in 
the Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling. As mentioned 
previously, Experiments 3a and 3b examine the same data set. However, it should be 
noted that Experiment 3b examines the impact of a mimicry manipulation in Stage 
One, before the Interviewers manipulation was implemented. Therefore, unlike 
Experiment 3a, it was not necessary to check for an interaction between the 
Interviewers (changed vs same interviewers) variable and the Mimicry (present vs 
absent) independent variable.  
 
Abstract 
The present study examined the effect of deliberate mimicry on eliciting (accurate) 
information and cues to deceit. Mimicry is considered to facilitate cooperation and 
compliance in truth tellers, whereas liars are limited in their ability provide detailed 
accounts. It was therefore predicted that truth tellers would be more detailed than liars, 
particularly after being mimicked. A total of 165 participants told the truth or lied about 
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a meeting they attended. In half of the interviews, a second interviewer deliberately 
mimicked participants’ non-verbal behaviour. Truth tellers were more detailed than 
liars, but only in the ‘mimicry present’ condition. Truth tellers also gave more accurate 
units of information than liars, and the difference was most pronounced in the ‘mimicry 
present’ condition. Mimicry as a tool for eliciting information and cues to deceit fits 
well with the emerging ‘interviewing to detect deception’ literature, particularly in the 
‘encouraging interviewees to say more’ approach. 
  
5.1 Introduction 
In the last decade researchers have started to examine ways to elicit verbal cues to 
deceit during interviews (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). One technique currently being 
tested is encouraging interviewees to say more, which results in less detailed and 
less plausible answers from liars compared to truth tellers (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, 
Vernham, & Fisher, 2015; Mann et al., 2013; Shaw et al., 2014). Encouraging 
interviewees to say more links particularly well with the core principles of 
interviewing: to obtain as much information as possible (Bull, 2010; Fisher, 2010; 
Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin, & Horowitz, 2007). Therefore, any (ethical) 
strategy that encourages interviewees to say more is valuable. The relationship 
between interviewer and interviewee can affect how much information is yielded in 
forensic interviews (Vallano & Compo, 2011; Walsh & Bull, 2012). The present 
study examines whether deliberate mimicry, a method to enhance the relationship 
between interviewer and interviewee, encourages interviewees to say more and 
thereby magnify differences between truth tellers and liars in terms of detail they 
offer.  
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 People often automatically (and unconsciously) mimic the behaviour of their 
interaction partners, as seeing someone behave in a particular way activates a 
behavioural representation, causing the perceiver to adopt the exhibited behaviour 
(for a review, see Chartrand and Bargh, 1999). Mimicry may have evolved to serve a 
social function by fostering relationships (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 
2003). Humans have a fundamental need to belong and affiliate (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995) and mimicry is conceived as a strategy for facilitating affiliation, a sort 
of ‘social glue’ (Lakin et al., 2003). When two interaction partners share an 
embodied state, they are likely to activate the same cognitions and affective states 
(Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003). This shared mental state creates in 
both the mimicker and the perceiver enhanced feelings of empathy and rapport 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stel, van Baaren, & Vonk, 2008; Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003).  
There is also evidence to suggest that deliberate mimicry of another person’s 
nonverbal behaviour can benefit social interaction. In Chartrand and Bargh (1999) 
participants completed a task with a confederate. In the experimental condition, the 
confederate deliberately mimicked participants’ mannerisms, and in the control 
condition the confederate displayed neutral mannerisms. Participants who were 
mimicked reported liking the confederate more, and felt that their interaction had 
been more smooth and harmonious.  
Research also suggests that deliberate mimicry can promote pro-social 
behaviour and compliance, which would be of great benefit in forensic interviews. 
Regarding pro-social behaviour, Van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, and Van 
Knippenberg (2003) instructed a waitress to mimic the verbal behaviour of her 
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customers, simply by repeating back their order. Over two studies, the findings 
revealed that customers in the mimicry condition tipped more often, and gave 
significantly larger amounts compared to customers in the non-mimicry condition. 
Similarly, in Van Baaren, Holland, Kwakami, and Van Knippenberg (2004), 
participants first completed an unrelated task during which the participants’ posture 
and body orientation was or was not mimicked by an experimenter. The 
experimenter then ‘accidentally’ dropped six pens when walking past the participant. 
Mimicked participants helped the experimenter pick up the pens on every occasion 
compared to only a third in the non-mimicry condition.  
With regard to compliance, Fischer-Lokou, Martin, Guéguen and Lamy 
(2011) instructed confederates to ask pedestrians for directions. In the experimental 
condition, the confederates mimicked the pedestrians’ verbal and nonverbal 
behaviour, whereas in the control condition no mimicry occurred. The mimicked 
pedestrians complied more with an additional request for money and gave 
significantly more than the pedestrians in the control group.  Similar findings were 
obtained in another study of deliberate mimicry and compliance (Guéguen, Martin, 
& Meineri, 2011). Participants were either mimicked or not by a confederate while 
discussing painting photography. After the discussion, the confederate approached 
the participant about help with an essay, adding a time constraint. In the mimicry 
condition, 76% of the participants complied with the confederate’s request compared 
to 46% in the non-mimicry condition. Note that the request for help in these two 
compliance studies was explicit rather than implicit (the participants were asked 
directly rather than having to act spontaneously), which is comparable to an 
interviewer requesting information during an interview. 
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Perhaps more comparable to the realm of investigative interviewing is a 
study conducted by Maddux, Mullen and Galins (2008). In study 1, business school 
students enrolled in a negotiation class were placed into a dyad, and engaged in a 
mock employment negotiation. In half of the negotiations, one member of the dyad 
was instructed to mimic their opponent; in the other half, no mimicry occurred. 
Mimicry facilitated negotiations, yielding greater joint gains compared to dyads in 
the non-mimicry condition. In study two, the experimenter employed the same 
methodology, but made it more difficult for each pair to come to an agreement.  
Again, mimicry facilitated cooperation, helping negotiators to establish compatible 
interests and increased the likelihood of obtaining a deal. 
In the light of the above, deliberate mimicry may enhance cooperation during 
interviews. In (police) interview settings, cooperation is typically defined as a 
willingness to give answers of any significance (Baldwin, 2003; Vrij, 2003). One 
could argue that cooperation could be further operationalised and that the more 
detail an interviewee volunteers, the more cooperative s/he appears to be. Truth 
tellers typically volunteer more detail than liars (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 
2005; Vrij, 2005, 2008), as liars have some constraints. They may be reluctant to be 
detailed as they run the risk that such detail can be falsified by an investigator  
(Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Masip & Ces, 2011; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 
2012a) and they may lack the imagination to conjure up details that sound plausible 
(Köhnken, 1996, 2004; Leal et al., 2015). Liars may also want to limit the amount of 
false information they provide so that they have less false information to remember 
in case they are interviewed again (Vrij, 2008). If deliberate mimicry encourages 
interviewees to cooperate, it could magnify the differences between truth tellers and 
liars in terms of detail, as reluctance to be detailed and a lack of imagination makes 
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it less likely that liars will add detail compared to truth tellers. It was therefore 
hypothesised that the difference between truth tellers and liars in reporting detail will 
be more pronounced in the mimicry present than in the mimicry absent condition 
(Hypothesis 1).  
Given that mimicry can increase levels of cooperation and compliance, it is 
interesting to examine whether mimicry would also result in liars volunteering more 
accurate information. This is an important question often ignored in deception 
research, which mainly focuses on ‘cues to deceit’. This focus differs from the aim 
of an investigative interview, which is to elicit accurate information from an 
interviewee (Bull, 2010; Fisher, 2010). Liars rarely make up entire stories but 
typically embed their lies in truthful stories (Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013; Vrij, 
2008), which means that liars provide a combination of false and accurate 
information. It is therefore relevant to examine whether certain interview techniques 
encourage liars to provide more accurate information.  It is also important to know if 
that technique does not encourage liars to provide more inaccurate information, and 
this was explored in the present experiment. Truth tellers were instructed to say 
nothing but the truth. Liars were instructed to give a mixture of false and accurate 
information, whereby the amount of accurate information they volunteered was up to 
them. The constraints mentioned above (liars’ reluctance to provide too many false 
details and lack of imagination) refer to providing false information, but not to 
providing accurate information, and liars, like truth tellers, could provide additional 
accurate information if they wish to do so.  
Mimicry requires concentration and cognitive effort and an interviewer may 
lack mental resources for this as he or she has to focus on the interview (Patterson, 
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1995). With this in mind, a two-interviewer protocol was adopted, with one speaking 
interviewer and one silent interviewer, with the silent speaker carrying out the 
mimicking. This protocol was adopted as it reflects the way in which two 
interviewers are employed by UK police and by intelligence agencies (Sim & Lamb, 
2012; Soufan, 2011). In addition, one previously noted benefit of using two 
interviewers is that it enables each interviewer to focus on their role within the 
interview (Huber & Power, 1985; Kincaid & Bright, 1957). 
5.2 Method 
Design 
A 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Mimicry: absent vs present) between-
subjects design was used with two dependent variables: (i) the frequency of visual, 
spatial, temporal, action and auditory details in participants’ responses, and (ii) the 
frequency of accurate details volunteered by participants. 
Participants 
A total of 165 participants (58 males and 107 females) took part in the study. 
The sample was made up of undergraduate students (N = 144), university staff (N = 
18), and members of the general public (N = 3). The average age was M = 22.56 
years (SD = 6.64 years). 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via posters, leaflets, and online advertisements on 
the University’s staff and student portals. An advert was also placed in a local 
newspaper. Participants were invited to play the role of a secret agent, attending a 
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meeting and then an interview. The advert provided contact details and offered a £5 
reward to those who were convincing in the interview.  
After arriving at the Psychology Department, the participant was greeted by 
the experimenter and signed an informed consent form before being briefed on their 
task. At this stage, all participants received the same instructions:  
Today you are going to play the role of a junior member of an 
intelligence agency known as ‘HMI’. You will attend a secret meeting with 
three senior members of HMI. The focus of the meeting is to decide on the 
most suitable location to plant a spy device, and you will be required to vote 
on which location you think is best to host the device. The device will be used 
to track a target, someone of great interest to HMI. The meeting will also 
involve some discussion of the device.  It is essential that you remember all 
the details of the meeting, as it will be your job to inform someone else later 
on. Given the sensitive nature of the information, you won’t be able to make 
notes.  
In addition, the experimenter instructed the participant not to introduce 
him/herself or interject during the meeting, and to return to the lab after the meeting 
had finished.  
The meeting. The meeting took place in a small room, which contained a 
table, four chairs, presentation materials (a laptop and a projector) and three 
confederates. The purpose of the meeting was to vote on a suitable location to plant 
a spy device, and included a visual presentation of the following details: the 
background of the three members other than the participant (confederates) present at 
the meeting; the spy device and its physical and technical features; and the 
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shortlisted locations suitable to host the device, including floor plans and details on 
suitability. Before the third and final location (a hotel reception) was presented, a 
scheduled interjection (notification of time constraints) by a confederate triggered a 
vote on which location should host the device. The outcome of this vote was pre-
determined, and the participant’s vote could not affect the result (the three 
confederates voted for a predetermined site, therefore the vote was either 
unanimously in favour of one location, or the participant was outvoted by three votes 
to one)  
The participant then returned to the room where s/he started the experiment. 
It was at this stage that all participants were randomly assigned to a veracity 
condition, either truth tellers (N = 82) or liars (N = 83). Prior to being interviewed, 
the truth tellers were informed that a sister organisation, HMR, was aware of the 
meeting they had attended. HMR knows HMI’s target and have been pursuing this 
person for some time. As a result, HMR want to work with HMI in a joint operation. 
Truth tellers were therefore instructed to have an interview with HMR and volunteer 
information about the meeting’s content. They were told that their task was to 
cooperate fully with the interviewers and to volunteer all the information they asked 
for. In addition, the experimenter informed the truth tellers that they would receive 
£5 as a reward if they managed to convince the HMR interviewers that they were 
telling the truth and cooperative. Alternatively, if they failed to convince the 
interviewers, they would have to write a report about the meeting instead. All 
participants in this experiment, truth tellers and liars, received the £5 for taking part, 
and no one had to write a report. Finally, before being led to the interview room, 
truth tellers completed a ‘Pre-Interview Questionnaire’ which measured how 
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motivated they were to perform well in the interview. This was measured on a five-
point scale ranging from [1] ‘Not at all motivated’ to [5] ‘Very motivated’.   
On returning from the meeting, the liars were first informed that a foreign 
intelligence agency, ‘EFA’, was aware of the meeting they had attended. To prevent 
an investigation into HMI, liars were told that they must now meet with EFA and do 
their upmost to convince the EFA interviewers that they were telling the truth and 
cooperative. The liars’ task required them to provide a mixture of truthful and false 
information. The truthful information, it was argued, would help convince EFA that 
they were being cooperative. Therefore, liars were first instructed to be completely 
honest about the room where the meeting took place, and the location that did not 
win the vote. Second, they were told that they must be completely dishonest about 
the location that did win the vote. In all cases, liars were instructed to say that the 
Hotel Reception was the location selected to host the device, and make up the 
following details: a floor plan, one reason why it was a suitable location, and one 
reason why it was not. Finally, liars were told that EFA knew something about the 
spy device and who attended the meeting, though it’s not clear what they knew. As a 
result, to appear cooperative, liars’ third task was to provide a mixture of truthful 
and false information about the device and the people present at the meeting. How 
much truthful and false information provided was at the discretion of the participant. 
Liars also received the same information as truth tellers regarding the reward for 
being convincing and the penalty for being unconvincing and completed the same 
‘Pre-Interview Questionnaire’. However, before liars started the interview, they were 
left alone and given as much time as they needed to think about the details of the 
Hotel Reception. They were not provided with any writing materials during this 
time. The time (in seconds) that liars took to consider what they would say about the 
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Hotel Reception was recorded by the experimenter. They took on average M = 
264.63 seconds (SD = 149.01 seconds) to prepare themselves and preparation time 
ranged from 70 to 900 seconds. 
The Interview. All interviews were videotaped and the participant was made 
aware of this videotaping. The interview protocol consists of two interviewers, one 
silent and one speaking. The interviewers were blind to the veracity condition and 
did not have any knowledge of the information presented in the meeting. Four 
interviewers were used in total, all female, aged between 31 – 54 years. Before the 
interview commenced, the speaking interviewer introduced herself and the silent 
interviewer, stressing that the silent interviewer had been trained to detect deception 
in interviews. The interviewee was also informed that the interviewers knew s/he 
attended the meeting with HMI, and that the purpose of the meeting was to select a 
location to host a spy device. The interview consisted of two stages. This experiment 
focuses on Stage 1 (see Experiment 3a which examines stage 2 also), which 
consisted of 15 questions examining the content of the meeting and the members 
present. Questions 1-2 focussed on the room where the meeting took place, and what 
occurred during the meeting. Questions 3-12 examined the locations that were 
presented in the meeting, and all the associated details. Questions 13-14 required 
participants to provide information about the device, and its physical and technical 
features. Finally, for Question 15, participants examined a series of photos and were 
required to identify those people present in the meeting, as well as providing details 
about their role in HMI. The complete interview schedule is included in Appendix 3.  
Mimicry. In the mimicry ‘present’ condition (N = 84), from the beginning of 
the interview, the silent interviewer mimicked the posture and mannerisms displayed 
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by the participant (adapted from Chartrand and Bargh, 1999). The interview room 
was set up so that the interviewee was positioned four feet in front of the two 
interviewers, with clear lines of sight between all those present. As soon as the 
participant had taken their seat, the silent interviewer altered her own posture to 
mimic that of the interviewee. With regard to the participants’ mannerisms, the silent 
interviewer mimicked the resting position and stereotyped movement of the legs and 
arms. The silent interviewer did not mimic gesticulations, as this type of mimicry 
may be too obvious and could lead to the mimicry being detected by the interviewee. 
The silent interviewer was extremely careful not to engage in any mimicry that may 
cause the participant to become aware that they were being mimicked (mainly 
gesticulations), as this could have a damaging effect on rapport (Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003). The mimicry manipulation was tested in a pilot study which revealed that a 
silent interviewer was able to mimic the behaviour of interviewees without the 
interviewees realising. In order for the mimicry manipulation to go unnoticed, 
interviewers delayed their mimicry of the interviewees by a few seconds.  In the 
mimicry ‘absent’ condition, no mimicry of the interviewee took place throughout the 
interview; instead the interviewer displayed neutral mannerisms, which remained 
constant throughout the interview. Of those participants who were mimicked (N = 
81), nine reported in the post-interview questionnaire that the silent interviewer was 
mimicking their behaviour. These nine participants did not influence the results, as 
excluding them from the analyses yielded the same results as when they were 
included. Therefore, these participants were included in the analyses. The first 
interviewer was not instructed to mimic the interviewees’ behaviour, and adopted a 
neutral posture (seated upright, legs uncrossed) throughout the interview.  
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After the interview, all participants completed a ‘Post-Interview 
Questionnaire’ examining what the participants could remember about the three 
aspects of the meeting (device, location, and people present at the meeting). First, 
participants were asked to list nine details about the device, including the mnemonic 
(for example, ‘What was the name of the acronym you were given to help remember 
the spy device?’), as well as the four physical and four technical details of the device 
(for each of the eight letters of the mnemonic, participants had to fill in the 
corresponding word, for example, the first letter ‘B’ related to a physical detail of 
the device, and represented the word ‘Black’). Second, the participants had to recall 
six details about the locations presented in the meeting, including: the name of each 
location (for example, ‘In the meeting, which location was voted for?’), and the 
reason why each location was suitable/unsuitable. Finally, the questionnaire had nine 
items relating to the confederates, with three items about their names (for example, 
‘In the meeting, under which names were the other members introduced to you?’), 
three about their roles, and three about their length of service. For each correct detail 
recalled, the participant scored one point, and the total for each topic was then 
calculated. After completing the questionnaire, the participants were debriefed and 
received £5 for taking part.  
Counterbalancing. Three aspects of the procedure (the suggested locations, 
the selected location and the interviewers) were counterbalanced. First, to control for 
any effects on recall resulting from the different locations, the locations were 
counterbalanced. In each meeting, two locations were presented from a selection of 
four. The two locations presented were determined by a schedule ensuring that an 
equal number of participants were exposed to each location.  Second, each meeting 
resulted in a different location winning the vote to host the device, which was also 
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pre-determined for the same reason. The locations themselves were standardised so 
that each location contained the same number of features re-arranged in a different 
format. For example, each location floor plan consisted of three rooms (one L-
shaped, one rectangular, and one square, two of which were labelled, one which 
remained blank), and one labelled object (for example, a table or desk). Third, the 
frequency with which each pair of interviewers was used was counterbalanced, so 
that the four interviewers were used an equal number of times. The interviewers 
never changed role, and the same interviewers remained in their respective role of 
either speaking or silent interviewer.  
Coding 
Objective Detail and Accuracy. A transcript of every interview was created 
using audiotapes from each interview. The verbal coding was derived from the 
transcripts. A coder blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions read each 
answer carefully and marked every detail the interviewee gave. These details were 
then classified as visual, spatial, temporal, action, and auditory. For example, the 
sentence ‘...then I sat down in front of the laptop which was beeping’ contains one 
visual detail (laptop), one spatial detail (in front of), one temporal detail (then), one 
action detail (sat down) and one auditory detail (beeping). All the details coded were 
then combined into one new variable, representing participants’ ‘objective detail’ 
score. This objective detail score could range from 0 (no details given) to an 
indefinite number. In fact, the score ranged from 26 (score obtained by a lying 
participant) to 124 (score obtained by a truth telling participant). A second coder, 
also blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions, coded a sub-sample of 42 
transcripts (25%). The inter-rater reliability between the two coders for objective 
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detail was very high (Intra-class Correlation Coefficient, ICC= .80). For each 
component detail, the results were as follows: visual detail: ICC = .93; spatial detail: 
ICC = .93; temporal detail: ICC = 1.00; action detail: ICC = .81; and auditory detail: 
ICC = .86.  
Accurate Detail. In addition, the coder also marked whether each detail was 
accurate. Note that accurate detail in liars’ responses could only be coded when the 
information volunteered could be coded for accuracy. For example, fictitious details 
relating to hotel reception could not be coded for accuracy, as liars were instructed 
to falsify these details. A series of checklists were created to help the coder score 
each response. Different checklists were used for different parts of the interview. For 
example, one checklist coded the participant’s normal order recollection of what 
occurred in the meeting (Question 2). A participant scored one point for each event 
s/he mentioned that occurred on the checklist (all checklists used to code the data are 
located in Appendix 5). To demonstrate how the checklist works, item 16 on this 
checklist was: ‘All members cast their votes by a show of hands for each location’. 
In order to score a point for this item, the participant must clearly make a reference 
to that event. For example, if the transcript read: ‘After the presentation, we had a 
vote to decide on which location should host the device’, the participant scored one 
point. If a participant’s response did not have a clear meaning (by stating something 
akin to: ‘After that, we all put our hands up’, then s/he did not score a point for that 
particular item. In addition, a participant earned extra points for any additional 
accurate information not present on the checklists. The total accuracy details score 
could thus range from 0 (no accurate information given) to an indefinite number of 
accurate units of information given. In fact, the total accuracy details score ranged 
from eight (score obtained by a lying participant) to 50 (score obtained by a truth 
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telling participant). A second coder, also blind to the hypotheses and experimental 
conditions, coded a sub sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-rater reliability 
between the two coders was very high (Intra-class Correlation Coefficient, ICC= 
.94). 
5.3 Results 
Motivation. Participants were motivated to do well in the experiment (M = 
4.33, SD = .69 on a five-point Likert scale), with 43% reporting that they were ‘quite 
motivated’ (score of 4), and 45% ‘very motivated’ (score of 5). A 2 (Veracity) X 2 
(Mimicry) ANOVA with motivation as the dependent variable revealed no 
significant main or interaction effects (all Fs < .54, all ps> .445) indicating that 
participants’ motivation level was similar amongst the experimental conditions.  
Accurate Detail Remembered. Three 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Mimicry) ANOVAs 
examining participants’ post-interview recollections of the device, locations, and 
confederates resulted in no significant main or interaction effects (all Fs <.87, all 
ps>.353) indicating that participants’ memory of the meeting was similar amongst 
the experimental conditions. The participants correctly recalled 84.75% of the device 
characteristics, 86.50% of the locations characteristics and 67.44% of the 
confederate’s characteristics. This represents a satisfactory memory of the meeting.  
Hypothesis Testing 
Objective detail. A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Mimicry) ANOVA with objective 
detail as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect for Veracity, F (1, 
161) = 8.27, p = .005, η2 = .05, d = .46, whereas the Mimicry main effect, F (1, 161) 
= 2.86, p = .093, η2 = .02, and the Veracity X Mimicry interaction effect, F (1, 161) 
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= 2.89, p = .091, η2 = .02, were not significant.  Regarding the Veracity main effect, 
truth tellers (M = 58.10, SD = 23.05) provided more details that liars (M = 49.16, SD 
= 16.20). The interaction statistics (p = .091) refer, of course, to any type of 
interaction. However, the hypothesis predicted a specific type of interaction based 
on theory and previous mimicry research and the pattern of results matched the 
pattern of results predicted in Hypothesis 1. In alignment with Nahari and Ben-
Shakhar (2011), this justifies further examination of the data, specifically examining 
the difference between truth tellers and liars in the two mimicry conditions 
separately, as this addresses Hypothesis 1. Truth tellers provided more detail in the 
mimicry ‘present’ condition (M = 63.16, SD = 22.19, 95% CI [56.23, 70.10]) than in 
the mimicry ‘absent’ condition (M = 52.78, SD = 23.00, 95% CI [45.67, 59.88]), 
F(1, 80) = 4.34, p = .04, η2 = .05, d = .46, whereas liars gave a similar amount of 
detail in the mimicry ‘present’ (M = 49.14, SD = 16.19, 95% CI [44. 14, 54.15]) and 
mimicry ‘absent’ (M = 49.17, SD = 16.41, 95% CI [44.11, 54.24]) conditions, 
F(1,81) = .000, p = .99, η2 = .00, d = .02. In the mimicry ‘absent’ condition truth 
tellers (M = 52.78, SD = 23.00, 95% CI [46.50, 59.05]) were no more detailed than 
liars (M = 49.17, SD = 16.41, 95% CI [42.97, 55.37]), F (1, 79) = .66, p = .418, d = 
.18. A discriminant analysis using the mimicry ‘absent’ data with the Veracity group 
as the classifying variable and objective detail as the predictor did not yield a 
significant discriminant function, χ2 (1) = .66, Wilk’s Lambda = .99, p = .418. 
Unsurprisingly, the non-significant function resulted in a chance level total accuracy, 
54.3%, with 40.0% of truth tellers and 68.3% of liars being classified correctly. In 
contrast, in the mimicry ‘present’ condition truth tellers (M = 63.17, SD = 22.19, 
95% CI [57.21, 69.13]) provided more detailed responses than liars (M = 49.14, SD 
= 16.19, 95% CI [43.18, 55.11]), F (1, 82) = 10.95, p = .001, d = .72. A discriminant 
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analysis using the mimicry ‘present’ data with the Veracity group as the classifying 
variable and objective detail as the predictor revealed a significant discriminant 
function, χ2 (1) = 10.21, Wilk’s Lambda = .88, p = .001. The function correctly 
identified 52.4% of truth tellers and 69.0% of liars, resulting in a total accuracy of 
60.7%. These findings support Hypothesis 1.  
 
Accurate detail. A 2 (Veracity) × 2 (Mimicry) ANOVA with accurate units 
of information as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect for 
Veracity, F (1, 161) = 129.71, p< .001, d = 1.76, and a significant Veracity × 
Mimicry interaction effect F (1, 161) = 5.79, p = .017, η2 = .04. The Mimicry main 
effect was not significant, F (1, 161) = .02, p = .894, d = .008. The Veracity main 
effect showed that truth tellers (M = 32.77, SD = 8.01, 95% CI [31.26, 34.28]) 
provided more accurate units of information than liars (M = 20.55, SD = 5.67, 95% 
CI [19.05, 22.06]). This, of course, is the direct result of the different instructions 
given to truth tellers and liars, and therefore this effect should be treated as a 
manipulation check. Regarding the Veracity × Mimicry interaction effect, truth 
tellers gave a similar number of accurate units of information in the mimicry 
‘present’ (M = 33.95, SD = 9.03, 95% CI [31.51, 36.40]) and mimicry ‘absent’ 
conditions (M = 31.52, SD = 6.65, 95% CI [29.02, 34.03]), F(1, 80) = 1.91, p = .17, 
η2 = .02, d = .3, whereas liars volunteered fewer accurate units of information in the 
mimicry ‘present’ condition (M = 19.21, SD = 5.77, 95% CI [17.51, 20.92]) than in 
the mimicry ‘absent’ condition (M = 21.93, SD = 5.34, 95% CI [20.20, 23.66]), F(1, 
81) = 4.93, p = .029, η2 = .057, d = .49. As a result, the difference in reporting 
accurate detail was larger in the ‘mimicry present’ than in the ‘mimicry absent’ 
condition. In the ‘mimicry absent’ condition, truth tellers (M = 31.53, SD = 6.65, 
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95% CI [29.63, 33.42]) volunteered more accurate units of information than liars (M 
= 21.93, SD = 5.34, 95% CI [20.06, 23.80]), F (1, 79) = 51.44, p< .001, η2 = .39, d = 
1.59. A discriminant analysis using the mimicry ‘absent’ data with the Veracity 
group as the classifying variable and accurate units of information as the predictor 
revealed a significant discriminant function, χ2 (1) = 39.36, Wilk’s Lambda = .61, 
p< .001. The function correctly identified 77.5% of truth tellers and 73.2% of liars, 
resulting in a total accuracy of 75.3%. In the mimicry ‘present’ condition, truth 
tellers (M = 33.95, SD = 9.03, 95% CI [31.63, 36.28]) again volunteered more 
accurate units of information than liars (M = 19.21, SD = 5.77, 95% CI [16.89, 
21.54]), F (1, 82) = 79.36, p< .001. The function correctly identified 76.2% of truth 
tellers and 90.5% of liars, resulting in a total accuracy of 83.3%. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
In the present experiment, truth tellers and liars were interviewed about a 
meeting they attended. Of particular interest was the effect of deliberately 
mimicking participants’ nonverbal behaviour on eliciting information and cues to 
deceit (verbal detail and accurate information volunteered).  
The mimicry ‘present’ condition was somewhat more successful in eliciting 
cues to deceit than the mimicry ‘absent’ condition. The Veracity X Mimicry 
interaction effect was not significant, which suggest that mimicry had no effect. 
However, without mimicry, no differences emerged between truth tellers and liars in 
the amount of detail they provided, whereas truth tellers gave more detail than liars 
when the silent interviewer mimicked the interviewees’ behaviour. This suggests 
that mimicry did have a (small) effect. The pattern of results suggest that mimicry 
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facilitated talking in truth tellers (but not in liars), supporting previous mimicry 
research showing that being mimicked makes people more cooperative and 
compliant (Van Baaren et al., 2003, 2004; Maddux, Mullen and Galins, 2008; 
Fischer-Lokou et al., 2011; Guéguen et al., 2011). The fact that mimicry did not 
make liars more talkative could be the result of their inability to make up plausible 
details (Köhnken, 1996, 2004; Leal et al., 2015) or their reluctance to provide 
detailed responses out of fear that these details will be falsified (Hartwig et al., 2007; 
Masip & Ces, 2011; Nahari et al., 2012a) or not remembered at a later stage (Vrij, 
2008).  
The finding that truth tellers and liars were equally detailed in the non-
mimicry condition may appear to be at odds with the deception literature in which it 
is typically found that truth tellers are more detailed than liars (DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, 2005, 2008). Two differences between the present study and 
other deception studies may explain this exceptional finding. First, unlike in many 
other studies in which liars are often expected to fabricate their statement (Leins et 
al., 2003, and see Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010 for a brief overview of deception 
scenarios), liars were in the present experiment instructed to provide a mixture of 
truthful and false information. Second, in the present study truth tellers and liars 
attended the same event, whereas in many other deception studies truth tellers and 
liars are involved in different activities. The fact that liars were allowed to provide 
truthful information and undertook the same activities as truth tellers makes lying in 
the present experiment cognitively easier than in many other studies, and when the 
task in hand is easy liars may give as many detail as truth tellers. Finally, one other 
explanation for this finding is that it is anomalous, and replications of the present 
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study may find that truth tellers are more detailed than liars when no mimicry takes 
place.  
The results showed an intriguing pattern for providing accurate detail, as it 
gave the impression that deliberate mimicry led liars to provide less accurate detail. 
There is no clear explanation for this finding and it needs to be replicated before any 
possible negative effects of mimicry on liars can be drawn. This finding, however, 
demonstrates the relevance of making a distinction between the provision of 
accurate and inaccurate information, and the author recommends that this distinction 
is made in future deception research. 
One limitation of the findings relating to accurate detail is that in a real world 
setting, accuracy as a cue to deceit can very rarely (if ever) be used in the way it has 
been presented in this experiment. For accuracy to be coded as a cue, the exact 
details of the event in question must be known, and investigators in most cases will 
not have this information. What is more likely is that investigators have some correct 
but incomplete information (the instructions given to liars in this study alluded to 
this) which cannot be used to judge the overall accuracy of an interviewee’s 
testimony. Therefore, in real terms, accuracy is a cue that can only be used 
diagnostically in laboratory experiments where the ground truth is known. One 
additional limitation is that no manipulation check was conducted to be sure that the 
interviewee’s mannerisms were mimicked. This could have been achieved by simply 
examining all those present at interview simultaneously (via videotaping), and 
checking that the second interviewer effectively mimicked participants.  
The finding that deliberate mimicry encouraged truth tellers in particular to 
talk further benefits investigators as it enlarges the differences between truth tellers 
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and liars, which, in turn, facilitates lie detection. This finding also fits well in a 
current stream of deception research: encouraging interviewees to say more (Leal et 
al., 2015; Mann et al., 2013). Encouraging truth tellers to say more has clear 
benefits. It results in more information, considered to be the core objective of 
investigative interviewing (Fisher, 2010), and it benefits investigators because a 
more detailed account gives them a more detailed picture of the topic under 
investigation. It also benefits truth tellers as, typically, detailed accounts are more 
likely to be believed by observers (Bell & Loftus, 1989).  
Future research may build on the present study by examining in more detail 
the impact of mimicry on the quality of the interaction during the interview. What is 
not clear at this stage is exactly why mimicry impacted on truth tellers in the way it 
did. One way to examine this would be to measure in various ways the interviewees’ 
perceptions of the interviewers, which might determine how and why mimicry 
caused an increase in detail. Presenting participants with an accepted definition of 
rapport before asking them to rate it would be a starting point for understanding the 
impact of mimicry on rapport.  
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Chapter 6: Experiment 4 
Examining repetition as a cue to deceit in reverse 
order accounts: A deception detection study 
 
Abstract 
Research suggests that under certain conditions, liars repeat themselves more than 
truth tellers when recalling a story a second time in reverse order. The present study 
examines whether changing interviewers half way through an interview and 
instructing judges to look for repetition can increase detection efficiency. Each 
participant (N = 165) read two unique extracts from interview transcripts. The 
transcripts were derived from a previous study of deception, and interviewees were 
either telling the truth or lying.  Participants were randomly assigned into two 
groups: the experimental group received instructions asking them to look for 
evidence of repetition in the extracts, and then make a veracity judgement. The 
control group were instructed to simply read the extracts before make a judgement. 
As consistency is the most frequently cited cue to deceit, it was predicted that 
participants in the control group would cite consistency as a judgement cue more 
than any other cue. The change of interviewers and ‘Instruction’ manipulations had 
no effect on detection efficiency. The results do not support the contention that 
repetition in reverse order responses is a cue to deceit. However, the results do 
support previous research indicating that consistency is the most commonly cited 
cue to deceit. Recommendations for future deception studies are discussed.  
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6.1 Introduction 
Detecting deceit in suspects remains a challenging but important task for 
investigators.  Research suggests that people are poor at detecting deception. Bond 
and DePaulo (2006) examined detection accuracy in numerous studies.  In all cases, 
the observers did not know the targets, had no background information or training, 
and did not conduct the interviews. The authors found that in these circumstances, 
people are able to detect deceit around 54% of the time. There are several reasons 
why lie detection is difficult (see Vrij, 2008, for a review). One reason is that while 
there are genuine cues to deceit, such cues are faint and unreliable (DePaulo et al., 
2003), a notion that is strongly supported in thorough examinations of the literature 
(Hartwig & Bond, 2011). Another reason is that judges are sometimes misguided by 
their false beliefs about deception (Elaad, 2009). In their meta-analysis, Hartwig and 
Bond (2011) challenged the idea that judges are simply attending to the wrong cues. 
It appears that there is a clear difference between the cues that judges report using 
and what they actually use. The idea that lie detection judgements depend on 
stereotypical cues such as gaze behaviour and fidgeting may be inaccurate. Rather, it 
seems that judges often use cues that are positively correlated with deception, such 
as plausibility and lack of detail. In fact, research tells us that these are two cues that 
judges also believe to be associated with deception. While the beliefs that people 
hold about deception are often inaccurate, people ‘…seem intuitively in tune with 
the characteristics of deceptive behaviour’ (p. 655). The authors highlight two 
factors that hinder judges’ detection efficiency. The first is the overestimation of 
some cues; that a particular cue is strongly linked to deceit when in fact it is not.  
The second is the general lack of valid cues available to detectors. In order to 
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improve our ability to detect deceit, it is argued that future research should focus on 
magnifying the difference between liars and truth tellers.  
Consistency. A lack of consistency between two accounts is the most often 
cited reason for discrediting another human being (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 
2000; Granhag, Strömwall & Jonsson, 2003). Inconsistency is viewed as deceptive 
because it indicates a poor memory (suggesting that the individual in question did 
not experience what they claim) or that someone is unable to keep “their story 
straight” (Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2013). Broadly speaking, inconsistency in 
autobiographical memory is present if it meets one of the following criteria: (a) a 
direct contradiction of earlier claims, (b) new recollections that did not appear in 
earlier reports (commissions), and (c) old recollections not being repeated in later 
reports. However, despite there being clear criteria for consistency, the relationship 
between deception and consistency is complex. The idea that liars are more 
inconsistent is too simplistic and unreliable, and research shows that truth tellers are 
not always more consistent than liars (Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2013). For example, 
when giving a statement a second time, truth tellers tend to reconstruct the event 
from memory, which can lead to details being remembered differently or new details 
emerging. When liars give a second account, they simply repeat what they have said 
previously. Therefore, truth teller’s ‘reconstruct’ approach can result in them 
appearing less consistent (i.e., less repetition of the same information) than liars’ 
adopting a ‘repeat’ approach (Granhag, Strömwall & Jonsson, 2003).  
Cognitive Load. People have finite mental resources, and lying can be more 
cognitively demanding than telling the truth, particularly in interviews (DePaulo et 
al., 2003; Mann & Vrij, 2006; Vrij, 2008, Zuckerman et al., 1981). If lying is 
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difficult, then by making it more difficult, more deceptive leakage may emerge as a 
result. One strategy that appears to make lying more difficult is recalling an event in 
reverse order; a task that on its own has high cognitive demands (Johnston, 
Greenberg, Fisher, & Martin 1970). The reverse order instruction is a memory 
enhancing technique from the Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992), and 
was intended for use with truth telling witnesses. Research showed that this 
technique helps witnesses to recall new information (Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 
2010). However, studies of deception tell us that liars struggle to recall their 
fabrication in reverse order. In Vrij et al., (2008) truth tellers and liars were 
interviewed about a staged event. Truth tellers had participated in the event in 
question, and were instructed to tell the truth in the interview. Liars had completed a 
separate ‘illegal’ task, but were told what the truth tellers did so they could use this 
information as an alibi. In the control condition, both groups simply recalled the 
event in normal chronological order, whereas in the experimental condition, 
participants recalled the event in reverse order. In the experimental condition, eight 
cues to deceit emerged from the analyses, compared to only one cue from the control 
condition.   
When recalling in reverse order, liars were less detailed (providing fewer 
auditory and contextual details) than truth tellers, and spoke more slowly. In 
addition, liars’ accounts included more hesitations, errors, and cognitive operations. 
Furthermore, in a subsequent deception detection study, judges were better able to 
classify truth tellers and liars when they recalled the event in reverse order. In Evans 
et al., (2013), participants either lied or told the truth about their whereabouts the 
previous Saturday, giving accounts in either normal or reverse order. Again, the 
reverse order condition differentiated liars and truth tellers. When 46 judges watched 
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the videotaped interviews, of those participants that described their whereabouts in 
normal order, 37% were correctly classified compared to 67% of reverse order 
accounts.  
Studies that have adopted the reverse order strategy have largely focussed on 
detail as a cue to deceit. One instance where reverse order recall influenced 
consistency is Vrij, Mann, Leal, and Fisher (2011), where participants (N = 28) 
completed a ‘mission’ involving the collection and delivery of a package. After 
delivering the package, participants were interviewed about the journey they took to 
complete their mission. The interview required participants to recall both in normal 
and reverse order the route they had taken. Comparisons of the normal and reverse 
order accounts after the interviews revealed that liars contradicted themselves 
significantly more than truth tellers.  
This experiment examines the diagnostic value of one measure of 
consistency - repetition - as a cue to deceit in a deception detection study. 
Participants in the present study were placed in two conditions. In the ‘instruction’ 
condition, participants were instructed to look for evidence of repetition in the 
reverse order responses, and use this information to help them make a veracity 
judgement. In the ‘no instruction’ condition, participants were simply asked to read 
the extracts before making a judgement, and repetition was not mentioned. There are 
a few reasons why participants were asked to look for repetition. First, previous 
research showed that truth tellers tend to repeat themselves more than liars in reverse 
order accounts (Shaw et al., 2014), but this outcome depends on the interview 
setting.  In Shaw et al. (2014) participants played the role of junior intelligence 
officers, attending a mock security meeting. After the meeting, participants were 
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informed that they were going to be interviewed about what they learned in the 
meeting. After being assigned to a veracity condition, truth tellers were instructed to 
be completely honest about what occurred in the meeting, while liars were told to 
provide a mixture of false and truthful information. In the interview, two 
interviewers (one speaking, one silent) first asked participants to recall the meeting 
in normal chronological order, and then later in reverse chronological order. The 
researchers manipulated the behaviour of the interviewers by having two new 
interviewers took over at a pre-determined point. The results showed that when the 
interviewers changed, truth tellers repeated themselves more (were more consistent) 
than liars when recalling what happened in reverse order. When the same 
interviewers remained throughout the interview, there were no differences between 
truth tellers and liars in terms of repetition. The explanation for this finding relates to 
the ‘repeat’ versus ‘reconstruct’ hypothesis (Granhag et al., 2003). When repeating 
their description for a second time to the same two interviewers, liars may have 
adopted the ‘repeat’ approach in order to be appear consistent. When two new 
interviewers took over the interview, for liars’, the need to appear consistent may 
have diminished, as the new interviewers may not have heard the previous 
statement. Therefore, the ‘changed interviewers’ condition may have reduced liars’ 
tendency to be consistent by repeating themselves.   
The second reason why participants were asked to look for repetition is that 
consistency is often cited as a cue to deceit, and repetition is one measure of 
consistency. Therefore, those participants in the experimental condition were not 
taught a new cue, rather, they were encouraged to look for a cue they were already 
likely to know. Being familiar with consistency may help participants in the 
‘Instruction’ condition to understand exactly what it is they are looking for. Finally, 
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while there are other cues to deceit that emerge from reverse order accounts, care 
was taken not to overwhelm participants by giving them too many cues to look for.  
Based on Shaw et al.’s (2014) findings, three predictions were made. First, 
participants in the ‘Instruction’ condition would have a higher overall accuracy in 
their veracity judgements than those in the ‘No Instruction’ condition (Hypothesis 
1). Second, those participants who read transcripts from a ‘changed interviewers’ 
protocol would have a higher overall accuracy than those participants that read 
transcripts from a ‘same interviewers’ condition. This prediction is based on a 
Veracity X Changed Interviewers interaction effect that emerged from the findings 
of Shaw et al. (2014).  When the interviewers changed, liars repeated themselves 
less than truth tellers in the reverse order accounts. There were no differences 
between the groups in terms of repetition when the same interviewers remained 
throughout the interview. Therefore, when participants in the present study read 
transcripts from the ‘changed interviewers’ condition, the expectation is that the lack 
of repetition displayed by liars compared to truth tellers should increase overall 
accuracy (Hypothesis 2). Finally, it is predicted that the two main effects described 
in Hypotheses 1 and 2 will strengthen each other so that the highest accuracy rate 
will be achieved in the ‘instruction’, ‘changed interviewers’ condition (Hypothesis 
3). 
Studies examining verbal cues in truth tellers’ and liars’ responses have 
found that truth tellers’ responses tend to appear more plausible (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Leal et al., 2015; Vrij, 2004; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012)’. Plausibility 
in this context represents the degree to which something could have happened as 
described by the participant, and is therefore not comparable to subjective ratings of 
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consistency, which look for evidence of consistency across two responses. In order 
to replicate previous research relating to plausibility, participants in the current study 
were asked to rate the extracts for plausibility. It was predicted that truth tellers’ 
transcripts would be rated by participants as being more plausible than liars’ 
transcripts (Hypothesis 4).  
In addition, participants also rated how truthful the transcripts were. In Shaw 
et al., the details that interviewees gave in the normal and reverse order responses 
were coded for accuracy. A score was created for the total number of accurate details 
volunteered in these two responses. To determine whether participants were able to 
detect the amount of truthful details in the extracts, participants’ ratings of 
truthfulness were compared with the accurate details score. Finally, in an open ended 
question, participants were also asked to explain their veracity decision. Participants 
in the ‘instruction’ condition were instructed to look for evidence of inconsistency 
(lack of repetition), but participants in the ‘no instruction’ condition were not.  
Consistency is the most frequently cited reason for discrediting another 
human being (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 2000; Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 
2003), however, its remains unknown whether this cue (or more precisely, one 
measure of this cue; repetition) will emerge from untrained judges examining 
reverse order accounts. Based on the literature, it was predicted that the majority of 
participants in the ‘no instruction’ condition would cite consistency (relating to 
either a truthful or deceptive judgement) as a cue to deceit (Hypothesis 5). 
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6.2 Method 
Participants  
A total of 165 participants (68 males and 97 females) took part in the study. The 
sample was made up of undergraduate students, university staff, and members of the 
general public.  
 
Design 
The experiment adopted a 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Interviewer: same 
interviewers vs changed interviewers) X 2 (Instruction: instruction vs no instruction) 
between-subjects design, with the following dependent variables: (i) participants’ 
veracity judgements of the transcripts (ii) participants’ ratings of repetition in the 
transcripts (iii) participants’ ratings of plausibility in the transcripts (iv) participants’ 
reasoning for their veracity judgement. To clarify, as the current study is examining 
the transcripts derived from Experiment 3a, the Veracity and Interviewer 
independent variables are those implemented in Experiment 3a.  
 
Procedure  
Participants were recruited via an online advertisement on the University’s staff and 
student portals and through opportunity sampling in the Department of Psychology. 
Participants were invited to play the role of a lie detector. The advert explained that 
participants would be required to read an interview transcript, and then make a 
veracity judgement about the interviewee’s responses. All participants were offered 
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a goody bag for taking part. Those that made contact with the experimenter were 
given details on when they could take part.  
After arriving at the Psychology Department, participants were greeted by the 
experimenter and taken to a cubicle nearby. Between one and six participants were 
tested simultaneously in separate cubicles. Participants then read and signed an 
informed consent form, which explained what the task entailed. All participants 
were presented with a few pre-prepared sheets of paper, which consisted of all the 
materials required to complete their task. Each set of materials contained some 
instructions, the transcript extracts, and a questionnaire. Participants completed the 
task in three steps. First, participants read the following instructions: 
‘Below are two extracts from an interview transcript. The transcript is taken from a 
previous experiment where participants were instructed to either lie or tell the truth 
about a meeting they attended. Truth tellers were instructed to be completely honest, 
while liars were instructed to give a mixture of false and truthful information about 
what happened in the meeting.   
The first extract is the participant’s description of what happened in the meeting in 
normal chronological order (beginning to end), and the second extract is the 
participant’s description of what happened in reverse chronological order (end to 
beginning). Please read the extracts carefully, then answer the questionnaire.’ 
Participants in the experimental condition had some additional instructions: 
‘Research suggests that truth tellers (more than liars) repeat what they have said 
previously when asked to describe an event a second time in reverse order. Please 
read the two descriptions carefully, noting the amount of details - from the first 
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description - that are repeated in the second description. Please use this as the 
criterion for determining whether the participant was lying or telling the truth.’ 
Next, participants read two extracts from an interview transcript. The extracts 
were derived from a mock forensic interview conducted in a previous experiment, 
where 165 participants (playing the role of an intelligence officer) either told the 
truth or lied about a security meeting they attended. Of the 165 participants that took 
part in the previous experiment, 82 were instructed to be completely truthful in the 
interview, and 83 were told provide a mixture of false and truthful information. The 
interview protocol consisted of two interviewers, with one speaking interviewer 
(asking the questions), and one remaining silent. The silent interviewer was 
introduced as being trained in detecting lies in interviews. The behaviour of the 
interviewers was manipulated. In half of the interviews, two new interviewers 
replaced the existing pair at a pre-determined point (the ‘changed interviewers’ 
condition). In the other half of the interviews, the same pair of interviewers 
conducted the entire interview (the ‘same interviewers’ condition).  
Each participant in the present study read extracts from one transcript, and 
each transcript they read was unique. After reading the transcripts, participants 
completed a short four-item questionnaire asking participants to rate: whether the 
interviewee was lying or telling the truth; the degree to which the extracts were 
truthful (measured on a seven point scale ranging from [1] ‘Complete truth’ to [7] 
‘Complete lie’); the perceived plausibility of the extracts (measured on a seven point 
scale ranging from [1] ‘Totally plausible’ to [7] ‘Not at all plausible’). The fourth 
item was an open-ended question asking participants to explain why they thought the 
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interviewee was lying/telling the truth. After completing the questionnaire, 
participants were debriefed, given a goody bag and thanked for their time.  
Coding. Responses to the open-ended questions were carefully examined to 
determine the rationale/s behind each veracity judgement. Given the prediction that 
participants in the ‘no instruction’ group would cite consistency most frequently as a 
cue to deceit (Hypothesis 5), some clear guidelines were devised for coding 
consistency in participants’ responses to the open-ended question. For consistency to 
be coded as a given reason for a veracity judgment, participants had to make an 
explicit and clear reference to consistency. Once this had been established, the coder 
then decided whether the response referred to either repetitions, commissions, 
omissions, or contradictions.  If the participant did not make it clear exactly how 
consistency was a factor by mentioning one the four components above, then the 
response was coded as ‘consistency (unspecified)’. For example, the response ‘The 
two answers were not at all consistent with each other’ would be coded as 
‘consistency (unspecified)’, while the following ‘The second answer completely 
contradicted the first answer’ was coded as a ‘contradiction’. 
Accuracy rates were determined by calculating the number of correct 
judgments of truthful and deceptive interviewees made by each participant in each 
experimental condition.  
 
6.3 Results 
 
Overall Accuracy  
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From a sample of 165, one participant could not make a judgement on the extracts 
alone, and was removed from the dataset. Of the remaining participants, 50.6% 
made correct veracity judgments, which did not significantly differ from chance 
accuracy (50%), t(163) = .156, p = .876.  
Hypothesis Testing 
A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Changing interviewers) X 2 (Instruction) ANOVA was 
conducted with accuracy as the dependent variable. The analyses revealed a 
significant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 148) = 7.67, p = .006, while all other main 
effects and interaction effects were not significant (all Fs < 1.34, all ps > .249). The 
Veracity main effect was the result of the truth accuracy (M = 39.5%, SD = .49) 
being significantly lower than lie accuracy (M = 61.4%, SD = .49), t(80) = 3.93, p < 
.001. Truth accuracy did not differ from chance accuracy, t(80) = -1.92, p = .058, but 
lie accuracy did, t(82) = 2.13, p = .036.  
 For interest, to determine whether the actual levels of repetition present in the 
responses had any impact on detection accuracy, some further analyses were 
conducted. Using the coding conducted in Experiment 3a, each response that 
participants rated in the present experiment was assigned into one of two groups: 
one group containing ‘low’ levels of objective repetition (those responses which 
were coded as having 0-6 observations of repetition, N = 75) and another group 
containing ‘high’ levels of objective repetition (those responses which were coded as 
having 7-14 observations of repetition, N = 89). A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Objective 
Repetition) X 2 (Instruction) ANOVA was then conducted with accuracy as the 
dependent variable. The analyses again revealed a significant main effect of 
Veracity, F(1, 156) = 4.646, p = .033, as a result of the lower truth accuracy (M = 
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39.5%, SD = .49) compared to lie accuracy (M = 61.4%, SD = .49).  However, all 
other main effects and interaction effects were not significant (all Fs < 2.14, all ps > 
.145).
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Table 6.1 Correct classifications overall in the ‘changed interviewers’ and ‘instruction’ conditions.  
 
  Changed Interviewers Same Interviewers Overall 
Instruction 50% 
60% 
57% 
74% 
54% 
No Instruction 48% 
50% 
48% 
60% 
 
 
48% 
Overall 49% 52%  
 
Table 6.2 Correct classifications of truth tellers and liars across the ‘changed interviewers’ and ‘instruction’ conditions.  
 
  Changed Interviewers Same Interviewers 
  Truth Tellers Liars Truth Tellers Liars 
Instruction 40% 60% 38% 74% 
No Instruction 45% 50% 35% 60% 
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Table 6.1 shows that participants in the ‘instruction’ condition made more 
correct veracity judgements (N = 84, 53.6%)  than participants in the ‘no instruction’ 
condition (N = 80, 47.5% accuracy), though the difference was not significant, t(83) 
= -1.16, p = .251, rejecting Hypothesis 1. In addition, participants that read 
transcripts from the ‘changed interviewers’ condition did not make more correct 
classifications (N = 80, 48.8% accuracy) than participants who read transcripts from 
the ‘same interviewers’ condition (N = 84, 52.4% accuracy), t(83) = .62, p = .539, 
rejecting Hypothesis 2. Finally, the Changing interviewers X Instruction interaction 
was not significant, F(1, 160) = .19, p = .666, rejecting Hypothesis 3.  
A one-way (Veracity) ANOVA was conducted with participants’ ratings of 
plausibility as the dependent variable. The test revealed that truth tellers’ (M = 3.42, 
SD = 1.35) and liars (M = 3.36, SD = 1.49) accounts did not differ in terms of 
plausibility, rejecting Hypothesis 4.  
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Table 6.3. Distribution of judgment cues cited by participants in the ‘instruction’ group that judged transcripts to be truthful (N = 30). 
Judgement Cue N % 
Repetition 12 40 
Lack of repetition 5 17 
Seemed genuine 5 17 
Pauses 4 13 
Commissions 3 10 
 
Table 6.4. Distribution of judgment cues cited by participants in the ‘instruction’ group that judged transcripts to be deceitful (N = 54). 
Judgement Cue N % 
Lack of repetition 34 63 
Pauses 15 28 
Lack of detail 7 13 
Appeared unsure 4 7 
Commissions 4 7 
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Table 6.5. Distribution of judgment cues cited by participants in the ‘no instruction’ group that judged transcripts to be truthful (N = 
34).  
Judgement Cue N % 
Consistency (unspecified) 13 38 
Seemed genuine 5 15 
Detailed descriptions 4 12 
Commissions 3 9 
Spontaneous corrections 3 9 
 
Table 6.6. Distribution of judgment cues cited by participants in the ‘no instruction’ group that judged transcripts to be deceitful (N = 
46).  
Judgement Cue N % 
Pauses 25 54 
Consistency (unspecified) 16 35 
Lack of detail 7 15 
Omissions 5 11 
Seemed to struggle 4 9 
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Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 display the frequencies of judgement cues cited by participants 
in the ‘instruction’ and ‘no instruction’ conditions, according to the veracity 
judgement (truth or deceit) they made9. Tables 3 and 4 show that the most frequently 
cited cues by participants in the ‘instruction’ condition were either ‘lack of 
repetition’ or ‘repetition’. This suggests that the ‘Instruction’ manipulation was 
observed and implemented by participants.  
Tables 5 and 6 show that consistency was the most frequently cited 
judgement cue by participants in the ‘no instruction’ condition. This supports 
Hypothesis 5. However, in the majority of cases where consistency was cited, it was 
not clear whether the participant was referring to either: a) contradictions, b) lack of 
repetition, or c) commissions. For interest, some additional analyses were conducted 
comparing those participants who cited ‘consistency’ (‘specified’ and ‘unspecified’) 
with those who did not cite it as a cue that they used. A one-way ANOVA with 
‘Consistency’ (two levels: participants that cited consistency as a cue to deceit, N = 
103; and participants that did not cite consistency as a cue to deceit, N = 61) as the 
independent variable and detection accuracy as the dependent variable revealed that 
participants’ use of consistency when making a veracity decision had no impact on 
the accuracy of veracity decisions overall, F(1, 162) = 2.759, p = .099. 
 
 
                                                          
9 Note that participants could cite more than one cue as being influential in their veracity judgement, and the 
tables do not differentiate between those participants that cited two or more cues.  
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6.4 Discussion 
In the present experiment, participants read two extracts from interview 
transcripts and made a veracity judgement about the interviewee’s responses.  The 
analyses examined the effect of the ‘Changing interviewers’ and ‘Instruction’ 
manipulations on participants’ ability to correctly classify truthful and deceptive 
responses. The results did not support Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, as neither of the 
manipulations examined had any effect on participants’ veracity judgements. There 
was an effect of ‘Veracity’, as participants correctly classified more liars than truth 
tellers. Veracity, however, did not affect participants’ ratings of plausibility, 
rejecting Hypothesis 4. Finally, the results supported the prediction that the majority 
of the ‘no instruction’ group would cite consistency as a judgment cue. 
 The findings provide an insight into the cues that judges use when making 
veracity judgments. When instructed to look for lack of repetition, the findings 
suggest that the majority of participants acted upon this instruction. In the ‘no 
instruction’ condition, the majority of participants also cited consistency as a 
judgement cue, but were not specific as to which type of consistency. That so many 
participants in the ‘no instruction’ condition referred to consistency supports the idea 
that it is central to veracity judgments in general (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 
2000; Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003). Furthermore, many participants made 
references to the global impression of a transcript; that it ‘seemed genuine’, or the 
interviewee ‘appeared unsure’. This supports Hartwig and Bond (2011) contention 
that many judges use these particular cues when making veracity judgements.  
What is striking about the results is that the sample appeared to possess some 
valid knowledge of deception. Of particular note is the number of participants who 
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cited ‘pauses’ as a cue to deceit when judging a transcript to be deceptive (N = 40). 
Deception literature tells us that there is a concrete link between pauses and 
deceptive behaviour (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2002), and specifically in reverse order 
responses (Vrij et al., 2008). These findings support the notion that judges use cues 
that are correlated with deception (Hartwig and Bond, 2011), even if in this instance 
they did not improve detection efficiency. It is worth noting also that the sample 
comprised undergraduate psychology students, many of whom may have been to 
lectures on deception detection. Therefore, it may be that a lay population with no 
exposure to deception literature would use different cues to make a credibility 
judgment, and this may have had some impact on the findings relating to judgement 
cues.  
Meta-analyses of lie detection literature show that observers tend to have a 
truth bias (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). However, the opposite was found in the present 
study, with  61% of participants judging the extracts to be deceitful. One explanation 
for this bias is the Othello error; that suspicious participants discounted cues of 
truthfulness in the extracts due to an early formed suspicion that the interviewee was 
lying. As mentioned, several participants in the ‘instruction’ and ‘no instruction’ 
groups cited ‘pauses’ as a judgement cue. While pauses are linked with deception, 
some judges could have become fixated on this cue, and overrated its diagnostic 
value when making a judgement. The presence of pauses in the normal order 
responses (first extract) could have coloured judges’ perception of the reverse order 
responses, causing them to disregard any other cues that indicate truthfulness.  
In the present study, no differences emerged between the ‘instruction’ and 
‘no instruction’ groups in terms of deception accuracy. The most obvious 
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explanation is that cues to deceit are indeed faint and unreliable (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Hartwig and Bond, 2011).  In the ‘instruction’ condition, 38 (45%) 
participants did not cite repetition as a cue to deceit, which suggests either that there 
was little evidence of it in the transcripts, or that it was difficult to detect. Research 
suggests that consistency is not a reliable cue to deceit, and one reason for that could 
be the different ways in which truth tellers and liars recall their story (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 1999).  
 One factor that may have affected the outcomes of the present paper is the 
instructions. Participants were instructed to look for repetition in the reverse order 
transcripts. The rationale for doing so stems from a finding in a previous study that 
liars tend to repeat themselves less in reverse order responses (Shaw et al., 2014).  In 
order to prevent participants from being overwhelmed, only one cue used to make a 
veracity judgement.  One criterion may not have been enough to facilitate detection 
efficiency. Consider also that in Shaw et al., the cue emerged from a judge rating all 
165 transcripts for evidence of repetition. In the present study, 84 participants read 
84 unique transcripts and were instructed to look for repetition. It is possible that the 
remaining 80 transcripts contained more evidence of repetition/a lack of repetition in 
the reverse order responses, which may not have been recognised by the participants 
in the ‘no instruction’ group. The present study would have benefited from having 
each transcript rated by two participants, one in each of the ‘instruction’ and ‘no 
instruction’ conditions.  
 One other factor that may explain the results is individual differences. The 
degree to which humans differ in their behaviour is one reason why deception 
detection is difficult (Vrij, 2008), and cues to deceit may be faint and unreliable for 
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this reason. However, there is another individual difference to consider: Those 
between judges. In Nahari and Vrij (2014), participants wrote one statement about 
something they had done in last 30 minutes, and one additional statement about a 
past event. After writing these statements, participants rated the quality of another 
statement written by someone else. The ratings of the target statements were 
conducted using Reality Monitoring (Sporer, 2004; Vrij, 2008) criteria, which 
includes: vividness, detail, perceptual information, spatial information, temporal 
information, affect, clarity, and realism. The findings revealed that if a participant 
was detailed in their own statement, they were more critical in their judgement of 
someone else’s statement. Equally, if a participant did not provide a detail rich 
statement, they were less critical in their judgement of others’ statements.  
Nahari and Vrij’s (2014) findings make it clear that individual differences 
between judges can have a dramatic effect on their judgements of others. Applying 
this concept to the present study, participants’ global judgement of each transcript 
would have varied significantly. It is reasonable to assume that most participants did 
not use just one cue (such as repetition or pauses) when making a veracity decision. 
Rather, it seems more likely that judges integrated several cues in order to come to 
decision. Indeed, many participants cited more than one judgement cue when 
explaining their veracity decision, even in the ‘instruction’ condition. Nahari and 
Vrij’s findings suggest that for each measure of a statement, there is likely to be 
considerable differences between judges in their assessment of that phenomenon. In 
the present study, participants in both the ‘instruction’ and ‘no instruction’ groups 
cited repetition as a cue to deceit. However, controlling for the actual presence of 
repetition within a given transcript, the degree to which participants rate repetition is 
likely to have varied considerably. This variation between participants in how they 
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rated repetition (and all other cues that they deemed important) may explain why no 
differences emerged between the experimental groups. In Nahari and Vrij, 
participants rated the detail in the statements using eleven six-point scales. The 
authors concluded by highlighting the need to use within-subjects lie detection tools 
(a recommendation echoed here), and carrying out objective (frequency counting) 
rather than subjective (scale ratings) RM coding. These recommendations can be 
applied to other criteria, such as repetition and cues to deceit. Future studies may 
benefit from having judges use a sheet to count frequencies of certain cues, which 
has two probable benefits. First, participants have an objective measure of a given 
construct, which is likely to diminish the variation caused by subjective ratings and 
individual differences. Second, with physical evidence of certain cues in front of 
them, it may help participants to focus on the cues that they have been instructed to 
measure.  
 To conclude, the findings presented here do not support the contention that 
repetition is helpful for detection accuracy, as this cue did not facilitate detection 
efficiency in judges instructed to look for repetition. Training judges may be 
ineffective if there is lack of valid cues, and if judges already have an understanding 
of these cues. Future studies should look to include more than one relevant cue and 
means to help judges objectively assess statements, and these measures are 
particularly important given the individual differences in deceptive behaviour.  
 
 
 
137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 
 
Chapter 7: General Discussion 
7.1 Overview of main findings and theoretical implications 
This thesis had three objectives. First, to determine what demeanour a second 
interviewer should adopt in order to effectively elicit cues to deceit. Second, to 
define ways in which a second interviewer can be used to encourage truth tellers to 
say more. Third, to use a second interviewer to learn more about consistency as a 
cue to deceit.  Taken together, the findings discussed here show that each of these 
aims has been met.  
To the author’s knowledge, no previous research has tested a two interviewer 
protocol in this way. In three experiments, participants were instructed to either tell 
the truth or lie in a mock forensic interview. Each interview was conducted by two 
interviewers, of whom one asked the questions and the other remained silent. Each 
experiment tested a different two-interviewer protocol. In the fourth experiment, a 
deception detection study tested a new cue to deceit.  
Experiment 1 examined the effect of second interviewer demeanour on 
consistency as a cue to deceit. After being assigned to a veracity condition, 
participants were interviewed about their occupation and their journey to work. All 
participants were asked to describe their journey first in normal chronological order 
before being asked to recall the same information in reverse order. During the 
interview, the silent second interviewer adopted a demeanour that was either 
supportive, neutral, or suspicious. As predicted, examination of the reverse order 
accounts revealed that truth tellers repeated fewer details (from their normal order 
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accounts) compared to liars, but only when the second interviewer was supportive. 
Experiment 1 also provided some evidence that the reverse order instruction is not 
expected by participants prior to a mock forensic interview.  
The findings in Experiment 1 lend support to the literature on deception and 
consistency, particularly the ‘reconstruct versus repeat’ hypothesis (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 1999, 2001; Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003). This theory 
contends that truth tellers and liars use different retrieval strategies when recalling 
information a second time. Truth tellers use their actual memory of the event in 
question to ‘reconstruct’ a story. Liars recall what they said in their first recollection, 
and simply try to ‘repeat’ this information as closely as possible. Liars’ strategy can 
result in them appearing more consistent than truth tellers (Fisher, Vrij, and Leins, 
2013), and the findings in Experiment 1 support this contention. However, support 
for the ‘reconstruct versus repeat’ hypothesis was only found in the supportive 
interviewer condition. A supportive interviewer may encourage interviewees to do 
well by providing a source of positive reinforcement. This could result in them 
putting more effort into using their preferred strategies. Thus, the presence of a 
supportive interviewer may have encouraged liars to use their ‘repeat’ strategy, 
which would explain why they repeated themselves more than truth tellers in their 
second accounts. In line with Mann et al. (2013), Experiment 1 recommends that 
forensic interviews adopt a supportive demeanour.  
Experiment 1 showed that a supportive second interview can elicit cues to 
deceit and that the reverse order instruction is not expected. Experiment 2 developed 
on these findings by examining the effect of first and second interviewer demeanour 
on detail in expected and unexpected questions. In a mock forensic interview, 
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participants either told the truth or lied about preparing a room for a seminar. 
Therefore, in terms of the method, Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 in a 
few ways. Experiment 2 required participants to complete a task as part of the 
experiment before either telling the truth or lying about that task in an interview. 
Experiment 1 required participants to recall topographical memories (their journey 
to work), whereas Experiment 2 required participants to recall episodic memories 
(how the seminar room was prepared just prior to the interview).  
Experiment 2 also differed from Experiment 1 in that both interviewers 
behaved either neutrally or supportive in each interview, and the second interviewer 
was presented as an ‘expert’ in lie detection. It was predicted that liars would 
provide more detail in response to the expected normal order question (due to 
preparation) and less detail in response to the unexpected reverse order question (due 
to a lack of imagination and desire to provide detailed accounts), and that this 
difference would be magnified by the presence of a supportive interviewer.  Indeed, 
when the second interviewer was supportive, the difference in detail between 
responses to the expected and unexpected question was significantly larger for liars 
than truth tellers. This outcome was due to the combination of liars being more 
detailed than truth tellers in answering the expected (normal order) question and less 
detailed in answering the unexpected (reverse order) question. No differences 
emerged when the interviewer was neutral. Finally, the prediction relating to the use 
of temporal connectives was supported, as truth tellers used more reverse order 
connectives (e.g., use of the phrase “before that”) than liars.  
 The findings in Experiment 2 support previous research suggesting that a 
supportive interviewer elicits detail as a cue to deceit (Mann et al., 2013), and that 
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liars can provide more detailed responses to expected questions than truth tellers 
(Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, & Waller, 2012; Warmelink, et al, 2012). Liars may have 
interpreted the supportive interviewer’s positive nonverbal behaviour as a form of 
positive feedback, indicating that they were being convincing. Liars responded to 
this feedback by providing a particularly detailed response to a question they had 
prepared for. As such, the findings also lend support to Interpersonal Deception 
Theory (IDT, Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Central to IDT is the notion that when 
deception occurs in a dyad, both the liar and the target mutually influence each 
other. This occurs because liars have to monitor their target to see whether they are 
being convincing and to respond appropriately As a result, the target’s behaviour can 
directly and indirectly influence the behaviour of the liar (Burgoon et al, 1999). 
Directly, the target can influence the synchrony or behavioural mimicry that emerges 
from communication (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Indirectly, through feedback, the 
target can influence the liar’s assessment of how they are being perceived. In 
Experiment 2, liars may have responded to what they perceived as positive feedback 
by providing a particularly detailed response to a question they had prepared for.  
IDT can also explain why liars had a significantly larger difference in detail 
compared to truth tellers. Regardless of the response liars gave to the unexpected 
question, the supportive interviewer always provided positive feedback. Liars know 
that investigators check their responses and worry they will be caught out by adding 
new information (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Masip & Ces, 2011; 
Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012a, 2012b). Therefore, adding new details is an 
unnecessary risk if liars believe they are already being convincing. Liars may have 
adjusted their behaviour in response to the supportive interviewer’s behaviour by 
providing fewer details in response to the question they had not prepared for.  
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 The temporal connectives finding provides support for Schank’s (1986) script 
theory, and the suggestion that temporal connectives act as retrieval cues (Kintsch & 
Mannes, 1987). A script is a mental construct that details a sequence of events 
necessary to achieve a goal.  For example, a restaurant script outlines the actions 
required in order have a meal, which involves taking a seat and placing an order, 
before waiting for the food to arrive.  It was speculated that truth tellers and liars 
formulated a script of how to prepare Room A for a seminar. Theoretically, although 
neither truth tellers nor liars are likely to have a strong script for preparing the room 
(compared to a more common activity, such as eating in a restaurant), truth tellers 
should have a stronger script than liars, because they had acted out the sequence of 
events, rather than solely using their imagination (see Duran, Hall, McCarthy & 
McNamara, 2010). When truth tellers recalled how they prepared the room in 
reverse order, they used connectives that reflected the reverse order. Temporal 
connectives are thought to act as retrieval cues. Overall, this suggests that truth 
tellers reorganised their scripts with great ease; a process that was aided by their 
strong retrieval cues. As liars did not actually experience preparing the room, when 
they reordered their script, the links between each episode were weaker, which in 
turn resulted in fewer reverse order connectives. 
 An alternative explanation for the connectives results is that liars experienced 
greater cognitive load when asked to reorder their script. Cognitive Load Theory 
posits that all humans have finite mental resources. Several aspects of lying can 
increase cognitive load (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981), and the reverse 
order instruction is known to make lying even more difficult (Vrij et al, 2008). 
Arguably, liars were disadvantaged by having a less detailed script for preparing 
Room A; this may have made the task of reorganising their script more mentally 
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taxing. Having knowledge of a script that can be applied in a certain situation 
requires less thinking and mental activity (Schank, 1986). Therefore, when liars 
recalled the preparation task in reverse order, they may not have had the mental 
resources available to use connectives that reflect a reverse order recollection.  
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that having a silent second interviewer 
behave supportively elicits cues to deceit. Manipulating the demeanour of the first 
interviewer did not appear to have any influence on interviewees’ responses. 
Therefore, Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that the most effective use of a two 
interviewer protocol is to have a neutral first interviewer (who asks all the 
questions), and a supportive second interviewer (who remains silent). While these 
findings were integrated into Experiments 3a and 3b (a supportive second 
interviewer was used), the focus shifted away from interviewer demeanour, and 
instead examined other ways of using two interviewers.  
Experiment 3a examined the effect of changing the interviewers half-way 
through an interview on two cues to deceit; detail and consistency. In a mock 
suspect interview, participants either lied or told the truth about a secret security 
meeting they had attended, answering a question in normal chronological order at 
Stage 1, and a question in reverse order at Stage 2. Therefore, while the scenario in 
Experiment 3a differed significantly from Experiments 1 and 2, participants in 
Experiment 3a (and Experiment 3b) were once again required to recall episodic 
memories. Experiment 3a adopted a similar approach to Experiments 1 and 2 in 
terms of the interview schedule, however, the time references ‘Stages 1 and 2’ were 
introduced to bring clarity to when each question was asked and when the 
experimental manipulations were implemented.  
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The manipulation of the interviewers was implemented between Stages 1 and 
2, and differed from previous experiments in that, for half of the interviews, the pair 
of interviewers changed and for the other half the interviewers did not change. In the 
‘same interviewers’ condition, the same pair of interviewers conducted the entire 
interview. In the ‘changed interviewers’ condition, the two interviewers conducting 
the interview were replaced with two new interviewers at a predetermined point. In 
all cases, the first (speaking) interviewer was neutral and the second (silent) 
interviewer was supportive. Five predictions were made about the impact of 
changing the interviewers on truth tellers’ and liars’ responses. It was predicted that 
at Stage Two, truth tellers would provide more new details than liars (Hypothesis 
1a), particularly when confronted with new interviewers (Hypothesis 1b). It was 
further predicted that overall, truth tellers would be more detailed than liars 
(Hypothesis 2a). The fourth prediction stated that truth tellers would be more 
detailed in the ‘changed interviewers’ condition compared to the ‘same interviewers’ 
condition, whereas liars would be less detailed in the ‘changed interviewers’ 
condition compared to the ‘same interviewers’ condition.  (Hypothesis 2b). The fifth 
and final prediction was that truth tellers would repeat more at Stage Two what they 
have said at Stage One in the ‘changed interviewers’ condition compared to the 
‘same interviewers’ condition, and conversely, that liars would show less repetition 
in the ‘changed interviewers’ condition compared to the ‘same interviewers’ 
condition (Hypothesis 3). All hypotheses were supported with the exception of 
Hypothesis 1b.  
Experiment 3a makes two contributions to the literature on deception and 
consistency.  First, when confronted with two new interviewers, truth tellers’ 
tendency to ‘reconstruct’ and liars’ tendency to ‘repeat’ may have been weakened, 
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resulting in truth tellers repeating themselves more, and liars repeating themselves 
less. Second, the findings also add to the ongoing debate about whether liars are 
more or less consistent than truth tellers. Experiment 3a makes it clear that 
consistency is an unreliable cue to deceit (Fisher, Leins & Vrij, 2013), and that 
various factors can affect the degree to which truth tellers and liars appear 
consistent. This thesis highlights that interviewer demeanour can have a dramatic 
effect on consistency as a cue to deceit. More precisely, the findings in Experiments 
1 and 3a suggest that a two-interviewer protocol can either discourage or encourage 
truth tellers’ and liars’ default retrieval strategies. Experiment 1 suggests that a 
supportive interviewer strengthens reconstruction (truth tellers) and repetition (liars). 
Experiment 3a suggests that the introduction of two new interviewers discourages 
the use of these strategies. It may be that the degree to which a retrieval strategy is 
used is determined by how effective it appears to be. If participants think they are 
being believed, their default strategy is encouraged, if not, then their default strategy 
is discouraged. It is a fair assumption that a supportive interviewer caused 
participants to think they were being convincing. Liars are known to monitor their 
targets for any indication that they are being believed or not (Buller & Burgoon, 
1996). Experiment 1 suggests that truth tellers also pay attention to their targets. 
Therefore, when a supportive second interviewer provides positive feedback, he or 
she acts as a kind of social reinforcement, encouraging and strengthening the 
participant’s current behaviour. Conversely, Experiment 3a suggests that the 
‘Changing Interviewers’ manipulation was interpreted by interviewees as a sign of 
suspicion, which would explain why it discouraged truth tellers and liars from 
adopting their default retrieval strategies.  
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 The idea that external feedback can encourage or discourage a default strategy 
may explain the findings pertaining to detail in Experiment 2. Perhaps the supportive 
interviewer encouraged participants’ default strategies when responding to expected 
questions. The way in which truth tellers and liars naturally respond to expected 
questions is likely to be very different. Liars have prepared for expected questions, 
therefore their strategy for such questions may be to give as detailed answers as 
possible to such questions. As mentioned previously, a supportive interviewer could 
have encouraged liars to give a particularly detailed version of their prepared 
response. Truth tellers do not prepare themselves as much as liars prior to an 
interview (Hartwig et al., 2007), rather they believe that the truth will “shine 
through”. Therefore, their default strategy for expected questions may be to simply 
provide an adequate response, and to wait for more follow-up questions.  
 Neither truth tellers nor liars can prepare for an unanticipated question. 
However, that does not rule out the formulation of an ad hoc strategy in the moments 
before providing a response. Liars’ default strategy for an unexpected question is not 
likely to involve providing a detailed response, as liars struggle to fabricate new 
details (Köhnken, 1996, 2004; Leal et al., 2015), and are discouraged from adding 
new details (Hartwig et al., 2007; Masip & Ces, 2011; Nahari et al., 2012a). 
Assuming that liars adopted a strategy of providing just enough details, this strategy 
would have been encouraged by the supportive interviewer, who provided positive 
feedback and social reinforcement. Truth tellers’ default strategy for unexpected 
questions may be exactly the same as their strategy for expected questions: To 
provide an adequate response. Taken together, the proposed impact of interviewer 
demeanour on default response strategies offers an explanation of the findings in 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3a.  
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Experiment 3b examined the effect of deliberate mimicry on detail as a cue 
to deceit. In an interview, participants either told the truth or lied about a meeting 
they had attended.  In half of the interviews, the second interviewer deliberately 
mimicked participants’ behaviour. Therefore, Experiment 3b differed from all 
previous experiments in a few ways. First, it was the first investigation to recruit a 
supportive second interviewer who also mimicked interviewees’ behaviour. Second, 
in no previous experiments were liars instructed to provide a mixture of truthful and 
false information in response to specific questions during the interview. Third, 
Experiment 3b examined detail in two ways; the amount of details provided and the 
accuracy of details provided.  
As predicted, deliberate mimicry resulted in truth tellers providing more 
detailed responses than liars. No differences emerged between truth tellers and liars 
in the non-mimicry condition. In addition, the results revealed that liars volunteered 
significantly less accurate information when they were mimicked.  
 Experiment 3b contributes to mimicry literature in a few ways. The finding 
that deliberate mimicry elicited detailed responses from truth tellers supports 
previous research that being mimicked makes people more cooperative and 
compliant (Van Baaren et al., 2003, 2004; Maddux, Mullen and Galins, 2008; 
Fischer-Lokou et al., 2011; Guéguen et al., 2011). Mimicry had no effect on the 
amount of detail in liars’ responses, possibly due to their inability to fabricate new 
details (Köhnken, 1996, 2004; Leal et al., 2015) or their concern that adding new 
information may reveal their guilt (Hartwig et al., 2007; Masip & Ces, 2011; Nahari 
et al., 2012a). 
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On a more fundamental level, the findings support the hypothesis that 
humans have a pervasive need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The 
belongingness hypothesis posits that humans have a strong desire to form and 
maintain positive interpersonal attachments. An interview is simply another 
opportunity for two or more human beings to establish new bonds. Deliberate 
mimicry appeared to foster a strong relationship between truth tellers and the 
interviewers, resulting in more detailed responses (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & 
Chartrand, 2003). In contrast, deliberate mimicry had a negative effect on liars by 
reducing the amount of accurate detail they volunteered. One possible explanation 
for this finding is that being mimicked discouraged liars from cooperating. Mimicry 
is believed to create an unconscious bond between interaction partners (Barsalou, 
Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003). However, rather than forge a bond, mimicry 
appeared to have the opposite effect and this may have something to do with rapport. 
The impact that rapport has on deceptive suspects has not been examined in great 
detail. It’s not clear whether rapport encourages or discourages liars to cooperate 
(this idea is discussed further below in the Future Research section). The real 
question is whether deceptive suspects are interested in establishing rapport with an 
investigative interviewer. There are conceivable benefits to doing so, certainly if this 
helps a liars to appear convincing. However, rapport itself is defined as being 
founded upon a shared interest (Newberry and Stubbs, 1990), and there is a clear 
conflict of interests between liars and their targets. If liars are not motivated to 
establish a rapport, this could explain why any attempt to facilitate a social bond 
may have the opposite effect. Perhaps, for the liars in Experiment 3b, rather than 
generate rapport, mimicry highlighted the conflict of interests between deceiver and 
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target.  If the deliberate mimicry did minimise the rapport between liars and the 
interviewer, this may explain why liars volunteered less accurate information.  
Experiment 4 used the data from Experiment 3a in a deception detection 
study. The purpose of the study was to determine whether training participants to 
look for repetition as a cue to deceit can improve detection efficiency. Participants 
read extracts from transcripts generated from the interviews conducted in 
Experiment 3a. More precisely, participants in Experiment 4 read responses to the 
normal and reverse order questions provided by interviewees in Experiment 3a. Half 
of the participants in Experiment 4 were instructed to look for evidence of repetition 
in the reverse order responses. After reading the transcripts, all participants made a 
veracity judgement, citing the judgement cues they used. The results rejected all but 
one of the five predictions. Although participants in the ‘instruction’ condition 
indicated that they did use consistency as a cue to deceit, the instruction had no 
effect on detection efficiency, rejecting Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, judges who read 
transcripts of interviewees in the ‘changed interviewers’ condition were no more 
accurate than judges who read transcripts of interviewees in the ‘same interviewers’ 
condition, rejecting Hypothesis 2. The ‘Instruction’ and ‘Interviewer’ manipulations 
combined had no effect on overall accuracy, rejecting Hypothesis 3. Truth tellers’ 
transcripts were not rated as being more plausible than liars’, rejecting Hypothesis 4. 
Finally, the majority of the participants in the ‘instruction’ condition cited 
consistency as a cue to deceit, supporting Hypothesis 5.  
Experiment 4 contributes to the literature examining consistency as a cue to 
deceit in suspect testimony. The results support the contention that inconsistency 
between two accounts is the most frequently cited reason for discrediting another 
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human being (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 2000; Granhag, Strömwall & Jonsson, 
2003). Participants in the ‘no instruction’ group cited consistency as a cue to deceit 
more than any other cue. While consistency certainly should be regarded as a cue to 
deceit, this thesis demonstrates that consistency can be determined by external 
factors such as interviewer demeanour. Veracity alone does not determine whether 
consistency emerges as a cue to deceit. Therefore, Experiment 4 supports previous 
research implying that judges do not rely on the wrong cues, rather that the cues 
themselves are faint and unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011). 
This thesis supports the recommendation that lie detection will be improved by 
creating stronger cues to deceit, and not by learning about the characteristics of 
deceptive behaviour (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). There is a compelling sense that 
judges do not have the cues at their disposal to effectively detect deceit.  
In sum, the findings discussed here provide evidence that a second 
supportive interviewer elicits cues to deceit. Combined with deliberate mimicry, a 
second supportive interviewer can encourage truth tellers to say more, which in turn 
can magnify the differences between truth tellers and liars. In terms of detail, a 
supportive second interviewer effectively differentiated liars and truth tellers by 
encouraging truth tellers i) to provide more information (Experiments 2 and 3b), ii) 
to provide more accurate information (Experiment 3b), iii) and to provide more new 
information (Experiments 1 and 3a). A two-interviewer protocol also elicited 
consistency as a cue to deceit (Experiments 1 and 3a).  
7.2 Practical Implications 
A second supportive interviewer. The findings discussed here represent the first 
attempt to examine and understand a two interviewer protocol of this nature. It is too 
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early at this stage to recommend that practitioners adopt the two-interviewer 
protocol tested in this thesis. Clearly, this strategy shows promise of being an 
effective means of collecting detailed accounts and catching out liars, but this 
research is still in its infancy. On 9th December, 2014, the United States Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) released a summary of a report on the 
Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program. Crucially, the 
summary showed that the torture methods described therein were ineffective in 
acquiring intelligence or encouraging cooperation. The contents of the report led to 
international condemnation of the agency’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” and 
highlighted the need for ethical and effective means of information gathering, 
particularly in intelligence settings. The findings presented here contribute to 
forensic interviewing in a few ways: 
Supportive interviewing. In all experiments, the presence of a supportive 
interviewer helped to differentiate truth tellers and liars. Therefore, one 
recommendation offered to practitioners is to have forensic interviewers behave 
supportively. This is not the first time this recommendation has been made. This 
thesis directly supports previous research highlighting good practice in interviewing 
children, witnesses and suspects (see Bull, 2010, Fisher, 2010, Kassin, Appleby, & 
Torkildson-Perillo, 2010; Meissner, Redlich, Batt, & Brandon, 2012; Vrij, 2011, for 
recent reviews), and indirectly the growing support for a rapport-building approach 
to investigative interviewing (Meissner, Redlich, Bhatt, & Brandon, 2013). 
Therefore, the option to train and use supportive interviewers in real life forensic 
interviews should be taken very seriously. Practitioners may benefit from working 
with researchers to formulate a new protocol and to determine which behaviours will 
reliably show support of an interviewee’s testimony. This new protocol should be 
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extensively tested and reviewed (in real world forensic interviews) with reference to 
the latest research in investigative interviewing and the rapport-building approach to 
ensure its efficacy and longevity. There is real scope to use a supportive interviewer 
to better meet the overarching goal of investigative interviewing; to obtain detailed 
accounts from interviewees (Fisher, 2010).  
 Encouraging interviewees to say more. A supportive second interviewer is 
one method that can encourage truth tellers and liars (in certain conditions) to say 
more, and there are several benefits to encouraging real life interviewees (suspects 
and witnesses) to do the same. The first obvious benefit is the increased level of 
detail in interviewees’ accounts, which may help investigators to gain access to 
crucial information that in other interviews may not have been volunteered. Second, 
encouraging suspects to provide detailed accounts will help truth tellers to prove 
their innocence and liars to trip themselves up. Detailed testimony offers more 
opportunities for investigators to verify certain details and to spot any 
inconsistencies. In addition, encouraging detailed responses may help investigators 
to focus in on certain topics. For example, encouraging all suspects interviewed for 
the same crime to provide detailed accounts may show that one suspect is offering 
less detail in their responses. This on its own does not indicate deceit, but may be 
cause for investigators to examine more closely the suspect who offers less detail. 
The investigation of detail as a cue to deceit is ongoing, but encouraging detailed 
responses may help magnify the differences between truth tellers and liars, as 
demonstrated in this thesis. Finally, evoking detailed responses from interviewees 
may help to highlight differences in responses to expected and unexpected questions, 
which was a cue to deceit in Experiment 2. This approach exploits the fact that liars 
cannot prepare for unexpected questions, while also encouraging liars to give 
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particularly detailed accounts in response to expected questions. Overall, any 
method that helps in some way to reveal the truth will help reduce miscarriages of 
justice and ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice.  
7.3 Future Research 
The second interviewer. In every experiment in this thesis, the second interviewer 
was silent. In Mann et al. (2013), judges rated that interviewees looked at a (silent) 
second interviewer less than ten percent of the time. Interviewees probably didn’t 
pay that much attention to the second interviewer simply because this interviewer 
was silent. Despite this, the second interviewer’s demeanour still had an effect on 
interviewees’ responses. If liars do monitor their targets to gauge whether they are 
being believed or not (Buller & Burgoon, 1996), drawing more attention to the 
second interviewer (and their demeanour) may enhance his or her overall impact.  
This idea should be explored by future research. There are several ways in which 
interviewees could be encouraged to pay more attention to the second interviewer.  
One obvious avenue to pursue is to have the second interviewer involved in the 
questioning. There is a clear rationale for thinking that an extra speaking interviewer 
will draw more of the interviewees’ attention than an extra silent interviewer. First, 
simply as a result of the verbal interaction, interviewees will pay more attention to 
the second interviewer’s demeanour. Second, a speaking interviewer can show that 
they are actively listening to what the interviewee has to say. This informs the 
interviewee that this extra interviewer is paying attention, and that they are involved 
in the analysis of the testimony. Third, a talking second interviewer shows that they 
have an active and important role in the interview schedule, as opposed to a passive 
silent interviewer who has no involvement in the questioning.  
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 Having a speaking second interviewer offers new ways for that interviewer to 
express support for the interviewee’s testimony. While this thesis shows that 
manipulating the non-verbal behaviour of the second interviewer can be effective, 
the scope for showing support via non-verbal gestures is quite limited.  The same 
cannot be said of verbal behaviour. There is a wealth of opportunity for future 
researchers to use language in order to have a second interviewer behave 
supportively. The possibilities are seemingly endless. There are many more ways to 
experiment with the combination and intonation of words than there are with simple 
gestures and posture. This thesis has explored new territory by testing a silent second 
interviewer in a variety of ways, and showing that a supportive second interviewer 
can elicit cues to deceit. The next logical step is to explore the potential benefits of a 
supportive speaking interviewer.  
 One note of caution regarding the testing and implementation of a second 
supportive interviewer is that at certain times, behaving supportively may appear 
odd or unnerving. For example, if the first interviewer is asking particularly difficult 
questions which prompt an admission of guilt (in a real life forensic interview this 
could relate to a particularly heinous or shameful act), an overly supportive second 
interviewer (adopting the mannerisms tested in this thesis) could have a negative 
impact on the interviewee. The degree to which a second interviewer should be 
supportive must take into account the nature of the questioning and responses, and 
should therefore be fluid. Based on the findings presented here, a second interviewer 
may be best employed during certain stages of an interview where it is deemed that 
they will have the greatest impact. For example, the second interviewer could be 
present at the beginning of the interview to establish and build rapport, then he or 
she could remove themselves for a brief period during the particularly difficult 
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stages of the interview, returning shortly after to continue to provide a source of 
support for the remainder of the questioning. Future research should also examine 
ways in which a second interviewer can be supportive in a more subtle way, notably 
during stages of the interview where the questions are emotionally challenging.  
 Rapport. A growing body of literature now supports the rapport-building 
approach to investigative interviewing rather than an accusatorial style (Meissner, 
2011; Redlich, Bhatt, & Brandon, 2013). Understanding and building rapport is 
becoming an increasingly important goal for lie detection researchers and 
practitioners. While rapport was not examined directly in this thesis, the second 
interviewer’s impact may in part have resulted from fostering rapport. For example, 
the nonverbal behaviours displayed by the supportive interviewer (smiling, leaning 
forward, head nodding, and maintaining gaze) are all behaviours that are associated 
with perceptions of warmth (Rosenfeld, 1966; Burgoon, Buller, Hale, & deTurck, 
1984; Kleinke, 1986; Coker & Burgoon, 1987; Burgoon, 1991) and behavioural 
mimicry has been directly linked with building rapport between interaction partners 
and cooperation in social interactions (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999;Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003; Maddux, Mullen & Galins, 2008; Stel, van Baaren, & Vonk, 2008; Guéguen, 
Martin, & Meineri, 2011).  If the second interviewer did generate rapport, it likely 
impacted on truth tellers and liars differently.  Greater rapport between interviewer 
and truth telling interviewees may explain why that truth tellers were encouraged to 
say more. Indeed, researchers believe rapport can encourage interviewees to 
cooperate and engage in free discussion (Buckwalter, 1983). It is harder to speculate 
on what impact rapport may have had on liars, particularly if rapport is a 
“…harmonious, empathic, or sympathetic relation or connecting to another self” 
(Newberry and Stubbs, 1990, p. 14). This definition implies the forging of a bond, 
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borne out of a common interest, but a deceptive suspect and an investigative 
interviewer do not share a common goal. What role then, does rapport play between 
liars and interviewers? Perhaps rapport has no impact (or even a negative impact, see 
Experiment 3b) on liars until it reaches an important threshold; the point at which 
the strength of the bond created by rapport persuades a liar to offer truthful 
information. Rapport may not have to reach a threshold where truth tellers are 
concerned. In contrast, rapport may build immediately in light of the shared interests 
between truth tellers and interviewers. This notion would explain the positive 
findings yielded from having a supportive second interviewer present.  
Future research should focus on establishing whether a supportive second 
interviewer does foster rapport. This could be achieved simply by examining the 
relationship between interviewees and the interviewer using the definition of rapport 
above. Note that in none of the experiments reported here was a liar instructed that 
they could switch to being a truth teller during the interview. If a supportive second 
interviewer does generate rapport, the next step would be to test whether this rapport 
can turn liars into truth tellers, and the best way to achieve this. 
7.4 Limitations 
The One Interviewer Protocol. One obvious limitation of all the experiments 
presented here is the lack of a one-interviewer control condition. Such a comparison 
may have been useful. Being able to show that a two-interviewer protocol is superior 
(or inferior) to a one-interviewer protocol (albeit in an experimental setting) would 
have strengthened the overall contribution of this research.  However, to the author’s 
knowledge, this thesis is the first examination of a second interviewer in mock 
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forensic interviews, and the lack of research examining a two-interviewer protocol 
was the driving force behind this thesis.  
Reverse order recall. In all experiments, participants were required to recall the 
same information in two ways: first, in normal chronological order and again in 
reverse chronological order. In addition to the three main aims of this thesis, one 
more minor aim was to build on previous research showing that the reverse order 
instruction can elicit cues to deceit; the findings presented in this thesis support this 
contention.  However, comparing reverse order responses with normal order 
responses may attract some criticism, as the reverse order instruction could be 
considered a confound. The author accepts that the reverse order instruction may 
have impacted on the results by interacting with the experimental manipulations, and 
it is not possible to know the degree to which this instruction effected the results. 
Despite this, considering the variation in the designs adopted (in terms of how the 
second interviewer was employed) and the consistent pattern of results across all 
experiments, it seems likely that the reverse order instruction did not have a greater 
effect than the manipulation of the second interviewer.   
Consistency. When consistency is rated objectively, each statement from the second 
recollection (Time 2, or T2) is compared with the first recollection (Time 1, or T1; 
note that T1 and T2 are comparable to Stages 1 and Stage 2 as described in 
Experiment 3a, however, the references T1 and T2 are used here as they reflect the 
wider literature relating to consistency coding), and categorised as being either 
consistent (a statement at T1 that is correctly repeated at T2), contradictory (a 
statement at T2 that contradicts a statement at T1), reminiscent (new information at 
T2 not mentioned in T1), or forgotten (a statement at T1 that is not present at T2, see 
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Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2013). One general limitation of these findings is that only 
repetitions are included in the analyses of consistency (including the subjective 
ratings), as no findings emerged for the other measures of consistency. In 
Experiments 1 and 3a, the number of statements at T1 that were repeated at T2 were 
measured. Repetition is only one measure of consistency, and yet the findings have 
been related to consistency without recognition of this limitation. Critics of the 
findings presented here could argue that repetition on its own does not reflect 
consistency as a whole.  
   There is one other limitation that relates to the ‘Meeting events checklist’ used 
to objectively code consistency in Experiment 3a. The checklist in question divided 
the secret meeting into 18 key events. The checklist had two columns side by side to 
code the T1 and T2 recollections. At T1 and T2, the coder simply marked whether 
each of the 18 key events was mentioned correctly. After coding both recollections, 
the coder was able to determine each measure of consistency by simply comparing 
the two columns. An event mentioned at T1 and T2 represented a repetition, and 
event mentioned only at T1 represented an omission, and an event only mentioned at 
T2 represented a commission. Contradictions were determined by making a direct 
comparison between corresponding events between the T1 and T2.  This method 
was used as it enabled the transcripts to be coded in less time. The downfall of this 
approach is that participants could mention details that would not be captured by the 
checklist, as they could be beyond the scope of the 18 events listed. This approach is 
weaker than coding each individual statement provided by participants. In using a 
checklist which could not account for every detail provided, inevitably, some 
examples of consistency and inconsistency have not been coded.  
159 
 
Stakes. Stakes are an important factor in deception research, as participants in low 
stakes settings (such as those tested in this thesis) may behave differently from real 
life suspects where the consequences are much more grave (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 
2002; Vrij & Granhag, 2012).  
This thesis shows that a second interviewer can elicit cues to deceit in mock 
suspect interviews, but testing in a high stakes setting would have increased the 
overall credibility of this research. Recent studies on high stakes deception highlight 
the importance of context in deceptive behaviour, and how some cues displayed in 
low stakes settings do not always arise in high stakes settings (Porter, 2010; Whelan, 
Wagstaff, & Wheatcroft, 2013). Experiments 1-4 show that relatively subtle 
manipulations can profoundly affect how interviewees respond. Given that the 
interviewee’s experience is qualitatively different in a high stakes interview, the way 
in which a second interviewer is interpreted and attended to may also be different. In 
a high stakes setting, a second interviewer could have an altogether different impact 
on interviewees. Note that the overwhelming majority of participants were 
undergraduate students who may respond differently to real life suspects presented 
with a supportive second interviewer.  It is possible that hardened criminals interpret 
the supportive mannerisms tested in this thesis differently, and could even be 
suspicious of such behaviour, especially if it conflicts with their previous experience 
of forensic interviewers. It also possible that a high stakes setting may enhance a 
second interviewer’s ability to elicit cues to deceit, though this remains unclear.  
In all the experiments described in this thesis, great care was taken to raise 
the stakes in an ethical and realistic way. Evidence that the stakes were raised lies in 
the fact that several participants expressed that the meeting scenarios made them 
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nervous. However, for good reason, there is a limit to how high the stakes can be 
raised in an experimental setting, and this limitation must be respected. It is 
therefore crucial that future research replicates the findings discussed here in a high 
stakes setting.  
‘No comment’ interviewees. In many jurisdictions all over the world, suspects have 
the right to remain silent during an investigative interview (Bucke, Street, & Brown, 
2000). Research conducted in the UK suggests that around 5% of suspects opt to 
remain silent (Moston, Stephenson, & Williamson, 1993).  Therefore, while it is a 
notable limitation of this research that it can only be applied to interviews where the 
interviewee is prepared to talk, in most cases interviewees cooperate by providing a 
verbal response (Baldwin, 1993). 
7.5 Conclusions 
This thesis offers three key findings that contribute to the deception literature and 
forensic interviewing. First, that investigative interviewers may benefit from 
adopting a supportive demeanour in suspect interviews. Second, that a second 
interviewer can be used to evoke detailed responses and elicit cues to deceit.  
Finally, whether consistency emerges as a cue to deceit is dependent on situational 
factors. The findings support previous research relating to good practice in 
investigative interviewing, and therefore contribute to real life forensic interviewing.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
 
Experiment 1: Interview schedule 
 
1. What is your job, and how many hours a week do you work? 
2. Where are you living at the moment? 
3. How long have you been in your job? 
4. Where do you work? 
5. Can you describe in detail how you get from home to work? 
6. Can you describe in detail how you get from here to work? 
7. Please describe the layout of your place of work in as much detail as you can. 
8. There must be one single experience in your job that must stand out - what is that?  
What happened? 
9. Can you describe a typical day at work/shift, hour by hour? 
10. Can you tell me about a recent interaction or event that you were involved in within the 
last week that occurred in your workplace?  
11. If you were training me to do your job for a day, what things would I need to know 
about it? 
12. Could you please describe your boss?   
13. Can you list your reasons and motivations for doing your job? 
14. Can you list the negative aspects about your job? 
15. Can you describe in detail how you get from your work to home? To clarify, I’d now 
like you to recall your journey from home to work in reverse chronological order. 
Therefore, starting from your work, I’d like you to work backwards and explain the 
journey in reverse order.  
16. Can you describe in detail how you get from your work to here? To clarify, I’d now 
like you to recall your journey from here to work in reverse chronological order. 
Therefore, starting from your work, I’d like you to work backwards and explain the 
journey in reverse order. 
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Appendix 2 
Experiment 2: Interview schedule: Part A 
First interviewer: My name is Sarah and I will be interviewing you today. I am a trainee 
investigator and I am accompanied by a senior investigator, Jackie, who is an expert in lie 
detection. We have reason to believe that some information was illegally accessed from our 
servers in this building. The incident in question took place earlier today. Our records show 
that you were in the building at this time, preparing Room A for a seminar. I will now ask 
you some questions about what you did in Room A. If you are ready, we will start the 
interview.  
Part A 
Q1: Giving as much detail as possible, please describe everything you saw in room A. 
Q2: Again, giving as much detail as possible, please describe all the things you did whilst 
inside Room A in the exact order in which you did them. 
First interviewer: I am now going to ask you to describe the locations of some of the items in 
room A. When you answer, I would like you to make reference to where the item was in relation 
to at least two other items in the room. For example if I asked ‘where was the sofa’ an 
appropriate answer might be ‘the sofa was to the left of the door and opposite a purple chair’. 
Q3: In relation to at least two other items, can you tell me where the materials (articles, pads, 
and pens) were when you entered the room? 
Q4: Again, in relation to at least two other items, can you tell me where the Attendance Sheet 
was when you entered the room? 
First interviewer: I want to now ask you about how you arranged the room as part of the 
preparation. 
Q5: Please describe exactly how you arranged the four different chairs you placed under the 
tables? 
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First interviewer: I am now going to ask you to describe again everything you did in room A 
only this time I would like you to tell me in reverse chronological order. This will mean starting 
with the last thing you did in the room and ending with the first thing you did. 
Q6: Please now describe, in reverse chronological order, exactly what you did in Room A? 
First interviewer: I’m going to ask you again about some objects in the room only this time I 
would like you to answer as if you were standing in front of the flip chart, facing the chairs and 
tables.  
Q7: Please tell me where the Attendance Sheet was located after you arranged the room? 
Q8: Can you tell me where the materials (articles, pads, and pens) were located after you had 
sorted through them? 
Q9: Please describe the final position of the black office chair in relation to the other 3 coloured 
chairs that you arranged?  E.g. Which coloured chairs were either side of the black chair etc. 
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Appendix 3 
Experiment 3: Complete interview schedule 
Stage 1 
Before we start, I will explain a little about how the interview will be conducted. I will be 
asking all the questions, and I am joined by a silent interviewer, who will monitor your 
responses. Now, the silent interviewer has been trained to detect lies in interviews, and will 
help determine whether you are telling the truth.   
In this interview, we will discuss the content of a meeting that you recently attended with 
members of HMI. We know that the aim of the meeting was to decide on a suitable location 
to plant a spy device. First of all, we would like to know about where the meeting took place. 
1. Please describe in as much detail as possible the room where you attended the 
meeting. 
2. I’d now like you to recall what happened during the meeting. That is, start from 
the moment you entered the meeting room, and describe to me what happened 
from that point onwards until the end of the meeting.  
We would now like to talk to you about the location that was rejected, that is, the location 
that was not chosen to host the device. Please try to provide as much detail as you can to the 
following questions:  
3. Please describe what type of building it was and the layout of this building.  
4. Ok, now I would like you tell me the exact location - at the rejected site – where 
the device would be planted? 
5. What would have made this location suitable? 
6. What was the downside of this location? 
7. Is there any information you wish to add about this site? 
Now we would like to talk to you about the site that was selected, that is, the location that 
was chosen to host the device. Again, please try to provide as much detail as you can to the 
following questions:  
8. Please describe what type of building it was and the layout of this building  
9. Ok, now I would like you tell me the exact location - at the selected site – where 
the device would be planted? 
10. Why was this location thought to be suitable? 
11. Was there a downside to this location? 
12. Is there any information you wish to add about this site? 
13. Moving on to the device, please can you provide me with a detailed description of 
the device? That is, please tell us everything you know about the device. Even 
features you may think are irrelevant. 
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14. Is there any information you wish to add about the device?  
15. I’d like to focus now on the other members that were present at the meeting with 
you. We have some photos we would like to show you, and these may or may not 
include the individuals who attended the meeting with you.  For each photo we 
show you, please say whether he or she was at the meeting. If you identify 
someone, please then tell us all you know about this person.  
Interviewer manipulation 
A note is presented to the speaking interviewer. The interviewers remain or swap depending 
on the condition.  
Stage 2 
16. I’d now like you to recall what happened during the meeting in reverse 
chronological order. That is, start from the moment you left the meeting room, and 
describe to me what happened from that point backwards until the beginning of 
the meeting.  
17. I would now like you to draw the floor plan of the location that was selected.  I 
also want you to mark with an ‘X’ the exact location where the device would be 
planted. Take your time and try to include as many details as possible.  While you 
are sketching, please describe in words the plan and the device location. 
18. I now want to turn the focus back to the device. I want to you describe the device 
for me again, but this time I want you to close your eyes when you do so. 
Research has shown that closing your eyes can help with memory recall. So, 
closing your eyes before you answer, please can you provide me with a detailed 
description of the device? That is, please tell us anything you know about the 
device? Even features you may think are irrelevant?  
19. We’ll now focus on the other members that were present in the meeting with you. 
Please sketch each of the people who were present during the meeting in as much 
detail as you can remember. Again, also describe in words what you are sketching.  
20. I am now going to show you photos again. As before, for each photo we show 
you, please say whether he or she was at the meeting with you. If you identify 
someone, please then tell us all you know about this person. 
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Appendix 4 
 
Experiment 3a: Meeting events checklist 
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Appendix 5 
Experiment 3b: Accurate detail coding sheets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3  
Members Appearance Checklist  
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Appendix 6 
Evidence of favourable ethical review for Experiment 1.  
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Appendix 7 
Evidence of favourable ethical review for Experiment 2.  
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Appendix 8 
Evidence of favourable ethical review for Experiments 3a and 3b.  
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Appendix 9  
Evidence of favourable ethical review for Experiment 4.  
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Appendix 10 
Completed UPR16 Form (updated 4.8.15). 
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